Mil News Australia, NZ, Oceania Military News

[Junglejim]

https://www.adfcareers.gov.au/jobs/air-force/fast-jet-pilot click the blue button!

damn must have military service or current resident, surprised though at the 48 years old age limit.

 

[digrar]

I reckon for a lot of jobs, it's there, but it's also totally ignored and no one within a couple of decades below that age is getting a slot.

 

[TheKiwi]

Deal struck to produce NSM missiles in Australia.

Australia strikes deal to build our own long-range missiles

The missiles will cost $4 million each and have a range over 275 kilometres.

www.smh.com.au

 

[BravoZulu]

The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Australia of FGM-148F Javelin Missiles (Fitted with a multi-purpose warhead (MPWH). Developed as "Spiral 2". Production started in May 2020.) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $100 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

The Government of Australia has requested to buy three hundred fifty (350) Javelin FGM-148F missiles (includes four (4) fly-to-buy missiles). Also included is U.S. Government technical assistance; technical data; repair and return services; and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $100 million.

https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-fgm-148f-javelin-missiles

 

[TheKiwi]

Photo shows someone in Swedish cammo??

 

[BravoZulu]

Photo shows someone in Swedish cammo??

Yep, a generic photo the Javelin. I couldn't be stuffed looking for an Aussie

 

[digrar]

"A soldier from 3 RAR fires a Javelin FGM-148 direct fire, guided weapon system during Exercise Kapyong Warrior. Story by Captain Diana Jennings. Photo by Corporal Dustin Anderson."

 

[av405]

Photo shows someone in Swedish cammo??

Norwegian

 

[BravoZulu]

The US State Department has approved the sale of up to 100 AGM-88G Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missiles-Extended Range (AARGM-ER) for the Royal Australian Air Force.

Australia requested the missiles and related equipment for an estimated $405 million. It is expected to be initially integrated with the Royal Australian Air Force’s EA-18G Growlers, according to Australian Defence Magazine.

The potential sale includes up to 24 AGM-88G AARGM-ER guidance sections and up to 24 AGM-88G AARGM-ER control sections.

 

[NZM305]

NZ Navy ship runs aground off Samoa https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/national/529935/nz-navy-ship-runs-aground-off-samoa

At least everybody appears to be safe......
but some one is in big trouble.....

 

[TheKiwi]

It's capsized and sunk now. I really can't understand, was no effort made at damage control?

Someone is pretty fast with the updates on Wiki...

HMNZS Manawanui (2019) - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Redav]

 

[Picanha]

BAE Systems Australia unveils new highly autonomous armed UGV - European Security & Defence

BAE Systems Australia has unveiled a new UGV called the Autonomous Tactical Light Armour System Collaborative Combat Variant.

euro-sd.com

 

[BravoZulu]

It is rare for a developed nation’s navy to lose a big vessel in peacetime. The sinking of the Royal New Zealand Navy’s HMNZS Manawanui after it ran aground on a Samoan reef this month—the country’s first naval loss since World War II—has raised important questions about naval preparedness. Fortunately, all 75 crew members were rescued, a testament to the ship’s commanding officer and crew.

Although the exact cause of the incident is under investigation, it highlights broader issues about the state of readiness, not just for New Zealand but also for allied and partner navies, including Australia.

This incident underscores several concerning issues about naval preparedness: insufficient naval capability, workforce challenges, budget constraints and the failure to invest in critical enablers. Each is acutely relevant to New Zealand and Australia, highlighting key vulnerabilities.

Manawanui was the only mine warfare and hydrographic survey vessel in the New Zealand fleet, a crucial asset for a maritime nation with the fifth-largest exclusive economic zone in the world. The loss of this ship leaves a glaring gap in New Zealand’s naval capabilities.

New Zealand’s navy, like many smaller ones, has long been operating with minimal capability across several domains. Manawanui’s loss illustrates the risks inherent in this minimalist approach: when one ship is the sole platform for a critical capability, losing it—even temporarily—paralyses that mission set.

This situation should sound alarm bells in Australia as well. The country’s decision to scrap its future mine warfare ship program, alongside the expansion of its at-sea replenishment capabilities in the latest Defence Integrated Investment Program, echoes New Zealand’s dangerous underinvestment in niche but vital capabilities.

The justification for cancelling the mine warfare ship program was that autonomous systems would replace the capability. However, without a ship to deploy from, these systems cannot cover the full spectrum of operations needed to protect Australia’s shipping routes from naval mines—something it should expect in the event of a conflict in the region.

