Mil News Australia, NZ, Oceania Military News

[BravoZulu]

A term that was unknown only a week or so ago has entered the lexicon of Australian strategic thought: ‘impactful projection’. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Richard Marles first used it in an armchair conversation at last week’s Submarine Institute of Australia conference, and then repeated it in a more formal address at the Sydney Institute this week.

So it’s now a thing, but what is impactful projection? Marles first defined it this way:

I think increasingly we’re going to need to think about our defence force in terms of being able to provide the country with impactful projection, impactful projection, meaning an ability to hold an adversary at risk, much further from our shores, across kind of the full spectrum of proportionate response. Now, that is actually a different mindset to what we’ve probably had before …

His later remarks expanded on this, stating: ‘The ADF must augment its self-reliance to deploy and deliver combat power through impactful materiel and enhanced strike capability—including over longer distances.’

The timing of Marles’s remarks is, of course, not random. In his Sydney Institute address, Marles told us: ‘Earlier this month, I received the interim advice on the defence strategic review from Professor Stephen Smith and Sir Angus Houston.’ That comes on the back of Prime Minister Anthony Albanese revealing that the National Security Committee of cabinet has had frequent updates from the review’s leads. So we can safely assume that Marles is giving us a foretaste of what they will deliver.

While the term ‘impactful projection’ might be novel, we shouldn’t be surprised at the underlying message, which calls for greater combat power, force-projection capabilities and self-reliant strike capabilities. Keen readers of recent strategic policy documents will hear clear echoes of the previous government’s 2020 defence strategic update, which put matters this way:

Given Australia’s limited resource base, we must improve our ability to deliver these effects without seeking to match the capability of major powers. This includes developing capabilities to hold adversary forces and infrastructure at risk further from Australia, such as longer-range strike weapons, cyber capabilities and area denial systems.

That’s not an accusation of plagiarism. The Albanese government has already expressed its agreement with the key judgements in the 2020 update. Rather, it’s confirmation of broad bipartisanship on the kinds of capabilities the Australian Defence Force needs. One of those capabilities is nuclear-propelled submarines. Marles noted that ‘a long-range-capable submarine does impactful projection more than any other platform that we have within our defence force right now’.

Members of the Canberra strategic policy blob, like me, will be analysing where impactful projection sits in Australia’s history of strategic thinking. And they’ll be attempting to reconcile that concept with the porcupine metaphor that Marles has also used.

Ever since federation, Australian thinking about the role of its defence force has sat along a spectrum. At one end are those who believe the ADF’s purpose is to defend Australia—that is, the continent of Australia. At the other end are those who think the best way to defend Australia is to work with our great and powerful allies to defeat significant threats wherever they may arise in the world. Porcupines might suggest the former philosophy, while impactful projection might imply the latter.

Regardless of the view of policy elites, the Australian people sit firmly in the first camp. While the majority of Australians support the alliance with the US, Lowy Institute polls suggest they are ambivalent about joining the US to fight a war over Taiwan. That means any argument for increased defence funding—and the prime minister has said the government will spend whatever it takes to keep Australia secure—has to be couched in terms that the Australian public find compelling. Ultimately that comes down to the defence of Australia. Tellingly, Marles didn’t refer to Taiwan or the South China Sea in either of the forums in which he talked about impactful projection.

So that explains the porcupine, but how is that consistent with impactful projection? In my view, it reflects a fundamental recognition of the changing nature of military technology and the threat that presents. Fighter planes with a combat radius of 1,000 kilometres might have been able to defend the ‘air–sea gap’ against conceivable threats in the era of Paul Dibb’s defence-of-Australia doctrine. But now that a potential adversary has capabilities that can kinetically strike Australia from more than 3,000 kilometres away, we’re taking a very small knife to a gunfight if we don’t increase the range of our own strike capabilities. This is not about the South China Sea or Taiwan. To expand on Marles’s own metaphor, impactful projection seems to be a porcupine with very long quills.

Of course, we can have intense debates about how long the quills should be and about the best strike capabilities for Australia’s particular circumstances. All of those debates should be based on a rigorous analysis of value for money—what capability return are we getting on our investment? And the Australian government can and will still deploy capabilities it acquired for the defence of Australia much further afield, as it always has done.

But we can see the key drivers in the government’s vision of the ADF’s role emerging. We’ll have to wait until the review team completes its work in March to see how that translates into a force structure and defence industry policy, but there too we are starting to see the factors shaping the government’s thinking. The need for large stocks of guided weapons is a consistent theme. Marles’s acknowledgement of a defence force personnel crisis is also significant, but again, we’ll have to wait to see whether that translates into a force design philosophy that builds the force around likely numbers of people rather than hoping that ‘if you build it, they will come’.

There’s still much work for the review team to do, but we’re starting to get a clear sense of the government’s defence priorities.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/i... projection a porcupine with very long quills

 

[BravoZulu]

It is tempting to express a bit of triumphalist satisfaction at Chinese President Xi Jinping’s acquiescence in meeting with an Australian prime minister after six years of stubborn rejection. And it must be said, a few commentators couldn’t help seeing the meeting as the bell tolling on Beijing’s attempt to grind Australia into submission.

True, China has blinked. But the bell was simply the end of the first round. We have survived it, but we shouldn’t kid ourselves; while Beijing might shift tactics, it has not changed its objectives.

