Politics China's Economy and Politics

China on a charme offensive due to decoupling. Don't fall for it.

People like him think that:

"I think there is a lot of hyperbole around this. And I'm not sure whether the (de-risking) measures the EU or U.S. are considering match the scale of the risk," said Dan Marks, research fellow for energy security at the Royal United Services think tank.

Better not think but know what will happen. For people so shortsighted it's astonishing what jobs they do.

China strong bullying everyone China weak comes crawled to get strong to bully later.

Best indicators is if your populace is leaving and taking all their money with them. From Xis paradise where he locked them up for three years.
Only fools believe in him and what he says.

Gold Bars and Tokyo Apartments: How Money Is Flowing Out of China. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/28/business/china-money-overseas.html?smid=nytcore-android-share

Gold Bars and Tokyo Apartments: How Money Is Flowing Out of China.​

Chinese families are sending money overseas, a sign of worry about the country’s economic and political future. But a cheaper currency is also helping exports.
In some cases, Chinese are improvising to get around China’s strict government controls on transferring money overseas. They have bought gold bars small enough to be scattered unobtrusively through carry-on luggage, as well as large stacks of foreign currency.
Affluent Chinese have moved hundreds of billions of dollars out of the country this year, seizing on the end of Covid precautions that had almost completely sealed China’s borders for nearly three years.

Beijing has also banned most overseas investments in hotels, office towers and other assets of little geopolitical value. The architect of China’s foreign investment curbs, Pan Gongsheng, was promoted in July to become governor of the central bank, the People’s Bank of China.
They are using their savings to buy overseas apartments, stocks and insurance policies. Able to fly again to Tokyo, London and New York, Chinese travelers have bought apartments in Japan and poured money into accounts in the United States or Europe that pay higher interest than in China, where rates are low and falling.
At a Bank of China branch on Hong Kong’s Kowloon peninsula, mainlanders were waiting on a recent morning at 7:30 to open accounts, 90 minutes before the bank was set to open. The line was so long by 8 a.m. that anyone arriving later was lucky to reach the front of the line before the end of the workday, said Valerius Luo, a Hong Kong insurance agent.
Families are then typically putting $30,000 to $50,000 in U.S. currency into insurance products, several times more than before, as they search for safe places to park their savings, Mr. Luo said. “There are still people with powerful capital,” he said, “and they want an investment package that preserves value.”

Around 50 bill. a month are leaving China.

Nearly missed this gem here.

Third largest investmentbank prohibits its employees to publish bad news regarding the Chinese economy.

Very interesting article I'll translate later.

Alicia Hennig teached in Chinese Unis with cameras in the room. She had to sign political disclosure agreements etc.etc. Not an open minded environment to learn or teach. Structural pressure and hierarchies dominanted.

She actually recommends companies leasing China in and interview with the SZ.

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More deflation a downwards spiral is a real risk

German companies don't invest anymore in China - 2,2 bill.€ and - 3,9 bill. € investment capital.

Other western/foreign companies doing the same led to a first net outflow of investment money from China this quarter.

Ah and China super friendly opened the country for Western people. After spraying them with disinfectant during Corona.

Are the tourists wanting family holidays in Xis socialist paradise already flocking there in masses?

Because here in declining Europe I can't get a room for a short ski trip the next weeks...all packed full..
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As 2023 draws to a close, how should we assess progress on the government’s stated objective of ‘stabilisation’ in Australia–China relations?

On the face of it, the Australian government has built significant momentum this year towards restoring relations with China to an even keel. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s visit to Beijing, in early November, was the obvious high point, signalling a diplomatic thaw after a years-long freeze.

We’ve seen the release of Australian journalist Cheng Lei and the prospect of senior Chinese government officials visiting Australia in 2024. And the government can point to some success in the area in which it has put the most focus—securing the winding back of punitive trade barriers Beijing imposed against a range of Australian imports from mid-2020.

Stability is, of course, a laudable aim in the abstract. However, it is becoming increasing clear that the diplomatic rhetoric of stabilisation is wearing very thin (and in fact risks being distracting or self-delusory) when the underlying reality is so at odds—namely, Beijing’s ongoing destabilising behaviour and the fundamental differences in our strategic interests and political systems.

First and foremost, though least obvious, it encourages a damaging relationship-management mindset towards China. This is a common foreign policy trap that Beijing knows how to play to its advantage. Whenever China succeeds in elevating subjectively defined atmospherics as a basis for engagement, it undermines national-interest considerations if the other side accepts that differences should be minimised in order to establish goodwill or to maintain access.

Canberra needs to be careful not to overemphasise a relationship-building approach towards China, especially one centred on personal diplomacy between Albanese and Xi Jinping. In China, the PM said he regarded Xi as an ‘honest and straightforward’ interlocutor. Earlier, he said Xi ‘has never said anything to me that he has not done’. While Albanese may have made such comments in the context and spirit of relationship building, such descriptions are a shaky foundation for a substantive relationship.