During World War II, Australian waters were heavily mined. There were minefields between Sydney and Newcastle, in the Bass Strait, off Hobart and in the Spencer Gulf.

Australia’s hydrographic capability, used for seabed surveys, is in a precarious state, with five of its six ships decommissioned in the past three years and the last likely to follow soon. The 2020 decision to outsource nearly all of the navy’s hydrographic responsibilities has severely weakened its capacity in this area.

Another issue exacerbating the challenges in enabling capabilities is the shortage of Australian replenishment vessels. Both of the Royal Australian Navy’s replenishment ships are out of action until 2025, and while the problems are reportedly being dealt with under the warranties, it raises a broader question: why does Australia have only two? The money allocated to expanding this capability was removed in the latest Defence Integrated Investment Program.

There are many examples of such underinvestment in the navy’s enabling capabilities. The failure to maintain and expand these powers now could leave the country dangerously exposed in the event of a maritime crisis. The underinvestment and lack of preparedness come at a time when Australia’s defence strategy has stopped assuming that the country will get a 10-year warning period of an emerging conflict.

Despite the Australian government’s recent Defence budget uplift in May, the funding allocation, which equates to about 2.1 percent of GDP, is simply not enough to tackle the issues.

While the figure in nominal terms might be historic, in real terms as a percentage of GDP, it is low—particularly at a time when Defence, and specifically the navy, are going through a major recapitalisation following the underinvestment since the end of the Cold War.

According to the 2024 Australian National Defence Strategy, the country is facing its most challenging strategic environment since World War II. Yet, this has not been met with equally robust investment.

During the Cold War, Australia’s defence spending averaged 2.7 percent of GDP and was even higher during periods of heightened tension or major recapitalisation.

Despite the current strategic environment and the largest defence recapitalisation in decades, defence spending is projected to reach only 2.4 percent of GDP by the end of the decade—well below the Cold War average.

Although funding has been allocated for new surface combatants and submarines, there is little left to enhance other naval capabilities, leaving many of these atrophying and compromising naval preparedness at a critical time.

This inconsistency between our strategic statements about the chances of conflict in the region and our investment is glaring—and our naval preparedness is paying the price.

The sinking of HMNZS Manawanui should be a wake-up call for Australia and New Zealand. A conflict in the Indo-Pacific region is no longer a distant hypothetical. Regional tensions are rising and our naval forces are likely to be at the forefront of any confrontation. The ability to prevail in such a conflict depends not just on major warships and submarines but also on the enabling capabilities that underpin maritime operations: replenishment, hydrography, mine warfare and other niche but vital domains.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/w... naval capability is minimal its also brittle

 

[TheKiwi]

Australia to purchase hundreds of SM-6 and SM-2 IIIC missiles for the RAN.

Australia buys $7b worth of US missiles for ‘greatest arms race’ since World War II

The deal will equip Australia’s navy with hundreds of advanced US-made long-range weapons.

www.smh.com.au

 

[BravoZulu]

Australia to purchase hundreds of SM-6 and SM-2 IIIC missiles for the RAN.

Australia buys $7b worth of US missiles for ‘greatest arms race’ since World War II

The deal will equip Australia’s navy with hundreds of advanced US-made long-range weapons.

www.smh.com.au

About bloody time! For decades the navy has run with a bare minimum stock of missiles to the point that a deploying ship will have a full magazine complimentary of another ship not deploying. It was common knowledge in the 80s that we (the navy) had 2 days of ammunition and no resupply except from the yanks

 

[BravoZulu]

While I’m wary of joining the chorus of defence commentators yelling at clouds, our government has boxed itself into a corner. We must spend more on defence, but creeping suppression of informed public debate coupled with dire cost-of-living realities make this an unlikely option for Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.

Australia’s defence and foreign policy is entrenched in short-term domestic political considerations, devoid of strategic imagination. The idea of nearing an inflection point in international security is routinely trotted out but misses the fact that Australia passed that point long ago. Perhaps the Cold War never ended; it just mutated and incorporated multipolar elements.

There are two sets of external changes shaping Australia’s defence problem. First, new groupings of states are emerging—with some firepower to boot—that prioritise different values to us. On values we share—say, the continued survival of the state—they are often interpreted differently. Australia might look to the multilateral rules-based order to shore up support for our right to exist. Another state might view this order as a legacy system that is not willing to facilitate the transfer of power to rising states. Problems ensue.