The Chinese Communist Party wants a region and ultimately a world in which it is the dominant geopolitical force; in which it sits at the centre of global economic activity; in which it remains inoculated from the contagious appeal of democracy and liberalism; and in which it can project sufficient military, economic and diplomatic power to coerce neighbours if necessary to get its way.

There is absolutely no sign that the CCP has reined in these ambitions—certainly not in Xi’s decision to meet with Albanese.

What we can celebrate is the fact that, by refusing to compromise on any area of Australia’s national interest, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was able to go into the meeting with his counterpart in a position of strength. Beijing has effectively accepted that its coercion of Australia has, so far, been unsuccessful. That is a significant achievement, not just for us but for all countries that were watching to see how far Beijing would go to bend another country to its will.

By underestimating Australia’s resilience, Beijing has shown itself to be a bully, but not an altogether effective one—a mistake it also made with Lithuania. Australia can now continue its steady, consistent course of making sovereign decisions without second-guessing itself. Any cleavage of the diplomatic relationship will have to come at Beijing’s initiative—and it would need a very powerful justification for doing so.

Meanwhile, Canberra ought to cooperate with Beijing where it can, even while we pursue fundamentally incompatible goals with respect to the shape of the international and regional order. The disciplined approach of Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles—which can be summed up as ‘cooperate if possible but counter where necessary’—reflects this truism.

Beijing’s readout put its own spin on the situation by welcoming ‘the will Australia has recently demonstrated to improve and grow its relations with China’—even though Australia’s standing position for the past six years has been a preparedness to talk with China at all levels without preconditions. To Albanese’s credit, he maintained that position with a dignified posture.

While the change of government in Australia has provided Beijing with an opportunity to re-engage, the Albanese government is demonstrating that bipartisanship is an indispensable strength in taking on a major power. In correctly identifying that Beijing’s responses to Australian policy decisions were wholly disproportionate and were breaches of international rules, the government has signalled it will not give an inch on security, foreign and defence policy, even as it maintains a calibrated and measured tone in dialogue.

Importantly, Albanese is showing both China and the Australian people that tensions can be managed, not ignored.

The prime minister said after the meeting that the two countries were taking ‘an important step to moving forward’, adding that there are of course many further steps needed.

What does moving forward involve? It is emphatically not a return to the callow attitude in which we believed we could keep business separate from international politics; nor is it relying on time-wasting platitudes such as that we ‘don’t have to choose’, or being deceived by feints such as ‘win–win cooperation’ and other favourite strategic phrases of Beijing’s.

China’s readout of the meeting noted that the two countries needed to learn from recent experience and look to ‘steer the relationship back on to the right track’.

The right track for Beijing is a perspective about which the Albanese government will need to remain extremely disciplined. Beijing is not capitulating but doing what it does better than most—treating this as a 12-round bout and assuming the other side lacks stamina. As dialogue increases, Beijing will aim, over time, to weaken Australia’s resolve on issues ranging from negotiations on the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, to investments in critical infrastructure and technologies, to human rights and regional security.

An easy litmus test is the coercive trade measures Beijing has imposed over the past two years. Diplomatic gestures on Beijing’s part lack credibility while those measures remain in place, and the Albanese government will need to watch carefully for any attempt by Beijing to move forward with those as part of a new baseline. Beijing will expect to receive a quid pro quo for ending its coercion – but Australia should not reward Beijing for simply ceasing to punch us in the face.

Similarly, all Australians hope that detained citizens like Yang Hengjun and Cheng Lei will be released and that the sentences for those on death row will be commuted. Such actions from Beijing would help stabilise relations and reduce some bilateral tension, but they should not elicit any compromise or praise on Australia’s part because they are simply the right thing to do.

There’s a long way to go in this period of strategic competition in which Australia is unavoidably a participant, not as an ally of the United States or a member of any particular international grouping but simply as a sovereign, democratic nation that wants to live in an open region not dominated by any one country, particularly an authoritarian superpower.

We have come through the first round well. Without hubris, we can take a moment to appreciate that before resuming our clear-eyed focus on what lies ahead.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/x... meeting shows strength of Australias resolve

 

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Growing Challenges, Rising Ambitions: AUSMIN 2022 and Expanding U.S.-Australia Cooperation

Download the Report On December 6, 2022, the U.S. secretaries of state and defense, Antony Blinken and Lloyd Austin, will host their Australian counterparts, Penny Wong and Richard Marles, at the 32nd iteration of AUSMIN—the annual Australian-U.S. Ministerial Consultations. Taking place against...

www.csis.org

 

[pigmode]

SecDef pledges to close Aussie Collins sub gap; Japanese forces to 'integrate' with US, Aussies - Breaking Defense

"Overall," Charles Edel of CSIS said, "I think this was a fairly robust AUSMIN that underscored just how important the America-Australian alliance has become to both countries — and highlighted how much more work they both need to do."

breakingdefense.com

 

[BravoZulu]

Fiji:
The looming Fijian election is, like the 2018 poll, another battle between two former coup leaders. The political histories of both Frank Bainimarama and Sitiveni Rabuka are well known in local and foreign security circles, and some are concerned another coup is on the cards. The outcome of the 14 December vote, and any subsequent power grabs, could dramatically shift regional partnerships and influence. Should Fiji’s election again be plagued by undemocratic practices, Australia will have to balance its close friendship with the country and its commitment to democracy in the region, seeking not to sacrifice one for the other.

