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[gafkiwi]

They're not on their own though, we've pretty much copied the USMC.

This also ties nicely into having the USMC MRF in Darwin

 

[BravoZulu]

This also ties nicely into having the USMC MRF in Darwin

Just because the yanks jump off a cliff doesn't mean we have to follow them, they have the capacity to do those experiments whereas it will take years to rebuild our armour and infantry up.
No new money to make this all happen, it comes out of the current budget.
And now another review taking place.
Pollies and bureaucrats should have their fingers chopped off

 

[gafkiwi]

Just because the yanks jump off a cliff doesn't mean we have to follow them, they have the capacity to do those experiments whereas it will take years to rebuild our armour and infantry up.
No new money to make this all happen, it comes out of the current budget.
And now another review taking place.
Pollies and bureaucrats should have their fingers chopped off

I'm not saying I agree with all the changes but adopting similar force structures as your key operating partners will always have benefits. Things like precision fires/rocket artillery are a given in this day and age but as you mentioned hasn't come with new funding and it's all out of the same money bucket and the big buys have already been made or committed to. Within this plan, a key issue with specialist Bde's in a relatively small army structure is the lack of redundancy which the Govt/ADF will discover (re-learn) in about one to two posting cycles.

When is the next election year there? That is generally what drives changes.

 

[BravoZulu]

The Australian government has inked a $1.5 billion deal to acquire a fourth MQ-4C Triton drone and upgrade its fleet of P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.

A maintenance workforce will be established at RAAF Base Tindal southeast of Darwin and RAAF Base Edinburgh north of Adelaide to support the introduction of the MQ-4Cs, with the first aircraft due for delivery in 2024.

The upgrades to the P-8As will begin in 2026 and will include improved acoustic sensors and datalinks and the ability to fire AGM-158C long-range anti-ship missiles. The decision is designed to enhance military operations from Australia’s northern bases, a priority identified by the 2023 defence strategic review.

 

[BravoZulu]

Australian Army soldiers from the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment have conducted a combined-arms assault exercise with the Papua New Guinea Defence Force as part of Exercise Wantok Warrior.

Hosted at Moem Barracks in PNG, the series of annual training activities aims to build on the longstanding relationship between the two countries and provides continuity of training for infantry who had worked closely together in Exercise Talisman Sabre.

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[BravoZulu]

The Government is supporting local jobs and domestic manufacturing by investing $220 million in munitions production at factories in Mulwala in New South Wales and Benalla in Victoria.

The investment will significantly boost industrial capacity through:

• infrastructure redevelopments at each site – ensuring they are equipped to support future production demands, such as 155mm artillery ammunition,
• new explosive mixers at Mulwala, and
• enhanced munition manufacturing procedures, including non-destructive testing.

Developed by Defence, the new Resonant Acoustic Mixing technology in place at Mulwala will produce a broader range of advanced munitions, faster and more safely.

This will increase the capacity for production of the BLU-111(AUS) aerial bombs, used by the Royal Australian Air Force.
https://www.minister.defence.gov.au...million-local-munitions-manufacturing-defence

 

[BravoZulu]

I congratulate Peter Court for his recent Strategist article, which was as timely as it was important. The Royal Australian Navy should wholeheartedly support his proposition to stand up a merchant marine, not because it’s Labor policy as Court points out, but because it’s vitally, critically important for the nation and its defence. As well as being very sensible, Labor’s policy intentions are clear and expressed quite emphatically, as they need to be. One wonders what they’ve done about implementing it.

As a young Australian navy lieutenant undertaking my principal warfare officer course with the Royal Navy in the UK in 1983 (as we all did in those days), my British and Australian classmates and I benefited enormously from the first-hand experience of instructors who had personally been ‘in’ the Falklands War a year earlier. It was an incredibly rich environment in which to learn the trade we were in, at a time when Australia’s most recent naval warfare experience was the Vietnam War. While still very relevant, that war was also very different from the Falklands, and for our navy people, less brutal and personally widespread.

One aspect of the Falklands War we absorbed was the importance to British success of STUFT—an acronym for ‘ships taken up from trade’. As Court points out, the British-flagged Merchant Navy fleet was vital. Without it, Britain may well have lost two wars—the Falklands War and World War II.

Soon after my UK immersion, I found myself sitting around the large chequerboard tactical-gaming amphitheatre of the RAN’s Tactical School at HMAS Watson in Sydney. It was a very energising experience for a young officer. I was flush with brash self-confidence after graduating from the pre-eminent professional naval warfare course available to us, one which we thought had also been pretty tough. On this day, the fleet commander was running a wargame to help him come to grips with one of his many responsibilities at the time. In this case it was defending Christmas Island.

It was a fascinating event. The top echelon of the Australian Defence Force’s war fighters of the day were there; the best of the best if you like. We few youngsters who were privileged to be present certainly thought so. There were ship’s commanding officers and their warfare teams of senior people, logisticians, army and air force specialists from many fields, eminent international lawyers, scientists, policy people and more.

Among this stellar gathering were a couple of people I’d never heard of. They were the NCAPS people—meaning naval control and protection of shipping. No one else seemed to know them either, nor did anyone seem to know what they did.

The admiral seemed to be taking this wargame very seriously indeed. We reached a point in the scenario where the question arose of moving what (to us) was just an unimaginably vast quantity of all manner of stuff to Christmas Island. There was just no way this sort of volume of essential materiel could ever be moved by air, in the quantities and at the speed needed. It could only be done by sea. There were solemn, if not sombre expressions around the tactical floor.

‘What about STUFT?’ some youngster piped up. He was instantly in the spotlight of everyone’s baleful stares.

The eminent international lawyer cleared his throat quietly and explained, more patiently than some may have, that we had no mechanism for doing that, because unlike the UK, we had no national-flagged merchant fleet. None. Well, not that would be of much use in solving this problem. Then the NCAPS people had a say. Older than most of the rest of the audience, it turned out that they were the vestiges of Australia’s Merchant Navy. What they told us was sobering.

The only option was chartering ships, and their crews (almost invariably not Australian). These were two different matters. Being able to do either, and necessarily both, of course depended on the shipowners and the crew ‘owners’ being willing to sign contracts to provide those shipping services to the Australian government. And if a shooting war looked possible, insurance companies may well either refuse to provide cover or make it prohibitively expensive. What then? It quickly became obvious that, potentially, we were truly stuffed.

In 2023, notwithstanding a really important Labor policy, nothing much has changed. I was reminded of this recently during a holiday cruise in a small passenger ship off northern Australia. I was an unpaid working hand, not a paying passenger. The captain was the only Australian. He was a humble man and a mariner of considerably more professional expertise and experience than me and most of my navy colleagues. He reminded me of how important a national shipping capability was for security. The ship’s officers were mostly British, European or Asian, the domestic staff were from the Philippines and the rest of the crew were mostly Indonesians. Our pilot through the Great Barrier Reef was Indian. Don’t get me wrong—they were all excellent, professional seafarers. That’s not the point.

The simple point is this: if you stop the sea traffic on which we depend, Australia stops. Not slowly; not gradually. Very quickly. Our seaborne exports are one issue, but not the most critical one. If someone stops bulk ore or liquid natural gas ships from taking our export trade away, things will grind to a halt relatively slowly. But if someone prevents just a couple of ships from carrying our refined petroleum needs into our ports, Australia will shut down very fast indeed. The pain in our economy from expensive petrol would be nothing compared with the pain of having no petrol at all.

