Mil News Australia, NZ, Oceania Military News

New Zealand's government unveiled plans on Monday (May 23) to train a small number of Ukrainian soldiers in using field artillery guns, deepening the country's involvement in a conflict on the other side of the world.

Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said her Cabinet agreed to deploy up to 30 members of the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) to Britain to train Ukrainian forces in the use of L119 105mm howitzers.

"We have been clear throughout Russia's assault on Ukraine, that such a blatant attack on innocent lives and the sovereignty of another country is wrong," said Ardern.

"Our response has not only included the condemnation of Russia, but practical support for Ukraine."

New Zealand previously deployed a C130 Hercules aircraft and NZDF personnel to Europe to provide intelligence, transportation and logistics support to Ukraine.

Ardern said the decision - a sensitive one for non-interventionist New Zealand - came after a request for assistance was carefully studied.
https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/australianz/new-zealand-to-train-ukrainian-forces-in-artillery-use
 
The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Australia of HIMARS Launchers and related equipment for an estimated cost of $385 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

The Government of Australia has requested to buy twenty (20) M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS); thirty (30) M30A2 Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS); thirty (30) Alternative Warhead (AW) Pods with Insensitive Munitions Propulsion Systems (IMPS); thirty (30) M31A2 GMLRS Unitary (GMLRS-U) High Explosive Pods with IMPS; thirty (30) XM403 Extended Range (ER)-GMLRS AW Pods; thirty (30) EM404 ER GMLRS Unitary Pods; and ten (10) M57 Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). Also included are Reduced Range Practice Rocket Pods (RRPRP); Vehicular Intercom System (AN/VIC-3) 3-Station; radio communication mounts; machine gun mounts; battle management system vehicle integration kits; wheel guards; ruggedized laptops; training equipment publications; spare and repair parts; support equipment; tools; test equipment; technical data; U.S. Government and Contractor support; technical and logistical support services; and other related elements of program and logistic support. The total estimated program cost is $385 million.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-himars-launchers
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Australia:
Washington was the last of the Quad capitals that Richard Marles visited in his opening diplomatic salvo as Australia’s deputy prime minister and defence minister. But, as far as defence matters are concerned, the agenda that he took to Washington was arguably the most ambitious and complex of all.

Of course, Marles’s meeting with US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and his team was not his first. The two met twice on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore last month. But a dedicated bilateral visit offered some obvious advantages, particularly so early in the new Australian government’s tenure. For one, it allowed top officials to explore issues of common interest in more depth than at engagements on the sidelines of regional forums. The rest of Marles’s visit provided opportunities for direct engagement with other important parts of the US system, including other government departments, the wider strategic and defence policy community, Congress, and defence industry entities.

If Marles’s excellent address at the Center for Strategic and International Studies was a tone-setter, then three words capture the essence of the agenda Marles would have sought to prosecute with Washington: integrate, integrate, integrate.

Importantly, Marles repeatedly made clear over the course of his visit that his government wasn’t looking to reinvent the wheel when it came to the US–Australia alliance’s defence integration program. Rather, his message was that the wheel needs to spin faster, whether in advancing defence technology cooperation or accelerating ambitious force posture plans—both longstanding objectives held by successive Australian governments.

For instance, at CSIS Marles flagged his intention to propose specific measures to streamline cooperation through the US national technology and industrial base, or NTIB. This mechanism is intended to facilitate greater defence innovation and easier technology sharing between the US and its most trusted allies, Australia included. Yet prohibitive export-control regimes and bureaucratic misalignment have prevented the NTIB from delivering on its promise as a veritable defence free-trade zone, barriers that continue to hamper Australian efforts to develop sovereign capabilities with US help, such as the guided weapons and explosive ordnance enterprise. It’s unclear exactly what reforms Marles proposed to his interlocutors at the Pentagon. But in making this a centrepiece for his engagement with American counterparts, Marles continued with the proactive efforts of former defence ministers Peter Dutton and Linda Reynolds to ensure that the NTIB remains at the top of the bilateral agenda.