After seizing power in 2006, Bainimarama chose not to face the polls until 2014. He won by a comfortable margin, but 2018 was a very close race. Sometimes long-term leaders find it hard to walk away from the job; former Samoan prime minister Tuila’epa Sa’ilele Malielegaoi is the most recent example in the region, having refused to go quietly after losing an election last year. And despite Rabuka, Bainimarama’s biggest competition, publicly stating he would not (again) attempt to seize power by force, Bainimarama hasn’t made the same commitment.

This is set to be the toughest election yet for Bainimarama. Although there are no reliable pre-election polls, it’s looking like Rabuka might win, forming a coalition with Fiji’s National Federation Party. The divide between Bainimarama and Rabuka used to be all about race, but Rabuka has consistently tried to demonstrate a change in his stance on Indo-Fijian rights since the 1987 coup. This year, it’s about social issues and government services. And a little bit about who can make the best TikTok video.

The results of the election and the subsequent handling of those results will further test Fiji’s democracy, and the commitment of security forces to the rule of law. A disputed election, possible post-election instability and the potential for political leaders to seek military interference would be an important test for the Republic of Fiji Military Forces, which originally brought Bainimarama to power. The RFMF is constitutionally responsible to ‘ensure at all times the security, defence and well-being of Fiji and all Fijians’. Their role may be critical in enforcing a democratic outcome, or protecting Fijians from the political jousting of the elites.

Giving us some relief from fears of a military-led intervention, this week the commander of the RFMF, Major General Jone Kalouniwai, encouraged all RFMF personnel to vote in the election, noting how important the result would be for Fiji’s future. In no uncertain terms, Kalouniwai stressed honouring the democratic process and respecting the outcome of the poll.

While a coup or a military-supported hold on power seems unlikely, this is still shaping up to be a messy election. Already, Bainimarama’s ‘free and fair’ approach to elections is being pushed to the limit. In November, prominent Indo-Fijian lawyer Richard Naidu was found guilty of contempt of court for pointing out a spelling mistake in a court document—a charge brought against him by Bainimarama’s closest political ally, Attorney-General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum. Naidu is now facing the possibility of jail time. And this week, a deputy leader from Rabuka’s People’s Alliance party was arrested for alleged vote buying. It appears Bainimarama will use the law and the government system as best he can to maintain his loosening grip on power up to and into the election.

Australia and the West need to be prepared for an undemocratic outcome. After the 2006 coup, Australia, New Zealand and the US punished Bainimarama’s new government by restricting some official travel and suspending some aid funding. Defence cooperation was cut off. Spurned, Bainimarama looked north for new partners such as China and Russia to limit the impact of sanctions. The Pacific Islands Forum (with a hard push by Australia and New Zealand) took a firm stance on Fiji after the 2006 coup, suspending it from the forum from 2009 to 2014.

The regional reaction to this election—voiced through the PIF—will be key. Pacific island nations have continued to develop their own styles of governing and their own styles of engaging with each other. A culture of non-interference, and an unwillingness to be placed under scrutiny themselves, could preclude an overly critical response to a Fiji coup—particularly one that occurred without widespread unrest, like in 2006—or any undemocratic activity surrounding elections. And the PIF can’t afford to lose a key member like Fiji, especially after the exit of Kiribati earlier this year. But even if the PIF doesn’t impose harsh sanctions on undemocratic processes, it is still a forum for dialogue and engagement, and for forming a regional stance.

Australia deeply values its friendship with Fiji, and ‘punishing’ it at a state-to-state level would have repercussions. Bainimarama could again turn back to China to fill any void left by Australia. But ignoring undemocratic processes in the name of a bilateral relationship would mean turning our back on democratic principles and the Fijian people’s right to choose—and could damage relationships with other powerbrokers in Fiji.

Australia needs to uphold democratic principles and values in the Pacific while—if at all possible—maintaining a positive relationship with all parties in Fiji. The best way for Australia to appropriately engage in any possible undemocratic outcome in Fiji is to respond on a regional level, in line with a Pacific-led PIF response. It should seek the support of other Pacific island countries and New Zealand to come to a fair response, advocating the importance of respecting free and fair elections. All partners should look to approach a restorative dialogue together. And if there is another coup, consequences such as restrictions on travel or trade should be decided on in the PIF by its members, not by countries acting alone. That will be tricky, especially if PIF members are reticent to take the lead. But regional and respectful diplomacy is the answer for Australia in this election. With any luck, it’ll be the answer to a question that’s never asked.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a...for an undemocratic outcome in Fijis election

 

[TheKiwi]

Third of NZ navy ships idle as defence force staff leave

Three of New Zealand's nine navy ships are sitting idle in port as defence personnel leave the force for better salaries.

www.rnz.co.nz

The usual story with staffing, nothing much new here.

 

[pigmode]

Government must retain unfettered power to send Australians to war | The Strategist

Tomorrow afternoon, the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade will hold a public hearing for its inquiry into international armed conflict decision-making. In our submission (number 86) to the committee, ...

www.aspistrategist.org.au

 

[pigmode]

A third of New Zealand’s Navy ships are docked over lack of crew

The 279-foot offshore patrol vessel HMNZS Wellington is now the third ship to enter a period of idleness.

www.defensenews.com

 

[TheKiwi]

First RNZAF P-8 Poseidon arriving today:

Stuff

www.stuff.co.nz

 

[gafkiwi]

First RNZAF P-8 Poseidon arriving today:

Stuff

www.stuff.co.nz

Just in time for the hangers that will be completed in 2024. At least it will give them time to work out if they want them to be able to take off fully laden which would involve extending the runway that currently has a bluff at one end and a State Highway at the other.