Some strategists point out that warships are easy to find and a cinch to sink these days—so why have any at all, they ask. One reason might be that in the part of the world in which we live, our survival depends on the huge numbers of ships that carry everything we need, in, out and in support of a fight if we face one. Perhaps we should be able to protect the most important of them. Perhaps we should also own our own ships, carrying at least some of the materials most vital for our survival as a nation.

A tiny island in the 1940s withstood the aggression of the most powerful military force the world had ever seen to that time. In large part, as Prime Minister Winston Churchill pointed out, they survived because of their ability to control a merchant fleet in their own national interest. That little island learned the same lesson again in 1982.

I applaud Peter Court for pointing out that it’s way past time we paid attention to that lesson too and learned from it. I commend that lesson to Australia’s navy, which should back the policy energetically. An Australian-flagged and Australian-crewed merchant navy would be a welcome partner in our national security, not a competitor or something to be feared.

Best we get on with it.
Rowan Moffitt is a retired rear admiral and a qualified surface warfare officer with 40 years’ service in the Royal Australian Navy. He has commanded frigates, destroyers and task groups and his appointments included deputy chief of navy and fleet commander
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/l...m=Lets get behind an Australian merchant navy

 

[BravoZulu]

As a country ‘girt by sea’, Australia must enunciate a clear maritime strategy that recognises the scale of its maritime territory and responsibilities, its dependence on trade for its prosperity and the increasing value of activity in the maritime environment.

In a highly interconnected world, we face fundamental vulnerabilities from the realities of our geostrategic situation, and we must be able to defend our national interests. In my ASPI report, An Australian maritime strategy: resourcing the Royal Australian Navy, released today, I argue that the Royal Australian Navy lacks the resources to adequately protect Australia’s vast maritime interests.

This isn’t unique to our time: maritime strategists have long lamented that, despite being uniquely an island, a continent and a nation, Australia struggles to understand the central importance of a maritime strategy to our defence and security. The underappreciation of Australia’s dependence on the maritime domain and its significance for our prosperity and security has consistently produced a RAN that’s overlooked and under-resourced.

Some argue that the AUKUS agreement shows that capability is driving strategy. But to develop a coherent force structure, strategy must drive capability. It’s important that the RAN’s structure and capabilities are driven by a strategy that’s clear and responsive to the circumstances outlined in the 2023 defence strategic review. Many of our partners, including the US, the UK and India, have recognised that and published public maritime strategies, but Australia’s maritime strategy is less clear, and the term itself is conspicuously absent from public strategic documents. A maritime strategy isn’t simply another domain strategy: the defence of our national interests is inherently maritime in nature.

To ensure maritime security, the RAN relies on a backbone of 11–12 major surface combatants. The major surface-combatant fleet consists of eight Anzac-class frigates and three Hobart-class destroyers. All have capabilities in anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-air warfare (AAW) and anti-surface warfare (ASuW).

The structure has remained relatively constant for more than 50 years, despite recommendations from multiple reviews that the fleet should have 16–20 ships. While the methodology behind recommendations for an expanded fleet isn’t clear, the context is relevant. Reviews in the 1970s and 1980s were conducted during the Cold War when the possibility of a ‘hot war’ was real. Throughout the 1990s and the 2000s, many policymakers believed that the era of state-on-state conflict was over. However, in the past 20 years, the power balance in the Indo-Pacific region has changed dramatically, and since 2022 Europe has faced the possibility of a major war.

By 2020, China’s military modernisation and its coercive and aggressive behaviour in the region, along with dramatic advances in technology, prompted the Australian government to abandon the assumption that it would have 10 years’ warning of a major conflict to strengthen the Australian Defence Force. But this significant change in strategic thinking, reinforced by the 2023 review, hasn’t brought relevant changes to the RAN’s structure, specifically to the major surface-combatant fleet. A review has been undertaken but its results aren’t yet public.

While Australia’s planned acquisition of eight nuclear-powered submarines under AUKUS to replace our six conventional submarines is important, it doesn’t represent a major structural change or significant expansion of the RAN. The program will significantly increase the capabilities of the RAN’s submarines, but not the overall capability of the fleet designed over 50 years ago.

In my report, I examine whether the bipartisan thesis of a structural change in Australia’s strategic circumstances, articulated in the 2023 review, also requires a structural change in and an expansion of the RAN. I argue that both a larger and balanced surface-combatant fleet and a review of the RAN’s structure are needed. The review should consider bold changes, including reconsideration of a fleet auxiliary, a coastguard or forward basing of assets to support the workforce requirements of an expanded fleet.

The report looks mainly at the structure of the surface-combatant fleet. As the government examines the recently completed surface fleet review, I make eight recommendations for its consideration.

I argue that the status quo of 11–12 major surface combatants is insufficient for Australia. That was the case even when the force was structured around the concept of 10 years’ warning time. The problem has become more acute given the strategic competition and the capability and size of potential adversaries, particularly China, as recognised in the 2023 review. I agree with past reviewers’ recommendations that 16–20 major surface combatants are needed.

The increased number must provide a range of operational effects in a balanced fleet. In this missile era, the planned number of ASW-oriented, multi-purpose Hunter-class frigates should be reduced. I argue that having nine would result in even an expanded fleet being biased towards ASW, with limited ability to field an adequate number of missiles per tonne across the fleet. That would have impact on its ASuW and AAW capabilities.

The scope and length of the report don’t permit consideration of Australia’s naval shipbuilding enterprise or the industry policy of continuous naval shipbuilding, although both must be considered in the expansion of the surface-combatant fleet. I don’t suggest what additional vessels should be acquired, but options include increasing the number of Hobart-class destroyers, modifying the Hunter class, or aligning with the US future frigate (Constellation class) or future destroyer program (DDG(X)). These possibilities all come with their own benefits and unique challenges.

The surface-combatant fleet can’t be viewed independently of broader maritime capabilities, including sealift, mine warfare and civil maritime trade operations, all of which will need to be enveloped in a clear and coherent maritime strategy. Although those capabilities aren’t considered in this report, their interrelated nature highlights why maritime strategy should be driving maritime capability.

Australia’s security and prosperity are intimately linked to the maritime domain, and yet our defence strategy—current and past—doesn’t clearly articulate a maritime strategy. Articulation, production and understanding of Australia’s maritime strategy are essential to deter conflict in the region, and an expanded fleet is required in case deterrence fails.

There’s bipartisan understanding and acceptance that our strategic circumstances will continue to change. That requires structural change of the RAN, not only acquiring a small number of nuclear-powered submarines—with opportunity and substantial risk—but bolstering the surface combatants which are the backbone of any force for achieving sea control and power projection.

This will be challenging and will require sweeping reviews of the wider RAN structure to crew and support that capability, hence the suggested consideration of a coastguard, a naval auxiliary or task groups at different readiness levels. This can’t be delayed. Tinkering around the edges of the ADF and RAN structures will provide neither the necessary deterrent effect nor the capability to defend Australia’s interests should deterrence fail. The dramatically reduced strategic warning time is itself a warning that we must act.
Jennifer Parker is a senior adviser with the National Security College at the Australian National University and an adjunct fellow in naval studies at UNSW Canberra with over 20 years’ experience in the Department of Defence.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a...stralian maritime strategy resourcing the RAN

 

[BravoZulu]

The Royal Australian Navy stands at a watershed. A child of the Royal Navy, the RAN shifted its primary relationship to the US Navy after World War II, buying predominantly American equipment from the 1960s. It has evolved to become more uniquely Australian but is to be further reshaped to meet future security challenges. This post examines how the RAN will contribute to Australia’s new strategic posture of deterrence by denial. Subsequent posts will analyse primary tasks and force structure considerations.