The most obvious weakness with ‘stabilisation’ is that it runs directly counter to China’s deliberately destabilising behaviour in the East China Sea, Taiwan Strait and South China Sea and across its land borders with India and Bhutan. This has continued unabated since Labor came to power. In particular, the unsafe and unprofessional use of sonar by a Chinese warship, injuring Australian divers from HMAS Toowoomba right after the PM’s visit to China, dramatically undercut Canberra’s claim to have steadied bilateral relations. This incident forced an immediate course correction from the government, when Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles condemned China’s ‘aggressive’ behaviour, in a media interview in India.

Beyond scripted joint statements issued at international summits, Australia’s ministerial line-up has appeared reluctant to call out China’s escalatory and intimidating behaviour towards the Philippines in recent months. Official statements of concern have seemingly been pushed down to the ambassadorial level.

Labelling Beijing’s actions as destabilising has arguably become harder for the government now that it has made ‘stabilisation’ the main metric of its China policy. That said, the most recent statement issued by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in support of the Philippines marks a noticeable strengthening in our language, though it also highlights the limitations if not contradictions in the government’s stabilisation narrative. It is also abundantly clear that Australia continues to compete geopolitically and directly with China in the South Pacific and that this is driving Canberra’s statecraft in the subregion.

As I wrote in Australia’s security in China’s shadow, the paradigm undergirding the Australia–China relationship swung from economics to geopolitics around a decade ago and won’t swing back again quickly. A competitive, largely adversarial framing is more likely to define the future than one based on expanding cooperation.

Even in the economic arena, where the government’s diplomatic efforts have borne the most tangible fruit, stabilisation is falling short of Canberra’s expectations. Trade Minister Don Farrell has said he is ‘very confident’ that ‘by Christmas’ China will remove all remaining trade impediments against Australia, predicting that ‘we will have restored that stable relationship that we want with our largest trading partner’.

In fact, China is likely to defy Farrell’s optimism by keeping a range of trade restrictions in place. This is Beijing’s best tactic to ensure that Australia remains absorbed in the ‘low politics’ of bilateral trade, averse to the risks of spillover from more contentious policy differences. Businesses desperate to re-enter the Chinese market are likely to counsel caution against holding Beijing to account in their own cause of stabilisation, narrowly defined. China’s efforts to coerce Australia, including through economic means, haven’t ended—they are merely likely to take on new and more pernicious forms.

The other shortcoming of the stabilisation narrative is that it underplays the fact that the primary explanation for China’s fence-mending approach towards Canberra wasn’t Labor’s superior diplomacy in comparison with the previous Coalition government, but Beijing’s own realisation that its efforts to coerce Canberra into a more compliant mindset had failed.

While certain export industries have undeniably suffered as a result of China’s economic punishment campaign, Australia avoided macroeconomic damage because of the success of market diversification efforts, by both government and the business sector. In fact, the value of bilateral trade with China scaled new heights, because China continued to import the commodities it most needed from Australia, at prices inflated partly by its own politically motivated interference.

The most important revelation from China’s attempts to punish Australia economically was Australia’s underlying resilience as a competitive exporter in a global, rules-based trading system. In the final analysis, Australia’s macroeconomic stability was shown not to depend on the political health of its relationship with China.

Foreign Minister Penny Wong has recently transitioned to talking about Australia–China relations in terms of a need to ‘navigate our differences wisely’. As 2024 beckons, with all of its uncertainties, perhaps it’s time to quietly retire ‘stabilisation’ as a narrative that has served its limited purpose.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a...y approach leaves China holding the big stick

How to lead a communist authoritarian system 101

Topics that are considered increasingly sensitive in China’s economy include record high youth unemployment figures (the government stopped publishing this data in August), deflation, the struggling property sector and capital flight.
The restrictions have been building for some time. In June, three finance commentators, one of whom had 4.7 million Weibo followers, were blocked by the platform as a punishment for “hyping up the unemployment rate, spreading negative information … [and] smearing the development of the securities market”.
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Parson bans Chinese and Russian companies from buying land near military sites​

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China has formally handed over the main stadium for this year's Pacific Games in the Solomon Islands' capital Honiara.
Chinese funding has proved a significant theme in preparations for the Games, with the multi-sport event backed to the tune of $SBD1.85 billion ($US220 million).
The state-run China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation completed work on the 10,000-capacity venue set to host opening and closing ceremonies during the Pacific Games, and is due to assist with maintenance for two years.
The stadium, which includes a full-size pitch that can be used for football and rugby, was handed to Solomon Islands at an invite-only ceremony last month where Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare expressed his gratitude to China.
"Today this relationship is taken to new heights as we witness the handing over of the facilities to our country and to our people," Sogavare said, as reported by China's Global Times.
Chinese Ambassador to the Solomon Islands Li Ming described the completion of the Pacific Games stadium as a major landmark in the relationship between the two countries.
"This is a symbol of the China-Solomon Islands friendship and a source of pride for the people of Solomon Islands," Li said.
"It is a significant achievement of the joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative between China and Solomon Islands."
Australia chipped in with 17 million.

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