 

[pigmode]

Pretty good article although it glosses over weaknesses and limitations of the AIP designs for Australia in a strategic role.

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Scott Morrison’s booby trap: Buying US nuclear submarines is a huge mistake

Some submarines will eventually be located here, with Australian flags and personnel, but they’re essentially US boats operated in the great power’s interests.

www.smh.com.au

​

OPINION​

Scott Morrison’s booby trap: Buying US nuclear submarines is a huge mistake​

Submarines are in the news a lot these days. Nuclear-powered ones especially.

There is no doubt that submarines are an essential defence capability for a maritime nation like Australia. They raise the stakes for any adversary contemplating hostile action against us. Submarines are expensive, but countermeasures against them are much more expensive. They allow the government to act at a time of its choosing and under any realistic threat scenario.

Australia’s defence interests would be better served by conventionally powered submarines, not nuclear-powered ones. Air-independent propulsion (AIP) submarines are a proven technology. They go as deep as nuclear-powered submarines and can lurk in an area for months. They convert chemical energy into electric power at high efficiencies, and can go for up to three weeks without having to surface to recharge their batteries, a process known as “snorting”. Their hydrogen fuel cells and Stirling engines are much quieter than nuclear-powered submarines, which have large meshing gears between their steam turbines and propellers and must also keep their reactor cooling pumps running.

AIP submarines are lighter as well. They are better at shallow water operations. They are considerably cheaper than nuclear-powered boats, meaning many more could be purchased, with more local maintenance jobs throughout the life of the boats.

Japan, South Korea and Singapore use air-independent propulsion submarines, as do Norway, Sweden, Germany, Spain, Portugal and Italy. So does Israel, a nuclear-capable state.

As former submariner and senator Rex Patrick has argued, Australia could have 20 modern, off-the-shelf submarines built in Australia and enhanced by Australian industry, for $30 billion. By contrast, the eight nuclear-powered boats may cost as much as $171 billion. Conventional submarines would free up funds so that Australia can acquire more fighter jets, a $40 billion industry resilience package, a national shipping fleet, long-range rockets and other artillery systems, utility helicopters, shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles, and more.

As the weeks and months pass by, the mirage of Australian nuclear-powered submarines will stay as alluring as ever, and as out of reach as ever, with the Labor government persisting, however absurd and expensive this theatre becomes.

They don’t seem to understand that Scott Morrison booby-trapped the defence self-reliance of this country. Some submarines will eventually be located in Australia, with Australian flags and personnel, but they’re essentially US boats operated in the US’s great power interests. We’re paying for them to set up part of their current and future fleet in Australia.

Nuclear-powered submarines create another problem. When the nuclear-armed states signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, they insisted on exempting fissile materials used in nuclear-powered ships and submarines from inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). They wanted to preserve the secrets of their naval reactor designs.

The US and Britain’s submarines operate reactors that use 93.5 per cent-enriched uranium as fuel. The US Navy’s reactors currently use about 100 nuclear bombs’ worth of highly enriched uranium every year, more than all the world’s other reactors’ production combined. Civilian reactors typically use 3 to 5 per cent-enriched uranium as fuel. (The French Suffren-class submarine runs on fuel enriched below 6 per cent).
Australia will become the first non-nuclear-armed state to acquire nuclear-powered submarines, and these will require the same high-grade uranium as the rest of the US fleet. Australia will have to work with the IAEA to figure out how to account for the fissile material without disclosing secret naval reactor design information. Iran, Brazil, South Korea and other countries could use the Australian precedent to develop or acquire nuclear-powered vessels too, enjoying similar exemptions from IAEA inspection.
There are powerful arguments for Australia to modernise its submarine fleet. Conventionally powered submarines make the most sense on grounds of performance, defence relevance, cost and non-proliferation.

Professor Clinton Fernandes part of the University of NSW’s Future Operations Research Group which analyses the threats, risks and opportunities that military forces will face in the future. He is a former intelligence officer in the Australian army.

 

[TheKiwi]

The idea of 20 conventional submarines in the RAN is delusional. There is enough trouble crewing the existing fleet that isn't even half that size.

The non-proliferation argument is a non starter too. It could reasonably be argued that the behavior of Russia in Ukraine and that of China towards Taiwan have already put people on notice that only having a formal defensive alliance with a nuclear state or having your own nukes will protect you from aggressive nuclear states.

 

[BravoZulu]

Australia:
L3Harris Technologies entered into a teaming agreement with advanced defence and intelligence electronics specialist IAI-ELTA Systems Ltd. to deliver a sophisticated fire detection and response capability for Australian armoured fighting vehicles.

The new system will enable a combat vehicle – when it encounters live fires - to immediately detect incoming rounds and initiate self-defence responses, which include a combination of electronic warfare measures and kinetic effects.

“Manufactured by L3Harris Micreo in Brisbane, the system sensors are easily deployed and integrated onto any vehicle. They will not only rapidly detect live fires, but will be intuitive for operators in any battlespace to employ,” said Sarah Earey, managing director of Intelligence and Cyber International – APAC at L3Harris.