The defence strategic review (DSR) highlighted that we should expect little warning of conflict in times of uncertainty created by the rapid growth of China and its competition with the US. We should do all we can to ensure our own security. Our alliance with the US provides important comfort, but there’s no guarantee that the US will come to our aid. We should never forget our history.

Australia must adapt its security approach to more independently pursue its national interests. The RAN has been neglected for many years but explicitly remains part of our future-focused force. The DSR tells us the navy needs to become more lethal, requiring a fundamental refocus on its firepower.

The DSR acknowledges that Australia’s fate must not be determined by others. Our strategic policy is geared to help shape our region in a manner encouraging its evolution to become prosperous while operating within agreed rules, standards and laws. Australia clearly recognises that there’s strength in numbers and it’s in our national interest to rebuild and fortify relationships wherever we can. In a recent speech, Foreign Minister Penny Wong underscored the importance of Australia’s interests in a regional balance of power and emphasised the centrality of ASEAN to the region’s future.

Wong referred to the Five Power Defence Arrangements, which commit Australia, Britain and New Zealand to consult in the event of an attack on Malaysia or Singapore. The DSR doesn’t reference that commitment.

Diplomacy is clearly the preferred method of settling international disagreements but, as noted by Chief of the Defence Force Angus Campbell, without credible hard power, diplomacy risks becoming more about negotiating the least bad option.

The DSR tell us that Australia’s security lies in the collective security of the Indo-Pacific, achieving defence objectives well beyond our borders. It also notes that the Australian Defence Force must be capable of ‘impactful projection across the full spectrum of proportionate response’ and be able to hold an adversary at risk further from our shores. How far from our shores is unstated, but the inference is that it should be as far as practicable.

If the air force’s operations are limited to Australian bases, even with refuelling, there’s a significant limitation on how far airpower can project into the region. In 2013, ASPI estimated that a single F-35 joint strike fighter with refuelling could remain on station for an hour 500 nautical miles from its base. That’s Darwin to Dili.

Deterrence by denial brings a wide range of considerations about what the RAN needs to ensure success. ASPI senior fellow Rod Lyon questions the feasibility of Australia unilaterally deterring any single country from attacking its forces or territory. Invasion is recognised as an extremely remote possibility, but its catastrophic consequences mean it can’t be ignored. This should also include occupation of our offshore territories, the Cocos (Keeling) Islands and Christmas Island in particular.

If Australia were to face defending itself by applying hard power from forward bases extending from the Cocos (Keeling) Islands to Townsville, something will have gone badly wrong. It would mean the US no longer had the weight in the near region to help us. For Australia to have passively watched such a circumstance unfold would surely mean it had been very careless in providing for its own security.

The important question, then, is how to support Australia’s diplomatic efforts with credible hard power in a region growing in wealth and having its own sense of the future, but with no prospect of having an extensive multilateral security alliance to guide and focus its efforts. Regional nations are undeniably assessing how they will react to China’s economic and other influence on their own national interests. This will require sophistication in how Australia builds those relationships, diplomatic and military, imposing a requirement on us to be seen to be a willing and credible friend when the need arises.

Relationship-building and responding to rapidly changing circumstances can’t succeed on a part-time basis. Australia has been accused of such behaviour recently by Pacific island nations. It is obvious and will not achieve the degree of collaboration that’s vital to success. Relationships among military personnel in our region are as important as those in the diplomatic community. It’s far too late to create the degree of interoperability that brings the familiarity necessary for coalition or combined military operations if it’s not there when a sophisticated, unconstrained and well-organised adversary takes the stage. If we’re to be taken seriously, we must be in the region and be seen to contribute to regional security outcomes.

This poses a sensitive political and operational dilemma. The Australian National University’s Stephan Frühling notes that Australia operating forward would achieve an immediate deterrent effect, but historically Australia’s political considerations have often overridden operational factors and prevented that presence. Today’s geopolitical conditions require that tension between political and operational considerations to be brought into much sharper focus. Australia’s public must not be shielded by polite diplomatic language about China’s behaviour in all manner of circumstances that work against our national interest. Governments must be better at communicating the facts to our citizens.

Multiple contested territorial claims over islands in the South China Sea and exploitation of several by China, coupled with its aggressive behaviour toward nations in their vicinity, create opportunities for potentially disastrous military miscalculation. This is the world’s busiest, most economically critical marine highway. Its disruption would have an immediate global impact and the outcry would be instant and loud, even if Australia’s trade were only selectively affected. While deliberate interference with trade seems a remote prospect, it would have such grave consequences that it’s hard to contemplate Australia not becoming involved in ensuring freedom of the seas.

How do these considerations affect the RAN’s future? Naval power doesn’t need agreement from any country to operate in international waters or economic zones. Warships can be present with persistence, provided the seaborne resupply system can cope. Naval forces can join those of other nations for training, to share knowledge and to grow the mutual understanding they might need for real operations. Navies, almost by definition, are international in character.

Australia’s future nuclear-powered submarines will be very potent offensive weapons that can create great uncertainty in an adversary’s mind. Surface forces can be highly visible or out of sight. Their ability to unthreateningly support diplomatic efforts while retaining an ability to become instantly engaged in operations at a time of our choosing is very useful. That’s different from but complementary to a submarine capability. Together, they provide the essential spectrum of options government will always need.

All forces are vulnerable to attack to some extent, but when suitably equipped, as those of the RAN should be, they will be as lethal and survivable as the best of any nation.

Achieving Australia’s strategic outcomes will place considerable responsibility on its navy to be able to conduct sustained operations and tasks throughout the enormous Indo-Pacific, now recognised as Australia’s primary area of military interest. Those tasks will be addressed in our next post.
David Shackleton is a retired vice admiral and former chief of the Royal Australian Navy. He holds a PhD in history from UNSW Canberra. John Mortimer had considerable experience in the Force Development and Analysis Division of the Department of Defence before managing the RAN’s international relations with other navies, and strategic policy formulation in Navy HQ.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/n...the RAN part 1 achieving deterrence by denial

 

[BravoZulu]

Part 1 of this series examined how the Royal Australian Navy contributes to the new national defence strategy of deterrence by denial. This part analyses the primary tasks the RAN must be capable of. A third post will address the required primary force structure.

The 2023 defence strategic review (DSR) reinforced objectives in the 2020 defence strategic update to shape Australia’s strategic environment, deter actions against Australia’s interests, and respond with credible military force, when required. These are the navy’s primary tasks.

The RAN has long been a major contributor to shaping Australia’s strategic environment. Participation in international exercises of varying levels of sophistication at home and throughout the region have been a hallmark, as have regular, lengthy goodwill visits, sometimes involving half a dozen ships or more and submarines.

An important component of these activities in shaping regional perceptions—and contributing to a deterrent mindset—is that the RAN is seen as a highly professional fighting force that is well-equipped for sustained combat operations in the region, if necessary.

The navy plays a highly valued role supporting regional humanitarian operations. Australia’s gifts of patrol boats to Pacific island nations, with supporting RAN operational and technical advisers, have helped small nations become more self-reliant in sovereignty protection and law enforcement.

These activities demonstrate our national capability, capacity and willingness to respond, while helping build confidence that we pose no threat. All are vital in shaping perceptions that Australians consider themselves part of the region. Reinforcing this view is essential for our security as some neighbouring nations’ economies surpass our own.