Efforts to get the NTIB working properly feed directly into another defence integration priority for the new government: AUKUS. Indeed, one of the NTIB’s chief architects has warned that, without urgent reform, longstanding collaboration could yet sink technology co-development and transfer projects flagged under AUKUS. Australia’s future nuclear-powered submarines, of course, remain the big-ticket item, and Marles indicated before his departure that accelerating the subs’ delivery timeline would be central to his discussions in DC. But Australia is looking for substantial advanced-capability pay-offs from AUKUS much earlier than the 2040s. Marles’s emphasis on the need for Australia to acquire long-range strike, advanced cyber capabilities and so-called area-denial systems like uncrewed underwater systems underscored that perspective, and will undoubtedly have been close to the top of the agenda in his meetings with senior US defence officials.

However, implementing AUKUS and the NTIB isn’t just about maximising benefits for Australia. Indeed, at CSIS Marles argued that Australia’s goal was to ‘supplement and strengthen US industry and [shared] supply chains’ by providing ‘a trusted second source’ for critical items like precision munitions for both militaries. In that sense, the alliance’s defence industrial and technology integration initiatives are closely tied to the expanded force posture initiatives (EFPIs) announced at AUSMIN last year, which are also intended to better integrate Australian and US defence forces. Marles made clear at the Australian–American Leadership Dialogue that he sees AUKUS as, ideally, facilitating the sort of ‘seamless’ defence industrial integration that would truly reflect the interoperability of US and Australian forces, and make Australia ‘a much more potent and effective’ security partner in the region.

With EFPI implementation high on the agenda, the government’s planned force posture review provides an opportunity to better integrate Australian forces with the US and prepare them for the sorts of ‘high‑end warfighting and combined military operations’ flagged in last year’s AUSMIN communiqué. As Marles argued at CSIS, timely progress on the EFPIs will be crucial if the alliance is to ‘move beyond interoperability to interchangeability’. Plans to develop a shared logistics, maintenance and sustainment capability as part of the EFPIs to support high-intensity and high-end operations neatly capture this dynamic.

However, an expanding aperture for the US military presence in Australia should also prompt Canberra and Washington to deepen their joint strategic planning—to better ‘share the burden of strategic thought’, as Marles put it. This is something that alliance practitioners have long called for as part of wider efforts to modernise the alliance for new and emerging deterrence challenges. Of course, Taiwan has dominated much of the public discussion on this point. But the growing number of close encounters between Australian and Chinese aircraft and warships across the region, and concerns that Canberra and other regional allies have that such ‘routine’ coercion could escalate into conventional conflict, make this more important than ever—particularly if the EFPIs are to be implemented and leveraged in ways of greatest benefit to Australian interests.

It goes without saying that implementing this integration program—only a part of the wider bilateral agenda—will take more than one successful high-level visit. But Marles’s clear message to Washington that the wheels of integration need to spin faster than ever before is cause for optimism that the US–Australia alliance can get ‘match-fit’ for defence challenges in the Indo-Pacific.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/m...tralia alliance integrate integrate integrate
 
The Australian Department of Defense (DOD) has signed a contract with American multinational aerospace and defense company Raytheon to provide training services support to the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF).

The package will see Raytheon train the RAAF on its F/A-18F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler aircraft, which the DOD said are critical to the RAAF’s combat fleet.

The AU $109.7 million ($ 76 million) contract will employ up to 49 personnel from Raytheon Australia and an Australian subcontractor, Milskil. The majority of the training services will be delivered from RAAF Base Amberley.

“This initial five-year $109.7 million contract will deliver ground-based simulator training support including maintenance and engineering as well as aircrew training services such as instruction, courseware development and force generation tasks,” DoD Aerospace Combat Systems director general air commodore Leanne Lee said in a statement dated August 1, 2022.