The vehicle protection systems are considered a mission-critical sovereign industrial capability in Australia, and a goal of the partnership is to ensure all current and future combat vehicles could be outfitted with the system that will enable each vehicle to defend itself against incoming attacks. The advanced tactical sensors for the system were developed by ELTA, including the StormGuard Tactical Multi-mission Radar System, Othello Optical Threat Locator and Othello-P Opto-Acoustic Hostile Fire Location System.

"IAI looks forward to working with L3Harris Technologies to provide these unique sensors for armoured vehicles in Australia,” said Zvi Yarom, IAI-ELTA’s vice president and general manager, Land Systems. “Together IAI and L3Harris have a superior combined knowledge and capability in this field. Further trials are ongoing with very positive reports, so we are confident that the full system will meet the local requirements."

L3Harris’ decade-long relationship with trusted partner ELTA has led to the defence systems innovator becoming the prime contractor for the delivery of the solution.

“Our strong partnership with ELTA has ensured they see us as a safe pair of hands, which is why we were approached to provide Australian Industry Capability and act as prime for local projects,” Earey said. “We look forward to working with ELTA to ultimately deliver a truly sovereign capability for Australian service members.”
https://www.l3harris.com/newsroom/p...ter-teaming-agreement-deliver-advanced-threat

 

[BravoZulu]

NZ:
The arrival of the first new P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) in New Zealand will see Royal New Zealand Air Force's (RNZAF's) No 5 Squadron move to its new base at RNZAF Base Ohakea.

No 5 Squadron will transfer from Auckland to Ohakea after the retirement of the remaining fleet of three P-3K2 Orion aircraft at the end of January 2023 – six months earlier than planned.

It will also see the ramp up of the training of RNZAF aircrew and maintenance personnel. The first P-8A landed at RNZAF Base Ohakea on 13 December. It was flown by US Navy pilots with stopovers in Hawaii and Fiji en route to New Zealand.

 

[BravoZulu]

Australia said on Thursday (Jan 5) that it had snapped up a United States offer to obtain the same long-range mobile rocket system Ukraine has deployed on the battlefield against invading Russian forces.

The government said that the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) would deter attacks on Australia but could also be transported by plane for deployment worldwide.

"The effectiveness of the HIMARS system in the Ukraine conflict has certainly influenced the government's decision," Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy told public broadcaster ABC.

The government acted quickly to order the missiles to secure its place in the queue given a "massive increase" in global demand for HIMARS, Conroy said.

Australia hopes to deploy HIMARS, which includes launchers, missiles and training rockets, in 2026 to 2027, the government said.

The minister declined to give a price for the system, saying only that Australia would spend A$1 billion to A$2 billion (US$680 million to US$1.4 billion) on HIMARS and a separately contracted weapon, the Naval Strike Missile made by Norway-based Kongsberg, which is to equip its destroyers and frigates from 2024.

HIMARS would extend the Australian army's strike range from 30km to 300km, and eventually to 500km with a future precision-strike missile, Conroy said.

Asked whether the HIMARS would be deployed in the Pacific region, where China has growing military and diplomatic clout, the minister said that the ease with which it could be transported anywhere in the world made it a "really fundamental asset".

https://www.channelnewsasia.com/world/australia-buys-ukraine-tested-himars-missile-system-us-3184701

 

[BravoZulu]

Last month, the world got its first look at the US Air Force’s new long-range bomber, the Northrop Grumman B-21 Raider. The company has called it ‘the world’s first sixth-generation aircraft’ and says it will incorporate enhanced stealth technology based on new manufacturing techniques and materials. The B-21’s open-systems architecture will allow new technology, capabilities and weapons to be ‘seamlessly incorporated through agile software upgrades and built-in hardware flexibility’.

The importance of the B-21 as a potential capability choice for Australia is covered in a recent ASPI report by Marcus Hellyer and Andrew Nicholls. But the ‘sixth generation’ tag alone is important, because it highlights the path for the USAF’s ‘next-generation air dominance’, or NGAD, system. NGAD isn’t a platform but a system of systems combining a crewed multirole combat aircraft with loyal-wingman-type autonomous systems.

Australia’s development of the MQ-28 Ghost Bat loyal-wingman system for the Royal Australian Air Force means that it’s already well positioned to contribute to NGAD, were Australia to approach the US with participation in mind. Capabilities such as the Ghost Bat may be relevant to some of the other next-generation air combat systems being developed around the world. And the MQ-28 itself could be developed into a larger, more capable platform that could sit at the mid-point between the F-35 fifth-generation fighter and a larger platform such as the B-21.

Australia’s strike and air combat capabilities rest on 72 F-35As, all of which are expected to be fully operational this year. Sometime this year, the Department of Defence, acting on advice from the defence strategic review, will consider acquisition of either an additional 28 F-35As or the MQ-28A Ghost Bat under Project Air 6000 Phase 7. Whichever platform is chosen, it will ultimately replace the RAAF’s 24 F/A-18F Super Hornets by the early 2030s. The RAAF also operates the E/A-18G Growler electronic warfare aircraft, with a total of 11 currently in service. So, the RAAF’s strike and air combat force seems to be coalescing around the F-35, potentially the Ghost Bat, and the Growler.