Australia must also demonstrate its willingness to look after its own sovereignty, especially in its vast exclusive economic zone. Maritime patrol and response is always a major naval task, no matter the circumstances. This is why the RAN is equipped with small patrol boats that are relatively inexpensive to operate and well suited to assisting the Australian Border Force in operations. The navy has been forced occasionally to supplement the patrol boats with larger and more sophisticated ships, but this drives up the cost dramatically and contributes little to the navy’s combat efficiency and effectiveness.

As the DSR implies and this discussion shows, achieving deterrence by denial has many strands, some of which are more nuanced than delivering a warhead, but all are important to its accomplishment.

The nature of potential military operations in the region is hard to predict, but an Australian government will always look for options to respond. Whatever hard power Australia might have to counter, the DSR sets out a response that will be in mass, extremely lethal and swift.

The DSR notes that Australia may have little warning of a regional conflict. If our efforts to achieve deterrence have failed, the RAN’s contribution to denial combat operations and impactful projection must be in place already. Operations extending possibly from the Cocos (Keeling) Islands across northern Australia into the Coral Sea would necessarily be part of a very large Australian Defence Force effort to defend the nation.

Use of the advanced sea mine capability being sought would help close off southbound routes, and our submarines would help close off choke points north and south of Indonesia and eastwards. But the overwhelming effort of Australia’s firepower would be delivered against any adversary through precision guided missiles from all three services. For the navy, the main contributors would be its surface combatants and submarines.

Developments in long-range precision weapons mean surface combatants and submarines can play a wider role. The navy’s destroyers with Aegis combat systems can contribute to the air defence and the land campaign over considerably longer distances than a few decades ago.

Several other capabilities are highlighted in the DSR as critical for ADF success. They are networked sensing and targeting for long-range strike in all three dimensions, integrated air and missile defence, an upgraded operational logistics capability and appropriate theatre command and control. Strongly implied also was an expeditionary air operations capability and a ‘fully enabled, integrated amphibious-capable combined-arms land system’. It has to be assumed that these operations will not be against a strong opposing force, but the ADF will be required to undertake forward-deployed operations for which the RAN is a critical enabler. Its associated lift ships are very lightly armed, placing greater onus on escorting forces for protection.

Distributed maritime operations can avoid or reduce the effectiveness of an adversary’s surveillance and constrain its ability to neutralise our forces through massed attacks. But these concepts require sophisticated, resilient, high-capacity communication networks to coordinate our own attacks. This poses significant technical and doctrinal challenges. Well-armed, suitably equipped surface combatants and submarines capable of long endurance are needed in sufficient numbers to participate in networked missile attacks. All require communications for command, control and coordination—and they must be able to defend themselves. As the technologies mature, uncrewed surface, air and submersible vehicles may enhance the volume of lethality and extend the length of time a presence can be achieved.

Our navy exists to fight at sea if we must, with as good a chance of winning as we are willing to afford. Owning a navy that is consistently capable of winning is difficult, complex and expensive. An unfaltering national commitment is required. It demands consistent investment in equipment and its upkeep, constant training and renewal, assessment and evaluation of performance, research and development, experimentation and sometimes taking risks with untried technologies in search of a capability edge, perhaps asymmetric.

Most of all, a navy requires a motivated, skilled and dedicated national workforce comprising uniformed, public service and blue and white collar private sector people. The RAN must ensure Australians want to be part of that endeavour.

Large vessels axiomatically contribute greater endurance and larger magazines that provide the firepower for distant, higher-end operations. They are also generally better suited to the environmental conditions faced in this region.

Adoption of the DSR’s vaguely worded tiered typology for warships implying that more but smaller vessels should be acquired has not met with support from experienced practitioners. The review of the RAN’s surface combatant force, still to be made public, could reset its combat capability to meet its future needs. Public commentary suggests there’s scope for serious and long-lasting mistakes.

Protection of shipping is a major task of the navy and air force, and interruption of fuel, largely imported from Southeast Asia, would have a major impact on our economy and military operations. In 2010 the RAN concluded that shipping was best protected by creating a safe corridor and umbrella for selected ships carrying strategically important cargoes. Our submarines, large surface combatants, and air surveillance and air combat capabilities will have to create and keep those routes secure. Mine countermeasures forces would ensure the safe passage of shipping through or around potentially mined areas. Naval marine science ships would gather data to help evaluate risks on shipping routes and define areas in which ship sensor performance is enhanced or degraded. The quantity and geographic distribution of ships requiring protection implies that several concurrent dispersed and demanding operations would be required.

Creation of a plausible anti-access and area-denial capability for the ADF is essential to convince any potential adversary that Australia can inflict much damage on a force intending to strike our nation. All the peacetime efforts of the ADF must be applied to prevent hostilities—with the ability to immediately switch to combat operations if required to help force a return to diplomacy.

A RAN equipped with heavily armed ships and submarines, complemented by an effective logistic support force, with other capabilities in prospect for the ADF’s four other domains, will give Australia confidence in its ability to withstand coercion—and will give any adversary pause for thought.

Part 3 will propose what the primary force structure of the RAN should become.
David Shackleton is a retired vice admiral and former chief of the Royal Australian Navy. He holds a PhD in history from UNSW Canberra. John Mortimer had considerable experience in the Force Development and Analysis Division of the Department of Defence before managing the RAN’s international relations with other navies, and strategic policy formulation in Navy HQ.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/n...e RAN part 2 tasking for deterrence by denial

 

[BravoZulu]

Part 1 of this series examined how the RAN could contribute to Australia’s new strategy of deterrence by denial as expressed through the 2023 defence strategic review (DSR). Part 2 analysed the RAN’s primary tasks to execute that strategy. This final post addresses the primary force structure the RAN needs to accomplish those tasks.

Deciding on the navy’s force structure is largely a process of common sense in maximising the impact of current and foreseen technologies and techniques within the available budget. But first must come the hard intellectual effort of deciding what’s to be achieved and why, how it can be done and with what. Long, hard-earned experience has revealed some useful rules to guide the common sense.

The fewer classes of ships and submarines and onboard weapons and systems the RAN possesses, the simpler and more cost-effective it will be to manage construction and lifecycle costs. Preparing and sustaining their crews will benefit too.

Building in batches, retrofitting upgrades only where relevant and sensible, and de-risking future classes by adopting an evolutionary process should be normal. Vessels should start with margins appropriate for a lifecycle involving their change and growth. Nurturing and aligning the supply chain are fundamental to minimising the challenge. The US approach to its Arleigh Burke–class destroyer illustrates the process.

For Australia, geography is the defining factor for designing its force. Almost everywhere the RAN will operate is a long way from its bases. Vessels must cover great distances economically at a reasonable speed and with sufficient volume to carry enough consumable items, including ammunition, to remain on operations for as long as possible. Artificially small crews will not suffice. Support ships are an essential part of high-endurance forces.

Being able to hit sooner, harder and further away than the other side matters. Naval combat involves attrition, and it’s best if the adversary suffers the most. Our primary platforms and systems and their crews are valuable, so they also must be as defensible and survivable as possible.

The DSR warns that the future Australian Defence Force must address a ‘current bias towards platforms’ and says a platform that can’t be crewed or that doesn’t have weapons to fire at a range to achieve the desired operational or strategic effect won’t serve us well in the current strategic environment. The navy needs multi-role platforms that are as self-contained as possible, incorporating advanced sensors, communications and other systems for networked warfare and delivering lethal effects in all domains, against the right target, and as part of an integrated force. They can also be controlling nodes for future large and small unmanned vessels as they become more practicable in the future.

Nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) with extensive range, endurance and high speed are a self-evident solution for Australia, but their real costs will be eye-watering. Submarines are offensive weapons and very hard and expensive to counter. They will create real challenges for an adversary if present in the numbers needed.

Submarines aren’t the only capability contributing to deterrence, and it remains to be seen if other capabilities have to be given up to pay for them. Current defence budgetary planning seems deficient in that respect. The DSR, for instance, suggests a trade-off with surface combatants, but it’s not clear what that trade-off might be.

Affecting all these considerations are the questions of what rates of effort are to be achieved, for how long, and against which threat. These factors are fundamental to the size of the force and its capabilities, not to mention its cost. The DSR is silent on this aspect, but it notes that the ADF needs to increase its preparedness for operations, which brings additional cost. Options such as multi-crewing are possible to keep ships and submarines in a distant area, if difficult to manage in practice, but eventually maintenance will require a return to home ports. Preparing to deploy and reconstituting ships on return require additional resources to keep a unit on station.

A rule of thumb of three to one is sometimes quoted, which should be interpreted as being a baseline for the conduct of hostilities because it misses the peacetime requirement for advanced training support, system updates and upgrades, and extended maintenance where ships and submarines are out of service for a year or more. A better ratio in peacetime would be five or six to one, which will permit efficient and sustainable management of the force and its workforce and provide the surge and higher availability demanded in hostilities. The same is true for aircraft.

Naval operations in a hostile environment require continuous airborne early warning support and in situ or immediately on-call combat air support. Australia has a major weakness in this respect because its F-35 joint strike fighter and Growler electronic attack aircraft are confined to land-based operations, and its fleets of E-7 airborne early warning and control aircraft and P-8 surveillance aircraft are too small to be on task in multiple locations continuously. The DSR is silent on how these issues will be overcome. It’s of note that the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force is converting its helicopter-carrying destroyers to become F-35B (V/STOL) capable. The RAN’s Canberra-class landing helicopter docks can operate SH-60 helicopters but, unlike their Spanish equivalents, were not constructed to operate F-35B aircraft.

We’ve proposed that the RAN should operate throughout our northern region on a consistent, if not constant, basis. The main purpose is to shore up regional capabilities so that our worst case—protection of our mainland—doesn’t become necessary. A viable peacetime naval task group would consist of at least three or four surface combatants and a dedicated support ship, plus one large ship such as a Canberra class to increase the number of Seahawk helicopters and uncrewed aerial vehicles in the group. In the future, that force should be directly supported by an SSN.

Maintaining such a force continuously in our region would also enable intensive denial operations, and would require approximately 18 major surface combatants and four or five support ships, and a commensurately larger number of helicopters. The number of SSNs required is likely to be closer to 12 than eight because they’re capable of simultaneously supporting a task group and conducting independent operations. At present, eight SSNs are planned to replace six Collins-class submarines.

In the 1980s, Kim Beazley wanted 17 major surface combatants to control choke points across Australia’s north, but they didn’t materialise, and since 1987 the RAN has shrunk. The DSR postulates that a similar operational requirement potentially exists for combat operations from the Cocos (Keeling) Islands to Townsville, but even with the Hunter frigate program Australia will only possess 12 such ships.

The RAN’s three Hobart-class ships ushered in Australia’s move towards the type of surface combatant we need, but three don’t deliver the sustainable combat power required. If the major surface combatant force remains at 12 ships (three Hobarts and nine Hunters), or up to 18 but including six corvettes, the force won’t have the capacity or capability to provide an adequate protective presence for our northern defence infrastructure, or the associated task of long-range precision strikes throughout our maritime approaches. Nor could it adequately protect amphibious deployments into the region, or the range and spread of strategically important shipping. The ill-conceived Hunter-class frigate program should be cancelled in favour of quickly building several updated Hobart class while longer term plans are developed, such as collaborating with the US Navy on its future large destroyer program.

The Cape-class patrol craft are adequate for law enforcement and sovereignty tasks into the future, and the need for the larger offshore patrol vessels should be reviewed. Their capability exceeds the patrol tasks required and they will be needlessly expensive to crew, operate and maintain.

The DSR proposes a highly ambitious strategy well beyond the current capability and capacity of all three armed services. We believe a significant expansion and restructuring of the RAN’s existing fleet is required. The air force and army are in similar positions. Funding the capability sought will require a substantial increase in resources allocated to Defence, but practical challenges will remain, especially the ability to recruit, train and retain personnel.
David Shackleton is a retired vice admiral and former chief of the Royal Australian Navy. He holds a PhD in history from UNSW Canberra. John Mortimer had considerable experience in the Force Development and Analysis Division of the Department of Defence before managing the RAN’s international relations with other navies, and strategic policy formulation in Navy HQ.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/n...tructuring the fleet for deterrence by denial

 

[BravoZulu]

The Falepili Union has shifted up the paradigm of Australia’s strategic policy in the Pacific by several gears. It represents a grand bargain, albeit in microcosm, that aims to address security needs from both Pacific islander and Australian viewpoints. The extension of a treaty-level security guarantee to the small island nation of Tuvalu, population 11,000, is currently within the Australian Defence Force’s capabilities, but nonetheless carries portentous implications for Australia’s defence and diplomatic settings in the Southwest Pacific. Has Canberra bitten off more than it can chew?

The decision to extend a formal security guarantee to Tuvalu as part of the agreement announced on 10 November was a surprise to many, but not exactly a bolt from the blue. The idea of linking Australia and the Pacific under a formal security arrangement has been debated in defence circles for over a decade, reflecting deep and long-term engagement. Australia’s security support, including through fisheries monitoring and military advisers, has primarily been delivered under the Pacific maritime security program and the defence cooperation program, with priorities determined jointly through annual talks.

For more than a year, Australia has been developing its thinking across government about how to integrate more closely with Pacific island nations by offering a broader policy package that addresses islanders’ climate, economic and human security needs, while simultaneously satisfying Canberra’s desire to staunch China’s growing security profile in the region.

The Falepili Union is not an obviously transposable template for other Pacific island countries to adopt. This is because its provisions echo a bespoke request from Tuvalu’s Prime Minister Kausea Natano—including protection from climate threats, but also the possibility of ‘military aggression’. But it is also because the Pacific is so diverse in its people and its politics. There is no one-size-fits-all model. That said, the agreement will provide a ‘shop window’ for other small island states in the region to monitor progress as they mull over whether to pursue similar arrangements with Australia or other parties.

Australia consulted widely across the Pacific Islands Forum before announcing the Tuvalu agreement, with particular attention to Nauru and Kiribati—the most likely candidates for a similar package deal due to their geography, demography and existing partnerships. For domestic political reasons, Canberra may also see advantage in trialling a special mobility scheme with a Pacific microstate before scaling up.

Attention has focused on the mutual agreement clause in the treaty, widely interpreted as giving Australia de facto veto power over Tuvalu entering into security-sector cooperation with third countries. That aligns with the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s public explanation of the treaty’s provisions. In practical terms, Canberra’s external concerns centre on Beijing and the desire to avert any replication of the Solomon Islands–China security agreement of April 2022.

Tuvalu is one of just four Pacific countries to maintain official ties with Taiwan. Yet before approaching Australia, Tuvaluan officials pursued exploratory talks with China. This is important context to understanding Canberra’s decision to negotiate a legally binding agreement, both to pre-empt a Tuvaluan move to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan in favour of Beijing—as Solomon Islands and Kiribati both did in 2019—and to protect itself against future reversals. The treaty is open-ended once it enters into force, though it may be terminated by either party with a year’s notice.

