@Fluff
Merkel has morphed into a typical liberal elitist, but the liberal elites despise Russia. Should Russia ever threaten a NATO member, setting out to undo gay rights and the whole rigmarole, they'd be the baddies even to the left. Make no mistake: The first time democratic Germany has ever participated in a war (i.e. the bombing of Yugoslavia) was initiated by the most pacifist government we've ever had.
Now, Russia is a hardcore capitalist country. It's entire economy relies on its gas and oil exports. There's a very strong economic motivation for them never to wage war against Europe. Is it strong enough to offset the demands of nationalists to reunite all the lands once held by Russia under Moscow's rule? In the short- and mid-term, I'd say it is.
See, the regime has a remarkably integrative capacity. The opposition is rather small and ideologically homogenous, whereas its supporters are legion and very heterogenous. Mr. Putin has raised the average Russian's living standards considerably, and he isn't an ideological person, so many can identify with him. The Western press believes him to be a right-winger, but as a matter of fact he only is when it suits him. In a way, he's actually very similar to Merkel, and I think that's because both grew up under Communist rule and learned the value of opportunism.
At any rate, as long as the "System Putin" stands, it's way more profitable for the Kremlin to keep Russia out of major conflicts with the West.
There are two future dates we might want to mark in our calendars, though. The first comes when Mr. Putin dies. Should he be unable to hand-pick his successor, that person might come under pressure to rock the boat a little and legitimise their claim to the power.
The second date is likely to fall into the late 2050s, provided that current trends carry on: The total independence of Europe from fossil fuels. These days, Russia attempts to diversify her economy, but hasn't been very successful so far. Her major exports beside fuels are iron, cereals, timber and precious metals. Her only industrial exports of note are arms; her financial and services sector is smaller than that of Sweden. Should it fall into a major economic crisis, a future government could indeed be tempted to stoke up a fire somewhere.
The only conceivable cause of a major crisis in the short-term (that I can see) could be some sort of tension between Eastern European countries and their Russian minorities. Moscow has played this card in the past with regards to Georgia and Ukraine. However, the most likely candidates for such a scenario (the three Baltic states) are also EU members, and should they infringe on the rights of ethnic Russians living in their lands, Brussels would be very quick to intervene, I think.
But even still I don't think Russia would resort to all-out war under these scenarios. I think they'd pursue aggressive policies bearing a potential to escalate, but they wouldn't just roll out their tanks. Why? Because they could still achieve all their goals without firing a single shot.
Imagine, say, riots broke out in Estonia between Estonians and ethnic Russians. Russia would only have to utter a very vague threat, and before you know it they'd all take their seats at a fancy round table and discuss the possibility of an autonomous province for Estonia's Russians.
That's why it's so ridiculous the nationalists accuse the West of war-mongering. The fact is that no one over here wants war – not in Estonia, not in Germany, not in the United Kingdom. We've become much too lazy for such shenanigans.