At the same time, the USAF is charting its path through NGAD to replace the F-22 Raptor, and the US Navy continues to work on its F/A-XX concept to replace its F/A-18E/Fs in around the same timeframe as is being considered for the RAAF’s Super Hornets. The UK, together with Japan and Italy, is looking to develop the ‘global combat air project’, of which the Tempest sixth-generation fighter will be a central component. This marks a historic step both for Britain in forging new ties with Japan that will give the UK a larger role in Asia, and for Japan in collaborating with new partners beyond its traditional partnership with the US. Meanwhile, France’s Dassault Aviation and Airbus are set to move to the next stage of development of the ‘future combat air system’, a sixth-generation fighter that like NGAD is a system of systems rather than a single platform.

In effect, the development of Western airpower is approaching an inflection point in a transition to future air combat architectures. The consistent trend across all three major projects—US, French and UK–Japanese–Italian—is crewed–autonomous teaming, with a high-end sixth-generation crewed platform at the centre of a networked air warfare capability.

It’s important that Australia take full advantage of this moment to pivot decisively towards next-generation capabilities that could initially complement, and ultimately replace, the F-35A. The objective must be a larger and more powerful RAAF with greater range and ability for ‘impactful projection’ across the Indo-Pacific. To get there, Australia should consider investing in partnerships on the next generation of air combat systems. Initially, that would comprise an autonomous component, such as the locally developed MQ-28A Ghost Bat or an evolved successor, and F-35s. At the same time, though, Australia needs to commit to acquiring a sixth-generation crewed combat aircraft in the 2030s that’s optimised for long-range air defence alongside autonomous systems. It would be a mistake to ignore the potential offered by sixth-generation capabilities in favour of relying only on the F-35A through to the 2040s. Acquiring additional F-35s under Air 6000 Phase 7 shouldn’t be the default capability solution, because it won’t address the RAAF’s lack of a long-range capability.

The retirement of the F-111C in 2010 left a clear gap in Australia’s long-range strike capability that has yet to be filled. Under the current force structure, the RAAF cannot operate deep inside the highly contested anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) environments that are likely to exist to the north of the Indonesian archipelago. At the same time, the challenge posed by China’s long-range air and missile capabilities, which can strike at northern Australian bases from inside that A2/AD envelope, will make it more difficult for Australia to support the US and other key partners in the Indo-Pacific. So far, there appears to be no effective capability response to the Chinese long-range missile threat, though maybe something will emerge from the defence strategic review when it reports in March.

Australia’s force structure lacks the means for defending Australian bases or supporting forward coalition forces directly from Australia without forward host-nation support. Developing long-range strike—perhaps with the B-21 or other capabilities—is only one element of a more complex capability solution to the distant defence of Australia. Undertaking long-range offensive and defensive counter-air missions with a mix of crewed and autonomous platforms—at long range and by exploiting effective stealth and crewed–autonomous teaming—must also be a requirement.

The development of advanced air combat capabilities could certainly be promoted as a new priority area for AUKUS, allowing Australia to work with the US on NGAD and the F/A-XX as well as with the UK on the Tempest. It would complement work already done with MQ-28A Ghost Bat and, were Australia to acquire the B-21, it would make sense for such a capability to be seen as part of a system of systems with fifth- and sixth-generation crewed fighters, long-range bombers and loyal-wingman-type autonomous systems.

By seizing the moment apparent in this inflection point in airpower, Australia should identify a goal of developing a larger and more powerful air force, with greater operational reach, even in highly contested airspace. Such a force could operate directly to deter or, if necessary, defend against the growing threat posed by China’s long-range strategic air and missile capabilities. Without this, Australia will be unable to deliver impactful projection far beyond the archipelago to its north. That would, in effect, be more of the same: a focus on the defence of Australia based on an assumption that we can effectively defend the sea–air gap.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/t...generation air combat capability for the RAAF

 

[BravoZulu]

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese is heading to Papua New Guinea this week for an annual leaders’ dialogue—his first overseas trip for 2023, and the first time an Australian prime minister has visited PNG since 2018 (due more to political turmoil there and the Covid-19 pandemic than to anything else). Albanese and PNG Prime Minister James Marape are no strangers—they met several times last year—and the Australian government is describing this trip as one to reinforce the strong bond between the two countries.

The relationship between Australia and PNG is a unique one. PNG is Australia’s nearest neighbour, with less than four kilometres separating the countries at their closest point. Historically, the two countries have been strongly linked—from traditional trade across the Torres Strait through to colonial rule and then independence. Now, they have a deep diaspora connection and maintain shared values and close ties.

In 2019, then–prime minister Scott Morrison and Marape announced ‘the beginning of a new chapter’ in the bilateral relationship and committed to boosting engagement in security, trade and investment, governance and development. An enhanced comprehensive strategic and economic partnership agreement was signed in 2020. Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles visited PNG in October, elevating already significant defence cooperation and pursuing a bilateral security treaty, which is being negotiated.

Australia’s relationship with PNG is in a very strong position. We’re already ‘family’. But to keep it that way, we have to stick around and be supportive. Strengthened ties should be balanced with effective development. What comes out of these meetings—for trade, the economy, infrastructure, defence and security, and climate change—should build on Australia’s commitment to foster PNG’s resilience, support its key areas of concern, and strengthen mutual friendship, trust and capabilities.

Australia provides more aid to PNG than to anywhere else in the Pacific. Because of the size of its population, that has always made sense. And late last year, a UN study suggested that PNG’s population could be as high as 17 million, nearly double the government’s estimate of 9 million. Marape admitted that he doesn’t know the exact size, and PNG is ill-equipped to deal with its population regardless of how many millions more there may be. Marape’s dreams of PNG becoming ‘the richest black Christian nation in the world’ are far from becoming a reality, and he recognises that.