So far, China’s reaction to the Falepili Union has been muted, limited to a brief response by the Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson and state media commentary from the Global Times. Beijing is still likely to be suspicious of Australia’s intentions, because the treaty will have the effect of shoring up Taiwan’s precarious diplomatic position in the Pacific. China’s suspicions are compounded by the fact that Nauru, which also recognises Taiwan, has been identified as the next cab off the rank. Taipei’s other two regional allies, Palau and Marshall Islands, are in compacts of free association with the United States that have both been renewed in 2023. The Federated States of Micronesia has also renewed its compact agreement with the US, and while it recognises Beijing it maintains very close relations with Washington. China is likely to read common purpose here between the US and its ally Australia.

Australia’s immediate motivations for offering Tuvalu a defence guarantee appear to be to deny China influence gains and a security foothold there. While no obvious threat of military aggression to Tuvalu is looming over the horizon, a treaty defence guarantee is an unprecedented commitment for Australia to make in the Pacific. Tuvalu is around 3,500 kilometres away from Australia’s closest bases, in Queensland. Mounting any kind of military operation over such a distance is no small undertaking. Even peacetime humanitarian and disaster relief operations in locations such as Tonga have strained the ADF’s capabilities.

In case of threatened or actual aggression against Tuvalu, Australia’s challenges would be exponentially harder. The ADF would be operating far beyond the range of unrefuelled land-based air cover, and Funafuti’s 1,500-metre runway is too short for high-performance aircraft. Even presupposing that Fiji, 1,000 kilometres away, was available for staging purposes, contested ADF operations in the vicinity of Tuvalu would be a stretch without help from the US. One of the noteworthy implications of ‘military aggression’ is that it points unambiguously to third-party contingencies in a way that previous Australian security commitments, to Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, have not.

Defending Tuvalu against external aggression may appear to be an unlikely worst-case scenario. But formal defence guarantees need to be credible for the long term, particularly in a deteriorating security environment. Australia and China already compete most directly in the Pacific. If strategic competition between Beijing and Canberra intensifies, China could employ well-rehearsed grey-zone tactics—for example, encroaching on Tuvalu’s large exclusive economic zone, with the aim of sowing doubts about Australia’s resolve as a security guarantor, or simply tying down the ADF in logistically taxing long-range presence operations. Beijing is already using information operations and other hybrid threat actions in Pacific island countries to try to undermine trust in traditional partnerships with Australia.

Canberra has secured access to Tuvalu’s territory for the ADF under the Falepili Union, but forward-garrisoning Tuvalu on anything more than a symbolic scale would appear to be a tall order given the ADF’s capacity constraints. Is Canberra prepared to invest money in prepositioning stores and equipment, at the expense of existing defence infrastructure commitments under the 2023 defence strategic review? That also sounds unlikely, without supplementary funding. Even allowing for promised reclamation projects, land use in Tuvalu is going to come under increasing pressure. Nauru’s prospects aren’t much better in that respect. Kiribati is bigger, though the fact that Beijing already has a diplomatic foothold could frustrate Canberra’s efforts to secure terms similar to the security agreement with Tuvalu. Rollback is always more difficult than denial.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/t...ty implications of the AustraliaTuvalu treaty

 

[BravoZulu]

The Australian government has launched what it calls a "game changing" blueprint to protect the country from a rising number of cyberattacks.
The strategy was released on Wednesday in Sydney by Clare O'Neil, minister for home affairs and also for cybersecurity. It includes awareness and protection initiatives for businesses and the broader community, safe technology and coordination measures, critical infrastructure resilience, and national and global networking.
"We have a cyber threat in front of us, but we also have a cyber opportunity," O'Neil said, while adding that "things are going to get worse and we are facing increased threats."
The first two years of the new schedule through 2025 will pay particular attention to better coordinating private and public sectors on cybercrime protection, and on developing a more cooperative approach between major sectors of the national economy.
This may include obliging telecommunications companies to allow "data roaming," by which customers from a hacked provider can shift temporarily to a competitor's network to help reduce the impact of a single data outage.
The second phase of the new strategy seeks to encourage greater "cyber maturity across the whole economy."
The complete package includes an injection of 587 million Australian dollars ($385 million), adding to an AU$2.3 billion cybersecurity commitment through 2030 made earlier by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's Labor government.
Approximately half of the AU$291 million in new funding will support a range of programs aimed at the small and medium enterprise sector and at public identity protection, among others.
The tranche will specifically target ransomware and hacking models perfected by online thieves who extract money from individuals and organizations in return for stolen or locked private data.
The government had previously announced requirements for businesses to report on their cybersecurity measures and also to inform the government on specific attacks encountered, including details on amounts.
The strategy is "aspirational" but is also "a very solid piece of work," said David Tuffley, senior lecturer in cybersecurity at Griffith University in Queensland. "I believe it will achieve much of what it sets out to do."
A controversial aspect of the overall strategy is the possibility of outlawing ransomware payments, which may see victims lose their data or may generate underreporting of cybercrime.
Some AU$130 million has been earmarked for building greater regional resilience and coordination among Asian and Indo-Pacific nations in particular.
O'Neil said she wants to create "a world-class threat sharing and threat blocking" system and is seeking to place greater obligations on companies in Australia and overseas in relation to their own data security.
International sanctions are being considered as a deterrent to hackers and their source networks.
The plan is the result of a high-level review of Australia's existing cybersecurity regime and likely security threats, chaired by former Telstra CEO Andrew Penn.
There were 1,100 cybersecurity incidents from local entities in the last year, according to the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD). The average cost of cybercrime to local businesses increased in the same period 14%, with the cost to medium-sized businesses estimated at almost AU$100,000 per reported incident.
The ASD reported that almost 94,000 separate or individual incidents were recorded by local law enforcement agencies -- around one every 6 minutes over the past 12 months.
Last year, Australia's second-largest telecom, Optus, was the victim of Australia's largest-ever cyberattack. This resulted in the private data of some 10 million customers being compromised. Soon after, in an apparently unrelated incident, sensitive patient data was stolen from the national public health body Medibank, after which the data was released on the dark web.
More recently, port operator DP World was forced to close facilities in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane and Fremantle and to delay the shipment of key exports after data was breached in a major cyberattack.
Tuffley at Griffith University said the threat is every bit as troubling as the minister suggests.
"There is that danger [that] if anything, she's understating it," he said.
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Australia-announces-game-changing-cybersecurity-plan

 

[colin traveller]

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[BravoZulu]

BAE Systems was awarded a contract by the Commonwealth of Australia to upgrade existing Mk 45 Mod 2 naval gun systems on ANZAC class frigates with a Common Control System (CCS).

The upgrade modifies existing Mk 45 systems to eliminate obsolescence issues and extend the life of the gun system.

The CCS upgrade replaces electronics on earlier Mk 45 Mod 1 and Mod 2 gun systems to be compatible with the Mk 45 Mod 4, the latest configuration used by the U.S. Navy. In addition to delivering commonality and interoperability with the U.S. Navy’s gun systems, the upgrade will equip the Mk 45s with the capability to integrate future extended-range precision guided munitions, such as the hypervelocity projectile.

“The Common Control System upgrade is the most cost-effective way to extend the life of Mk 45 gun systems, enabling them to provide critical ship naval fires and creating a configuration that allows for the integration of future precision guided munitions” said Brent Butcher, vice president of weapon systems at BAE Systems. “We are committed to modernizing and equipping allied nations with enhanced Mk 45 gun systems to address current and future threats.”