It is getting harder to tackle these problems thanks to the second set of changes influencing Australian security. There are new approaches to navigating the international system. Where alliances and shared interests are central to Australia’s international engagement, the new grouping of powers has normalised a sense of transactional statecraft in international relations. Security ties are not infused with a liberal-west dose of morality. Interests are king.

Government has failed to grasp at a strategic level these two sets of changes. Lazy conceptual frameworks have been tabled without adequate funds to deliver. Capabilities needed yesterday are earmarked for two decades’ time. Word-soup statements of ‘unprecedented unpredictability’ feature heavily, disingenuously attempting to engage Australians. We know the international environment has always been unpredictable, to a point, and contestation has never not been a feature of international security.

In a word, Australia is lost – lost in reviews, lost in rhetoric and lost to a government fixated on complicating a rather straightforward problem set. Australia is unprepared and unserious about our position in the emerging international strategic environment.

We must be willing to have this discussion publicly. Government needs to come to the party and rapidly enhance its appetite for risk. Canberra should rediscover the agility of a relatively smart population and urgently craft a sustainable defence footing for the nation. This requires a strategic culture overhaul, which must come from the top.

We can’t do all the things, and a realistic plan for the defence of Australia need not be gold-plated. Of course, the inability of government to articulate in basic terms our vital national interests will continue to stupefy our debate. Where is our national discourse on the costs of Australian prosperity and security? Where is the funding for foresight analysis of strategic trends. Sure, China is a challenge, but what of India?

I offer the tale of Australia’s Bangladesh strategy. We continue to pump millions of dollars of humanitarian aid each year into Bangladesh. Yet, by the end of this year, two of the four planned units at Bangladesh’s Rooppur nuclear power station will be operational. Nuclear power will continue to lift Bangladesh towards prosperity; its economy has just become the second-largest in South Asia.

Built by Russia on a site where ground was broken in 2017, the plant will have sanctioned fuses that China stepped in to provide. In late 2023, Bangladesh settled the final payments to Russia in Chinese yuan. The point is, Australia has a surface-level grasp of the intricate regional relationships on our doorstep. This continues to undercut adequate manoeuvring of our international political environment. We must know our environment if we want to prosper and compete within it.

Australia is part of a group of states, in a club, of minority power in the international system. Humbling ourselves to accept this strategic reality will allow for hard but necessary discussion of our plan to adequately defend Australia. Australia has a middle-power ego on a small-power budget. Canberra must be creative.

A sense of strategic culture can’t reside in the halls of departments—nor can it remain a job of government. National security is every Australian citizen’s duty. Education therefore becomes paramount. As the saying goes, ‘if one does not know to which port one is sailing, no wind is favourable.’ If we don’t know what we are competing for, and why, how can we possibly begin to chart success?

The Albanese government’s legacy may well be that it failed to discern between the concepts of intent and capability. Intent is the thing that can change overnight. Capability, not so much. From platitudes to policy, our strategic narrative is narrowly fixed in terms of intent. It is time to focus on capability—or at least craft a viable concept of a plan to do so.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a...f strategic failure and a lack of imagination

 

[TheKiwi]

Review of Australian Defence Force property holdings on hold until after the election.

Defence real estate sell-off put on ice

The Coalition and Greens leapt upon the delay to accuse the Albanese government of dithering over tough decisions on defence.

www.smh.com.au

 

[gafkiwi]

The NZDF has selected the VAMTAC ST5 and CK3 from UROVESA of Spain as replacements for the Pinzgauer Light Operational Vehicle (LOV) and the 1700 UNIMOG respectively.

Army and NZDF set to welcome new workhorse utility vehicle

From 2027 Ngāti Tūmatauenga, the New Zealand Army, will receive sixty brand new utility vehicles in a significant boost to New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) capabilities.

www.nzdf.mil.nz

 

[TheKiwi]

Japan is seeking to capitalise on its rapidly deepening “quasi alliance” with Australia as it competes with Germany in a fierce battle to win a $10 billion contract to build 11 frigates for the Australian navy.

Defence Minister Richard Marles this week officially announced that Japan’s Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Germany’s Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) have been shortlisted for the lucrative general purpose frigate contract, knocking out rival bids from Spain and South Korea.

Japan and Germany battle for edge in lucrative war ship deal

Japan is seeking to capitalise on its rapidly deepening “quasi alliance” with Australia as it competes with Germany for a $10 billion shipbuilding deal.

www.smh.com.au