“This new electronic attack air combat training support contract will ensure our RAAF personnel retain their edge through high-quality F/A-18F Super Hornet and EA-18G Growler training,” Lee added.
https://www.aerotime.aero/articles/31802-raytheon-raaf-training-fa18f-ea18g
 
Austal Limited (Austal) (ASX: ASB) is pleased to announce Austal Australia has delivered the second of eight Evolved Cape-class Patrol Boats (ECCPB’s) to the Royal Australian Navy.

The vessel, ADV Cape Peron, was officially accepted by the Commonwealth of Australia.

Austal Limited Chief Executive Officer, Paddy Gregg said the delivery of the second Evolved Cape-class Patrol Boat highlights the critical importance of the vessel as a capability to the Royal Australian Navy, and Australia’s national naval shipbuilding enterprise.

“The Evolved Cape-class Patrol Boats are not only enhancing the Royal Australian Navy’s capability, but further strengthening Australia’s sovereign shipbuilding capability, which is more important than ever before,” Mr Gregg said.

The 58-metre aluminium monohull patrol boat is the second of eight to be delivered to the Royal Australian Navy. The first Evolved Cape-class Patrol Boat, ADV Cape Otway, was delivered in March 2022, following approximately 18 months construction. The six remaining vessels are in various stages of production at Austal’s Henderson, Western Australia shipyard and deliveries are scheduled progressively through to 2024.

With greater capability than the benchmark Cape-class Patrol Boats, the Evolved Capes feature new, larger amenities to accommodate up to 32 people, improved quality of life systems and advanced sustainment intelligence systems.
https://www.austal.com/news/austal-...-cape-class-patrol-boat-royal-australian-navy
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Australia:
About 100 aircraft and 2500 military personnel from 17 nations will arrive in the Australia's Northern Territory in mid-August to commence Exercise Pitch Black 2022.

With a four-year hiatus since the last Pitch Black due to the global pandemic, this year's exercise will see a return of the combined force to Australian skies, enhancing interoperability and strengthening relationships.

"International participation in Exercise Pitch Black, from within the Indo-Pacific region and further abroad, provides all nations' personnel with experience in working with aircraft, systems and work practices, in northern Australia's unique environment, that would otherwise be unfamiliar," said Group Captain Peter Wood, Pitch Black 2022 Director Engagement.

Exercise Pitch Black is Air Force's biennial capstone international engagement activity with key strategic partners. Besides the hosting Royal Australian Air Force, this year's participants include air forces from NATO members Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the US, NATO Partners New Zealand, Republic of Korea and the United Arab Emirates as well from Indonesia, India, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Participating air forces will be operating out of RAAF Bases Darwin and Tindal primarily, supported by RAAF Base Amberley.

Multinational live-fly exercises offer a unique opportunity for Allied and Partner air forces to hone their flying skills and enhance common tactics, techniques and procedures indispensable for operating alongside each other in real-world missions. By inviting NATO Allies to conduct interoperability training with Partners and other regional air forces in the Indo-Pacific region, Australia has created an opportunity for bringing the air forces together and promoting mutual understanding of global security issues.

Since 2005, NATO and Australia have been engaged in dialogue and cooperation. Australia is one of a range of countries beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, often referred to as "partners across the globe". Priorities in NATO-Australia relations include upholding the international rules-based order, and enhancing interoperability between NATO and Australia. Cooperation is underpinned by regular high-level political dialogue. Australia is an Enhanced Opportunities Partner, alongside Finland, Georgia, Jordan, Sweden and Ukraine.
https://ac.nato.int/archive/2022/Ex...itch Black,commence Exercise Pitch Black 2022.
 
Little noticed publicly in either Australia or South Korea, Seoul has taken steps in recent months that suggest intent to forge closer strategic links with Canberra. The trend has accelerated under Korea’s new administration and should be factored in to Australia’s defence strategic review as an opportunity to strengthen our regional security and economic relationships.

During the June NATO summit attended by President Yoon Seok-yeol (who met with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese), Korean Prime Minister Han Duck-soo reportedly said: ‘Our priorities in values and national interests are changing’ and ‘I am not convinced that we are going to be affected much by China’s complaints.’