The cost-effective CCS upgrade ensures that Mk 45 gun systems remain supportable for decades to come and ready to integrate the latest, most innovative technology features to support advanced munitions and future mission capabilities for a significantly lower cost than a new gun.

https://www.baesystems.com/en/artic...cal-mk-45-upgrade-to-australian-navy-frigates

 

[BravoZulu]

Australia will spend an additional A$400 million ($260 million) to manufacture next-generation military drones - one of a number of locally manufactured projects that will create more jobs, its defence industry minister said on Friday.

The MQ-28A Ghost Bat, designed and manufactured in collaboration with an Australian subsidiary of U.S. aircraft manufacturer Boeing (BA.N), opens new tab, is designed to undertake a wide variety of functions, including combat roles, the government said.

"This is the first military aircraft to be designed, engineered and manufactured in Australia in more than 50 years and underscores the depth of innovation and expertise in our defence industry," defence industry minister Pat Conroy said in a statement.
The government has already spent A$600 million acquiring 10 of the drones.
Australia is attempting to manufacture more defence systems domestically, justifying the huge costs of projects such as the AUKUS military alliance with the United States and Britain by pointing to the jobs the projects create.

The additional funding for the Ghost Bat secures more than 350 jobs across Australia and will ensure ongoing work for over 200 suppliers, the statement said.

https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-...m-next-generation-military-drones-2024-02-09/

 

[BravoZulu]

The Enhanced Lethality Surface Combatant review has laid out plans for the Royal Australian Navy to grow larger, with more firepower in the coming decade to ensure that it can meet the challenges highlighted in the 2023 defence strategic review (DSR).

Navy’s surface combatant force will see the three existing Hobart class destroyers proceed with a previously planned upgrade to their Aegis combat system from Baseline 8 to Baseline 9, but this will occur sooner than planned. Of the nine planned Hunter class frigates, only six will be acquired, configured for anti-submarine warfare. This sees a reduction in the number of Tier 1 surface combatants from a planned 12, down to nine ships. However, the review also has suggested the acquisition of six large optionally crewed surface vessels (LOSVs), each with 32 vertical launch missile system (VLS) cells. These will be jointly developed with the United States to provide additional strike capability.

The LOSV sounds like a good investment. It gives the Navy 144 cells across the three Hobart class air warfare destroyers (AWDs), 192 across the six Hunter class future frigates, and a further 192 across six planned LOSVs), 528 cells in all. That compares to 432 in the original fleet plan of three AWDs and nine Hunter class frigates. It’s a step up in firepower across a larger fleet of Tier 1 vessels, yet it can be argued that investment in a capability like LOSVs, that sound like ‘arsenal ships’, should have seen a capability with a far greater number of VLS cells per LOSV. For a reminder of what a real arsenal ship could deliver, South Korea is developing its joint strike vessel that that could each carry 80 missiles of varying types, the US Navy’s Arleigh Burke class destroyers carry 96 cells, and China’s Renhai class cruiser with 112. So, the LOSVs, if configured as planned, seem like a missed opportunity to dramatically boost Navy’s firepower.

There’s also the reality that not every Tier 1 ship will be available for operational deployment at any time—given that three ships are required to keep one on station.
Turning to Tier 2, 11 general purpose frigates will replace the six remaining Anzac class frigates to be retired. Four platforms are under consideration, the German Thyssen-Krupp Marine Systems MEKO 200, Japan’s Mitsubishi Mogami 30FFM, Korea’s Daegu class FFX Batch II and the Spanish Navantia ALFA3000. The general purpose frigate will be optimised for supporting undersea warfare with towed array sonars and, in the wording of the review, ‘provide air defence through a limited number of point and self defence systems’ and provide maritime and land strike capabilities.

That suggests an expansion in fleet size through Tier 2, which is good, but the description so far of each ship suggests only a limited capability to undertake anti-ship missile defence (ASMD). Yet these vessels will be as vulnerable as any to long-range antiship missile capabilities which will only grow more potent in the coming decade. When operating as part of a multinational task force, they will need to rely more on larger ships’ ASMD suites for protection.

The review goes on to sensibly scale back acquisition of the Arafura class offshore patrol vessels (OPVs). But if they are not survivable, why acquire any, especially if funds saved could then support acquisition of a greater number of general-purpose frigates, or even autonomous systems. The review advises looking for other uses for the remaining six OPVs, but perhaps this money could be better spent building up actual combat capability.

In terms of timelines and money invested, there’s certainly additional funding, a good move by government, with an additional $1.7bn over the forward estimates, and $11.1bn over the next decade. The timelines on acquiring specific capabilities—the LOSVs and the Tier 2 vessels are not clear, but the review emphasises that a capability gap must be avoided as the Anzac class are progressively retired.

There are also the workforce and ship building implications, which are as important as the acquisition of naval vessels. There’s a clear commitment by government to sustaining shipbuilding in South Australia and Western Australia. The Hunter class frigates to be built at Osborne, South Australia, and eight of the 11 general purpose frigates and the six LOSVs at Henderson in Western Australia, are good news for the shipbuilding industry. No government could walk away from sustaining such an important industry and seeking to grow jobs within this sector. In that sense the review will succeed politically as jobs are created to sustain, maintain and support a larger navy.
The workforce challenge, and the retention of uniformed and civilian personnel to operate and support these new ships remains the big hurdle in making this review a reality.

At present one, and potentially additional Anzacs, cannot be deployed due to lack of crews. Investing in new naval surface combatants will be for nought if at the moment of crisis, ships cannot be deployed because we simply lack personnel to crew them. Maintaining adequate crewing of the ships, and an ability to sustain them at a high level of readiness is just as vital as getting the number and type of ships right and acquiring them within a reasonable timeframe.

The government’s call for an independent analysis of the surface fleet looks to have succeeded in providing a reasonably coherent and sensible path forward to a larger and more powerful Australian Navy. Whether it will be sufficient in the face of rapidly growing threat capabilities, and a deterioration in strategic circumstances, needs to be determined. There needs to be flexibility in how recommendations are implemented, and a readiness to ‘review the review’ in coming years. As with the DSR itself, the opportunities presented by a biennial national defence strategy mean that if strategic and operational demands suggest that even greater naval capability, that is fully funded, and which can be adequately maintained within an expanded shipbuilding sector, is needed, more ambitious objectives need to be considered.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/t...igger under the fleet review But is it enough

 

[BravoZulu]

This week’s unveiling of the expansionary blueprint for Australia’s future naval surface fleet brings with it a golden opportunity to revive defence cooperation between Australia and its occasionally ambivalent ally, New Zealand. Specifically, the announcement that Australia will acquire up to 11 general purpose frigates opens the door for New Zealand to join the acquisition process for its own Anzac frigate replacement.

When New Zealand defence minister, Judith Collins visited Melbourne recently to attend the inaugural ANZMIN joint ministerial conclave, she invoked the ‘Anzac model‘, in the context of seeking greater inter-operability between Australia and New Zealand’s defence capabilities. In recent times, the Anzac model is most associated with the Anzac frigate programme, which saw Australia and New Zealand acquire eight and two hulls, respectively, from a common German MEKO-design in the 1990s. The Anzacs have proved to be durable workhorses, on both sides of the Tasman, but they are now in the twilight of their operational lives. HMAS Anzac will shortly become the first ship in that class to be decommissioned.

