What awaits Ukraine in the second half of 2024?
Forecast test.
Like any forecast, it is subject to the risk of error. At the beginning, I would like to remind you the entry why aid from the USA will not be a significant change in the current situation and how to assess the concept of victory in the political layer:
A few theses:
1. The situation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is currently the worst since the summer of 2022. It results not so much from the lack of ammunition, but from problems with command, training and personnel shortages of the Armed Forces. In my opinion, the AU is currently taking quite hasty and desperate measures with the OT brigades. Ukraine is losing 300 to 500 soldiers a day, which translates into a loss of approximately 180,000 soldiers a year. The capacity of training centers at the AU is known - about 5-6 brigades per year (about 33,000 soldiers). The rest are NATO partners, but even with their help there is no way to achieve the number of trained (and not just conscripted) soldiers that will make up for the loss of personnel. Ukraine has the human resources to mobilize soldiers, but it lacks training capacity and most brigades have command problems. Their replenishment system is shaky and creaky and is on the verge of collapse, but not because of the lack of people, but because of "humanization" and training inefficiency.
As a result of many mistakes from 2023, the defense of the Armed Forces currently depends on a few cadre (or quasi-elite) brigades that defend very well and suffer losses. But about 60% of the "select" brigades are not in Donbas but cover other directions. The rest are poorly trained, usually poorly commanded IOT brigades or "hundredth" brigades converted from IOT brigades to mech/mechanical combat. What's worse - the few "cadre" brigades in the combat area are exploited mercilessly - in fact, until they need to be completely recreated, successive battalions from the brigades are rotated. As a result, the 3rd Assault Squadron, the 47th Infantry Division and others act as "fire brigades" and even if they are rotated, they are immediately thrown back into combat from the recreation areas. Why? Because the defense based on "hundredth" brigades is weak and falling apart, and there are not enough field fortifications. Of course, the AU has reserves, but they are involved in the north and south. Not in Donbas for now. This is not an oversight by the UA but a conscious choice.
The Armed Forces have a frighteningly short time in terms of good units in Donbas. There are other and much more serious problems of SZU, but as a person supporting Ukrainians, I have no intention of writing about them publicly.
2. The Russians know very well about the SZU's problems and, at the expense of not taking into account their own losses, they are trying to "grind" the potential of the SZU's cadre brigades. This is a deliberate action resulting from the fact that in 2024 and 2025 the Russians will not run out of restored equipment from stockpiles, and approximately 28-35 thousand soldiers after 90 days of training (up to 120 days) are available to the Armed Forces. Not annually, monthly. The Russians are currently training at a tolerable level as many "meat inserts" per month as Ukraine is able to sensibly train conscripts A YEAR. Of course, Russians still have a speed run from calling to Gruz200 in 30 days, but these are exceptions. Most of those mobilized have high morale, field executions are completely extralegal (in the Russian legal system), execution discipline is maintained, training is adequate to the tactics of use. In general, RUS suffer personal losses that are two or three times greater than the Ukrainians overall. But if we look at the efficiency of the systems of supplementing both sides with a trained infantry soldier, unfortunately the Russians - while suffering much greater losses, in fact suffer smaller losses in terms of their ability to reproduce them. This is a terrible situation and forced the UA to send OT brigades into combat or convert them into mechs and... also send them into combat. Weak and often poorly commanded brigades, whose quality does not differ from the Russian ones, but there are fewer of them. Of course, the Russians suffer horrendous losses, but this is a deliberate action calculated to ensure that before the fat one loses weight, the skinny one will die of hunger. And unfortunately it works for them. In addition, what I wrote a month ago about the AU losing "assets" and the increasing advantage of the Russians in the field of WRE, drones, artillery and aviation remains in full force. Here, the erosion of Ukraine's capabilities is progressing, but in the field of air defense and artillery, deliveries from the West only minimally help. In terms of aviation, WRE and drones - unfortunately not.
Generally speaking, the Russians are currently preparing the strategic situation for the next phase of the operation - by the end of the occupation of at least two oblasts (Donetsk, Zaporizhia) and, optimally for the RUS, also Kharkov and Sumy.