China’s demands irk Korea. Recognising Chinese power, proximity and major trade and investment interests, Korea will think hard before offending it, evidenced by Yoon—clumsily—not meeting US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in person in Seoul following her visit to Taiwan. And Korea will also not formally join the Quad, although Seoul is positive towards both it and possible cooperation with AUKUS.

But China’s recent aggressive military exercising and demands to limit operations of a US THAAD anti-missile battery in Korea (which, on its deployment in 2016, provoked tough Chinese economic sanctions) will strengthen already high levels of anti-China sentiment in Korea. It may lead to toughening of Seoul’s Indo-Pacific policy and greater willingness to engage substantively with Western powers and others concerned by the risks in China’s actions.

Like Australia, Korea faces a darkening geoeconomic and strategic outlook. Policymakers in the new Yoon administration will be weighing:

  • renewed belligerence by North Korea, with resumption of nuclear testing considered imminent, perhaps aimed at development of tactical nuclear weapons
  • sharpened US–China strategic competition, with growing possibilities for miscalculation and pressures on Seoul to abandon its policy of ‘strategic ambiguity’
  • concerns that any military action in the region will disrupt Korea’s sea lines of communication and could cripple its economy
  • related concerns that a resumption of Chinese economic coercion could include China throttling exports of rare earths and other critical minerals to Korea’s critical semiconductor industry
  • fears that America’s (and Europe’s) preoccupation with the Ukraine war will weaken their attention to East Asian challenges, a view given more substance by Washington offering no new market access under its Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
  • widely shared worries about a return of Donald Trump—or a Trumpian figure—to the White House in 2024, again undermining confidence in Korea’s US alliance, and ‘America first’ policies that weaken the US commitment to a robust Indo-Pacific posture
  • Korea’s inability fully to surmount its historical differences with Japan, bolstered by Japanese frustrations with Korean policy, which continues to truncate critical trilateral US–Japan–Korea defence and intelligence cooperation.
In short, Korea, like Japan, feels increasingly vulnerable and faces multiple challenges to its interests. But Korea is not sitting idle. It is building its already significant defence manufacturing industry—now a major export earner—to encompass not only ground force equipment but space, cyber, longer-range ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, drones, fighter aircraft and a light aircraft carrier.

These capabilities help address the growing North Korean nuclear and conventional threat, and in particular respond to the North’s apparent effort to develop a battlefield nuclear weapon, an indication that the North hasn’t given up ambitions to blackmail the South, if not force a reunification on the North’s terms.

And the defence build-up goes well beyond that, enabling Seoul to play a much larger regional security role. The posture involves development of means to project power well beyond the Korean peninsula and to enhance deterrence against a more assertive China, even if the US alliance weakens. Korea has a long historical memory.

So where does Australia fit in? Australia has been a key member of the United Nations Command for Korea since the Korean War, and although this commitment has been small, it has been consistent. After the central US role, Australia’s probably the most significant. It has provided the basis for annual exercising with both countries in South Korea and a window into contingency warfighting and evacuation planning.

Until now, though highly valued by the US, the Australian commitment hasn’t been similarly valued by the myopic Korean military. But, driven by Yoon’s initial foreign policy advisers who have strong links with Australia, and a deteriorating regional and global security outlook, this view may be changing.

Aside from the common interests of the two countries, Korea eyes a potential significant defence market. Korea’s Hanwha Defence is building K9 self-propelled howitzers for the Australian Army in Geelong, and is bidding for the major contract to replace the army’s infantry fighting vehicles with a vehicle designed to meet Australian conditions. If it wins the contract, defence links could become much stronger.

But Korea, short of key resources, is also looking to Australia for secure supplies of hydrogen as it transitions from a fossil-fuel-dependent economy and away from Australian-supplied coal and liquefied natural gas. Australian rare earths and critical minerals will help reduce Korea’s vulnerability if China reimposes economic sanctions on Korea.