Only last week, the possibility of New Zealand buying into a common hull design with Australia for the replacement to its two, aging Anzac frigates appeared remote. Australia’s Hunter frigate programme, frequently castigated in the media for being overweight, overdue and overbudget, but now backed in by the surface fleet review, remains well beyond Wellington’s more limited means and naval ambitions. Now, Canberra’s commitment to buy an off-the-shelf frigate, of a more modest design has changed the calculus overnight, bringing the Anzac model of a synchronised warship acquisition back into play, after a long recess.

For New Zealand, the economies of scale involved in a joint acquisition with Australia point to one inescapable advantage, lower unit costs. But Wellington would need to come in quickly to have any say over the decision. New Zealand’s next defence capability plan, the first under its new coalition government, will surface in June. That could provide a helpful forcing function for Christopher Luxon’s cabinet to reach internal agreement on whether to join forces with Australia. With contradictory signals on defence spending emerging from the new government so far, it helps to have an eye on the prize.

That prize is a gifted opportunity to recapitalise New Zealand’s surface force at an affordable price tag, with the potential for a modest expansion from 2 to 3 frigates, ensuring that the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) has at least one surface combatant available at any one time—a minimal requirement given New Zealand’s scale of maritime responsibilities.

New frontline frigates, with far more combat capability than New Zealand’s current Anzacs, would bring further strategic dividends, giving New Zealand greater leverage—not only in the alliance relationship with Australia, but enabling a more regular and credible naval presence, from the Pacific to Southeast Asia, where Wellington remains a founding party to the Five Power Defence Arrangements. Three modern frigates, displacing between 3,500-5,000 tons and equipped with vertically launched air defence and anti-ship missiles, would give the RNZN a combat capability that is currently scant not just within the navy, but across all three services.

For Australia, a more capable New Zealand surface force would be an obvious plus, shoring up more aggregate Anzac heft, including in the increasingly contested expanses of Oceania and the neglected Southern Ocean. And while Wellington and Canberra’s threat perceptions do not always align, their interests do broadly coincide. The overlap is big enough to make an interchangeable capability an objective worth aiming for.

Joint crewing of Australia’s Anzac replacements with sailors from New Zealand could be a trickier proposition than joint acquisition and sustainment. But it’s also worth consideration with imagination. Both parties could gain out of an arrangement that enables New Zealand crew to obtain operational experience on Australia’s new frigates before their own enter into service, while potentially helping Australia’s navy to weather recruitment shortfalls as it undergoes a challenging expansion of both its surface and submarine fleets over the next 15 years.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a...on opens the door for the Anzac frigate redux

 

[BravoZulu]

So now Chinese police are operating in Kiribati. Let’s be clear about why that’s a problem.

If Chinese police are in a country, Chinese expatriates are more easily controlled and groups favoured by China can act with greater freedom. Also, the local population can be surveilled, and the policing emphasis turns away from the community and towards protecting the leadership.

All that contrasts with policing help provided by other Pacific Island countries and Australia. There’s reason to think that Canberra wants to provide more support. It should.

Kiribati officials confirmed to Reuters last month that Chinese police in the country of 130,000 people were working in community policing and on a crime database program. Disturbingly, Kiribati had not, and still has not, announced its policing agreement with China.

Australia’s Minister for International Development and the Pacific, Pat Conroy, later told Reuters that Australia had ‘been consistent in (its) view that there is no role for China in policing, or broader security, in the Pacific.’ The US also cautioned Pacific Island countries against taking assistance from Chinese security forces.

Although there is reportedly no Chinese police station in Kiribati, the presence of police can make it easier for groups linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to conduct other activities that also undermine the country’s governance.

Chinese police have been found to work with criminal groups in foreign countries to establish informal police stations. The presence of such establishments was first reported in 2022 by the international NGO Safeguard Defenders, which focuses on transnational repression by China. It counted more than 100 of them in 53 countries.

The unofficial stations are not staffed by uniformed officers, but they work with Chinese police to seize Chinese dissidents and diaspora and take them back to China. In some cases, they persuade the targeted people to return home. China has conducted mass extraditions from Fiji and Vanuatu that have thrown doubt on those countries’ ability to uphold the law on their own territory.

Safeguard Defenders recommends that ‘all governments thoroughly investigate these “overseas police service centres” and their underpinning United Front networks’. The United Front Work Department of the CCP aims at gaining influence over individuals and organisations to promote the party’s interests.

Other security support that China has offered or given to Pacific countries provides the CCP with opportunities to collect biodata and conduct mass surveillance. Forensic laboratories, surveillance camera packages and Huawei-built data centres vulnerable to remote access all threaten to undermine the privacy and sovereignty of Pacific people and nations.

Since Kiribati has not revealed its policing deal with China, we don’t know how many of those problems it has now imported.

Australia won’t be the only country in the region to be concerned. When Solomon Islands signed a security agreement with China in 2022, the then president of the Federated States of Micronesia, David Panuelo, wrote to Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare urging him to reconsider the potential regional security effects.

There are also concerns about the differences between how China approaches policing and what the Pacific wants. For Chinese police, the priority is to protect the state and its leaders. That contrasts with the community policing approach that Australian assistance promotes.

When riots erupted in Honiara in November 2021, China’s embassy was criticised for reportedly making a failed attempt to bring in powerful weapons, including machine guns and a sniper rifle, and a 10-man security squad for protection.

Australia seems eager to provide further support to fill policing gaps in Kiribati and other Pacific island countries. There is no Australian policing presence in Kiribati but Canberra has pledged funding for a new police radio network and a police barracks. Two Australian maritime security advisers are based in the country to support the Kiribati maritime police in operating and maintaining a patrol boat that Australia donated to the country. A second patrol boat is due to arrive next year.

The US also delivers police training to Kiribati and last month had Kiribati maritime police aboard a US Coast Guard vessel for a patrol against illegal fishing. That was part of a US ship-rider program in the Pacific, under which ship personnel are exchanged between the US and partnering countries where there aren’t enough vessels or crew to patrol large maritime territories.

Australia should offer to provide additional policing support to Kiribati directly. Alternatively, the in-development Pacific Policing Initiative (PPI), supported by Australia and led by the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police organisation, could expand its scope to invest more in developing a country’s domestic capacity and ensuring it will not be sidelined by the vision of regional operations.

The PPI is focused mainly on developing a multinational response capability for policing major events, similar to what was delivered by Australia, PNG, Fiji and New Zealand at the Pacific Games in Solomon Islands last year.

Regional training centres will also be established to support the development of the multinational response. These centres should be run in a way that boosts everyday local policing capacity for countries such as Kiribati, not drain expertise and manpower away from the streets.

Kiribati can invite Chinese police onto its territory if it wants to. If Australia wants to protest, it had better be offering comprehensive alternatives and making the security and privacy risks of Chinese engagement very clear.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/w...cing in Pacific island countries is a problem

 

[TheKiwi]

RNZAF's aircraft serviceability plummets because of the loss of skilled personnel.

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(Original article behind paywall: https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/air-f...57-transport-jets/4NSUDSD525BY3HP5JOFH4MAMTE/)

Air Force transport jets have been in the gun for their reliability this year - but new figures reveal the readiness of our flagship choppers is even lower. George Block reports. The mission-readiness of New Zealand’s military helicopters has plunged below that of the beleaguered pair of transport jets as the Air Force battles to retain skilled staff.

New figures released by the New Zealand Defence Force show the serviceability of the Air Force’s fleet of eight NH90 helicopters nose-dived to 34 per cent in January, down from 68 per cent in 2022 and 51 per cent last year. The serviceability of the Navy’s Seasprites is even lower, at just 11 per cent in January.
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