Simply saying you can’t win, so why fight, is going to get you eaten.
That's not what I said though, did I? (Continued below.)
Saying we will fight for time, or our allies to arrive, or to hurt the enemy are sensible approaches, and reminds the potential enemy that they must consider man6 variables.
Agreed. Hence my comment the air force is where Germany needs to get its act together before anything else. Even a numerically inferior force wins the day if it's got air support. There's not a whole lot of catching-up to do in the land department, though.
You've mentioned Poland; well, if the numbers I've seen are still up to date, they plan to field about 500 modern main battle tanks in the future. That too is far removed from 1989 levels, simply on the account it'd more than suffice given the replacement's technical superiority.
Germany should focus on its army, and Air Force, it’s unlikely to be invaded from the sea.
Germany's territory is not threatened under any conceivable scenario. As a consequence, I think Germany should focus on building up the means to stabilise NATO's flanks. I say, "stabilise", as the Two Plus Four Agreement prevents German forces from crossing the river Oder permanently. The Russians tolerate exercises and temporary deployments of between four to six months; but a permanent presence would violate the treaty.
Realistically, the strengthening of NATO's flanks could require Germany to strengthen its Navy. That's why they're in talks to raise the number of frigates from 12 to 18 and the number of corvettes from 5 to 15.
By the way, the Soviets did indeed always plan a naval invasion of Holstein in order to cut off Denmark from Germany, wheel around and bypass the Central German Uplands. It's a sound strategy, and realistic enough that LANDJUT (the Danish-German command defending those coastlines) stood down only fairly recently (relative to NATO's remaining cold war structure).
Don’t you have anyone with some military mindset?
You guys made sure to cast out those demons, remember?
In case of Finland; In 1939 we had a field army on the front, soviets were building up their troops and negotiations had been cut off. Despite that, politicians still believed that there wouldn't be war. And then the first shells dropped.
I've championed that argument myself in the past, and caution makes me inclined to agree, but reason doesn't.
1939 or even 1989 isn't 2019.
I wouldn't be surprised if there'd been days in 1939 where not a single Finnish citizen crossed a Soviet border. I wouldn't be surprised if there'd been days in 1939 where not a single Finnish journalist cabled a report home.
Compare that to 2019's 300,000 Russians and Europeans each crossing the mutual borders every single day. Compare it to the god-knows-how-many terabytes of information leaving Russia every single day. In addition, we watch each other through satellites. We listen in on each other's communication. These are all sources of information Finland's government wasn't privy to in 1939. Many of them are now open to
ordinary citizens.
The point is, in this globalised and electronically connected world, the relevant information is bound to be picked up by somebody. If it's not picked up by the government, which is impossible, it'd be picked up by a news broadcaster or by concerned citizens on Facebook.
Heck, not a long time ago a hell of a lot of countries – including Russia – accidentally revealed their clandestine operations because their special forces members were smart enough to work out logged in to a fitness app that located their position.
I genuinely don't see how war preparations amongst developed nations could go unnoticed in this day and age.
Europe is completely dependent on Russian energy but Russia could survive a year or two without European money.
Completely? No. The Eastern European countries are relatively reliant on Russian gas due to infrastructural reasons; Germany imports Russian gas mainly because her people are stupid enough to nourish an unwarranted fear of nuclear energy. All in all, though, Russia supplies only 6% of Europe's energy use in total. That's not a share that can't be replaced.
On the other hand, Russia's oil-and-gas sector accounts for a fifth of her GDP, more than fifty percent of the federal government's revenues and almost three quarters of all her exports. No, they need us more than we need them.
The Soviets continued to sell gas to the West even at the very height of the Cold War, and the reason then was the same as it is now: The Kremlin uses its fuel revenues to indirectly subsidise and stabilise an otherwise deficient industrial complex. Should that spring ever run dry, a frightening number of Russian companies would be left without solvency.
It'd be as though a bank that controls all the debts of an entire country collapsed.