Hence outgoing President Moon Jae-in’s unexpected visit to Australia at the end of his term last November to engage potential suppliers and investors, particularly for critical minerals. A big resources trade delegation quickly followed in March, and an Australia–Korea Business Council delegation, focused specifically on these priorities, was welcomed in Korea in June.

In turn, this was followed in July by a visit from Korea’s minister for defence acquisition, Eom Dongwhan, accompanied by a delegation from key defence manufacturers. Only three weeks later, in early August, Korea’s defence minister, Lee Jong-sup, visited both Canberra and Hanwha’s new Geelong plant, meeting with Australia’s defence minister, Richard Marles. These visits came early in the life of both new governments, indicating priority on both sides. The visits were not part of the routine structure of consultations between defence and foreign ministers, suggesting a wish to quickly build stronger defence links—and for Korea to promote its defence exports.

Australia’s defence strategic review should look closely at this pattern. Korea has a sophisticated defence industry, while its strategic priorities align increasingly closely with Australia’s. Until now, the opportunities in this new alignment have largely been overlooked—by both countries—but growing regional tensions suggest a rethink is timely.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/s...a seeks closer strategic links with Australia
 
The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Australia of UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters and related equipment for an estimated cost of $1.95 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

The Government of Australia has requested to buy forty (40) UH-60M Black Hawk helicopters;
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-uh-60m-black-hawk-helicopters

Australia’s attempt to replace the troubled MRH90 Taipan helicopter with the UH-60M has taken another step forward after the US government approved the potential Foreign Military Sale on August 25. The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency said in Transmittal No 22-51 that the proposed sale “will replace Australia’s current multi-role helicopter fleet with a more reliable and proven system.” In its justification to buy the UH-60M to replace the MRH90, former Australian Defence Minister Peter Dutton said last year that the “performance of the MRH90 Taipan has been an ongoing and well-documented concern for Defence and there has been a significant effort at great expense to try to remediate those issues.”
 
It is with sadness I learned of the passing of this great Kiwi warrior, Raymond (TREM) Trembath NZDF and FFL veteran.

30 August 2022 -

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Short Bio from a Facebook post -

"Raymond Trembath , TREM, as he was commonly called. He was born on 24 April 1955.

He joined the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment on 11 June 1973. Retired on June 11, 2015.

He went to South Africa and tried to join SADF, after that, Trem served in the French Foreign Legion for 5 years from 1989 to 1994, serving in the 2 REP and becoming an elite shooter.

Trem returned to New Zealand and continued to serve again in the New Zealand Army, reaching the rank of SSgt. He enjoyed being a soldier and teaching those around him.

He had cancer for about 8 years and had to take hormones twice a day... And was in constant pain and discomfort. This means he spent the majority of the day sitting, because it was painful to even walk to the mailbox and back.

He enjoyed a physical challenge, cycling through the United States twice and riding most of New Zealand through the bush.

Life was great for Trem and he had many friends, in service, veterans and military collecting groups. He always loved a good chinwag.

Trem said goodbye. And enjoy life to its fullest And always be yourself. Dont try to be someone else.

You have lived an EXCEPTIONAL life.

Thanks for being part of the AVWW group

ka noho tonu koe hei toa je runga je te whenua & je te rangi.

RIP & whakaute je taku hoa
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(you'll always be a warrior on earth & in heaven.

RIP and Respect my friend)

RIDE OR DIE
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Peace to your soul Raymond Trembath have a good trip to the country of the Lords
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docplayer.net/79036571-Further-faster-harder.html
 

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Sept. 14, 2022 – Northrop Grumman Corporation unveiled Australia’s first MQ-4C Triton autonomous aircraft during a ceremony at its high-altitude, long-endurance (HALE) aircraft production site in California. The event, attended by Australian, U.S. government and defence officials, highlights the continued progress of the MQ-4C Triton program for both the Royal Australian Air Force and U.S. Navy.
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https://news.northropgrumman.com/ne...grumman-unveils-first-australian-mq-4c-triton
 

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