PNG’s 20-year development strategic plan seeks, among other things, human development—through education, health care, economic opportunity and increased service delivery to rural areas, all of which Australia is supporting. And, importantly, PNG’s development goals seek to enhance national sovereignty and self-reliance. So, Australia’s responsibility is as much about building national resilience, government functions and a strong economy as it is about direct aid.

Yet Australia’s national and regional security concerns, while they impact PNG, are not always synonymous with the major security issues PNG faces day to day. Through its defence cooperation program, Australia assists the Papua New Guinea Defence Force, training its personnel, funding its infrastructure and supporting its ability to provide capabilities such as maritime domain awareness and border security. Further flashy offerings—like air capabilities—while nice additions for PNG’s security, don’t target the ongoing internal security needs of the country. And although the Australian Federal Police’s work with the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary bolsters its capability and capacity, that alone doesn’t tackle the growing list of security issues.

Tribal warfare, land disputes, forced migration, gender-based and domestic violence, and sorcery-related violence all contribute to a deeply unstable security environment and stifle PNG’s development. These security issues have probably been exacerbated by population growth. Increasingly disruptive climate impacts may also have contributed, and these problems we be more difficult to resolve as climate change intensifies in the years to come. There’s no immediate solution to these issues, and PNG has to be at the forefront of addressing them. Australia’s focus should be on building the country’s sovereign capacity to deal with these issues as self-sufficiently as possible.

We almost can’t talk about the Pacific without referencing the geostrategic competition in the region. China’s presence in the Pacific, and particularly in the security domain—historically dominated by Australia, New Zealand, the US and France—causes the heart rates of Pacific partners to rise every few weeks. Pacific islands’ autonomy and receptivity is often overlooked in the face of China’s gifts and economic prowess. But, if the West is in a battle against China for influence in the Pacific, we have no greater stronghold than PNG.

Australia’s very public status as PNG’s key security partner, and the deep ties on all levels of the two countries’ engagement, doesn’t preclude China from engaging—and nor should we expect it to. Marape has made it clear that he doesn’t want to take sides, and his country needs trade with China to sustain its economy and development assistance to sustain its booming population.

But Australia’s engagement does help PNG to feel secure that it has what it needs, which makes it confident to only take what it wants from China, whether it be aid, development assistance, trade or sometimes security infrastructure and equipment. And PNG has so far proven that it knows how to accept what it wants while maintaining its sovereign ability to make its own decisions in its national interest. PNG doesn’t need, or indeed want, deep security ties with China—due probably in large part to Australia’s cooperation and partnership. And the security engagement it does have with China—equipment donations and subpar infrastructure—don’t make for a lasting relationship.

Albanese’s trip should focus on PNG’s priorities for its development, through the economy and service delivery. Australia should focus on building PNG’s capacity and resilience—for its internal security challenges, its development goals and its response to climate change impacts. Deeper defence cooperation, and a furthering of the move towards a bilateral security agreement, should also be priorities—as our nations’ strategic security is intrinsically linked.

Australia’s strong ties with PNG are important. But, in the long run, dependency won’t support PNG’s development. Australia has a fine line to walk between helping and hindering, and it must make PNG part of the solution instead of dragging it along for the ride. The prime minister’s trip should aim to keep our friend close and help it soar.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a...a New Guinea can help build a stronger nation

 

[BravoZulu]

Who's Going To Build Australia's Nuclear Submarines?

Vice Admiral William Joseph Houston is a thoughtful and experienced United States naval officer, entrusted with command of perhaps the most potent US capability: its submarine fleet.

Houston is also steeped in the history of the US submarine service, and the outsized role it played in defeating Japan in World War II. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the only viable weapon immediately available was the US submarine force. In fact, USS Gudgeon commenced the US fleet’s first offensive patrol just four days after the attack of 7 December 1941.

By the time the war had ended, US submarines had sunk more than 30% of Japan’s navy (including eight aircraft carriers) and more than 60% of Japan’s merchant marine fleet.

Not surprising, then, that Houston is fond of describing his submarines as ‘apex predators’ that fear ‘nothing above the sea, nothing on the sea, and nothing under the sea’.

Which is why Australia wants the best possible submarines, too. Nuclear-propelled boats would give Australia the same ‘stealthy, full-spectrum expeditionary platform’ that the US Navy has—minus the nuclear weapons, of course.

But Houston has a problem on his hands: while the number and size of submarines planned for the US Navy continues to grow, the size of the workforce needed to build those submarines has shrunk in real terms.

Events of the past week have highlighted the risk that, regardless of the strongly stated political and military support for AUKUS, members of Congress could begin to take a more ambivalent view if it comes at the expense of US operational readiness.

The leak of a letter that the chairman of the Senate armed services committee, Jack Reed, and then-ranking Republican member James Inhofe wrote to President Joe Biden showed that the senators held concerns that the AUKUS plan to sell or transfer Virginia-class submarines to Australia would undermine the US Navy’s own requirements.

The letter highlights the risk of key US policymakers concluding that nuclear-powered submarines for Australia are a great idea, just not right now. Not while the US is simultaneously planning for war with China.

At the heart of the problem is this simple fact: according to current projections, the US needs to turn out two submarines a year, but only around 1.3 per year are coming out of its shipyards.

