The past year brought a renewed focus on Australia’s deteriorating security situation and maritime capability. Despite the maritime emphasis in Australia’s 2024 defence announcements, the country remains far from being adequately positioned to defend its extensive sea lines of communication, subsea cables and broader national interests at sea.
With a federal election due by May, the next Australian government must spend on the navy, address the capability gaps and make timely decisions on future capability.
In the past 12 months, the oceans on which we depend for our protection and prosperity have experienced a dramatic deterioration in security terms, unseen in recent decades. Globally, from the Black Sea to the Red Sea, maritime trade is under pressure. Europe has experienced further attacks on critical maritime infrastructure, including subsea cables – the backbone of internet connectivity.
Closer to home, we’ve witnessed escalating aggression from China’s coastguard, which regularly has attacked Philippine vessels in the West Philippine Sea.
Australian sailors have been placed at risk, most recently when a Chinese fighter pilot inexplicably deployed flares in front of an Australian helicopter operating in international airspace. This is not simply a canary in the coalmine; it means the breakdown of global norms.
If a conflict arises in the Indo-Pacific, it will be inherently maritime in nature and we will be compelled to fight with the capabilities we have at the time.
In February 2024, the government announced a historic expansion of the surface combatant fleet—the destroyers and frigates of the Royal Australian Navy equipped with offensive and defensive weapons including missiles and torpedoes. But this expansion is not expected to materialise until the 2030s.
During the past 12 months there has been an integration of new missile capabilities in the navy’s small fleet. Announcements have included the acceleration of building ships for the army and key achievements in training, treaties and export controls to support Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines. In fact, 38 percent of Defence’s spending plan, the Integrated Investment Program, across the next decade will be directed towards maritime capabilities.
These developments are positive, but they have not shifted the needle in the near term to address Australia’s vulnerabilities in the maritime domain.
Australia’s surface combatant fleet has been reduced from 11 to 10 with the decommissioning of HMAS
Anzac because of its age. The mine-hunting fleet also has been diminished, leaving only two vessels remaining after a mid-year decision to cancel their replacements. Australia’s two tankers, critical for replenishing fuel, food and ammunition for naval ships, have been laid up for most of 2024 because of defects. Additionally, much of Australia’s hydrographic capability, vital for surveying beneath the surface of the water, has been decommissioned, leaving only one ship in operation.
The list goes on. These issues are the product of decades of delayed and indecisive decision-making compounded by a lack of investment. The increasing frequency of attacks in the maritime domain, coupled with the absence of strategic warning time for a potential regional conflict, highlights the urgent need to address Australia’s waning maritime power. This is not simply a nice-to-have but an essential requirement for an island nation when global security norms are being redefined.
In 2025 a timely decision on Australia’s future frigate design will be critical to achieving the planned 2029 delivery of the first of 11 ships. This decision must prioritise the option that minimises delivery risks, ensures operational capability by 2029 (or sooner), maximises commonality with existing Australian systems and offers the design flexibility to accommodate future upgrades.
We must be even bolder than this. While the thought of another review may make us groan, the next government must conduct a thorough assessment of our broader naval and maritime capabilities. If we acknowledge that we’re not currently equipped to protect our trade routes or subsea cables, we must critically examine the composition of the wider fleet—not just the surface combatants but also our mine warfare, hydrographic, amphibious, replenishment and clearance diving capabilities.
Finally, we must confront the difficult conversation about spending to deliver these capabilities at speed. While the current government has made the first substantial increase to the defence budget in nearly a decade—projecting defence spending to rise from the current 2 per cent of GDP to 2.4 per cent by the end of the next decade—this will not be enough to revitalise our defence, particularly our naval capabilities.
During the Cold War, Australia consistently spent an average of 2.7 percent of GDP on defence, with spending exceeding that level during major naval construction efforts. If Australia is truly facing its most complex and challenging strategic environment since World War II, as outlined in the 2024 National Defence Strategy, we cannot afford to continue underspending.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/t...n government needs a bolder plan for the navy
Jennifer Parker is an expert associate at the National Security College, Australian National University, an adjunct fellow at the University of New South Wales and Nancy Bentley Associate Fellow in Indo-Pacific Maritime Affairs at the Council on Geostrategy. Jennifer has over 20 years of experience in the Australian Department of Defence, working in a broad range of operational and capability areas.