The deficit in shipyard capacity is a problem that affects maintenance and refits as well as new boat construction. Last year, Rear Admiral Doug Perry, director of undersea warfare requirements in the US Navy, admitted that of America’s 50 attack submarines, ‘18 were either in maintenance or waiting to go in maintenance’. That figure should be closer to 10.

In the words of senators Reed and Inhofe, ‘what was initially touted as a ‘do no harm’ opportunity to support Australia and the United Kingdom and build long-term competitive advantages for the US and its Pacific allies, may be turning into a zero-sum game for scarce, highly advanced US SSNs’.

Reed and Inhofe will have been briefed in detail by US officials, and presumably those classified briefings led them to conclude that the projected additional demand from the AUKUS program would come at the expense of America’s own military preparedness.

The senators added that they ‘recognise the strategic value of having one of our closest allies operating a world-class navy’. Indeed, Reed subsequently tweeted that he is ‘proud to support AUKUS’, noting that America’s advantage over China is ‘our network of partners and allies’.

Or as one senior US government official privately stated: ‘China hates AUKUS, which means we should love AUKUS—and I love AUKUS!’

Further support arrived in the form of an open bipartisan letter to Biden from nine members of Congress calling for expanding the industrial base, and noting that ‘far from a zero-sum game’, AUKUS could be a ‘rising tide that lifts all boats’.

However, the back-and-forth shows that wider congressional commitment could be put under strain if the program comes to be seen as improving Australian capability while stretching the US to breaking point.

Ultimately, the success of the AUKUS submarines program will be determined not by expressions of political support, but by the ability of an integrated defence industrial base in the US and Australia.

It will take some difficult, even unpalatable decisions: more money, certainly, in the form of government support. But likely also a larger, deeper, better-skilled workforce that will need to start being trained almost immediately, and possibly a workforce that poaches talent overseas from countries that themselves face capacity constraints.

All that plus a fundamental rethink of the way governments and the private sector integrate on long-term advanced technology projects. Add to that the need for a concerted effort to overcome institutional and policy barriers such as the labyrinthine US export controls regime, and the way forward will be anything but easy.

The alternative for Washington, however, is a less capable ally in its primary area of strategic competition. At a time when it is widely accepted by governments in Washington, London and Canberra that the US cannot be expected to carry the burdens of strategic deterrence alone, AUKUS is worth the investment.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/w... going to build Australias nuclear submarines

 

[BravoZulu]

Australia confirmed on January 18 that it would buy 40 Black Hawk military helicopters from the United States for an estimated A$2.8 billion ($1.96 billion), finalising a sale approved by Pentagon in August 2022.

The Australian army’s fleet of MRH-90 Taipan helicopters, dogged by maintenance issues for years, will be replaced by Lockheed Martin Corp’s UH-60M Black Hawks.

According to the schedule, the deliveries will start this year. The UH-60M is an upgraded version of the Black Hawk that Canberra had previously used.

UH-60M is the latest variant in the Black Hawk family of helicopters. A multi-mission helicopter created by Sikorsky, the UH-60 Black Hawk has been used by the US Army since 1978.

https://eurasiantimes.com/black-hawk-down-under-australia-confirms-acquiring-uh-60/

 

[BravoZulu]

Australian defence contractor NIOA has expanded its global reach with the 100 per cent acquisition of the industry-leading rifle design and manufacturing company, Barrett Firearms.

In announcing the deal, NIOA Group CEO Robert Nioa said the two family-owned companies came together out of a shared commitment to quality, innovation, loyalty, and mission.

“NIOA’s association with Barrett dates back to 2008. We have been inspired by the story of Barrett and admire what Ronnie, Chris and the family have built over more than four decades,” Mr Nioa said.

“It’s been a story of hard work, perseverance, and purpose culminating in the delivery of critical capability for the men and women of the US military and its allies around the world as well as exceptional products to law enforcement agencies and civilian markets.

“Together we share the same mission - combining our expertise and family business values will ensure Barrett carries on building the finest products in the world.’’

Mr Nioa confirmed the company would continue to operate under the Barrett brand as a separate division within the NIOA Group alongside NIOA Australia, NIOA New Zealand, the Australian Missile Corporation and the group’s investment in joint venture company Rheinmetall NIOA Munitions.

All management and staff at the Murfreesboro manufacturing facility in Tennessee have been retained and production will continue as normal. Over time it is expected that manufacturing activities in Murfreesboro will be further expanded.

Financial terms of the transaction were not disclosed.

Mr Nioa also announced two key leadership appointments – current Barrett President Sam Shallenberger has been promoted to the role of Chief Executive Officer while long-serving Barrett Chief Operating Officer Bryan James becomes President.

Ronnie and Chris Barrett will provide ongoing support as executive advisers to Barrett and the NIOA Group.

Barrett founder Ronnie Barrett said: “Today marks the beginning of a new chapter in the Barrett story. Rob and the NIOA team have great respect for the legacy Barrett has created as the leader in long range precision rifles. It’s reassuring to know Barrett will be in good hands with a family-owned company that is focussed on manufacturing and delivering world-class firearms and munitions to a global network.”

The Barrett acquisition marks an exciting next chapter for NIOA as the company’s entry to the US market where it has long-standing trusted relationships with American companies such as Vista Outdoors, Leupold, General Dynamics, Northrup Grumman, and the Winchester-operated Lake City ammunition plant.

NIOA Group CEO Robert Nioa
https://www.nioa.com.au/latest-news/nioa-acquires-us-manufacturer-barrett-firearms