The use of tanks in Afghanistan
Tank units took part in the Afghan war from the very beginning. Even with the introduction of the Soviet limited contingent, 3 tank regiments, which were part of the motorized rifle divisions, were sent to the country. Military units were sent to Afghanistan according to their staffing structure. The motorized rifle regiments included tank battalions. However, it soon became obvious that in the mountainous terrain, the presence of large units with heavy equipment is redundant. Tank regiments simply could not operate in full force in rough terrain. Subsequently, two of them were withdrawn from Afghanistan in 1980, another was reorganized into a motorized rifle. On the contrary, tank battalions of motorized rifle regiments took a very active part in the hostilities.
Initially, the troops that entered Afghanistan used T-55 tanks, but in the spring of 1980 they began to be replaced with more advanced T-62s. An attempt to use the T-64 in this war did not lead to success, its engine turned out to be unreliable in mountainous areas. T-72 and T-80 were not sent to Afghanistan. The T-62 became the main tank of the Afghan war.
In Afghanistan, tanks were used mainly to escort columns, as firing points at outposts, and also to support the battle formations of motorized riflemen and paratroopers during the assault on strongpoints. The terrain itself was not suitable for the use of large tank units. However, in the context of local operations, they were often indispensable. The fire of tank guns crushed the firing points of the Mujahideen, ensuring the advance of the infantry. Already during the war, tank units were included in the Airborne Forces. A tank battalion appeared in the 103rd airborne division, a company in the 345th regiment, and a platoon in the 56th airborne assault brigade.
In the course of hostilities, the problems of Soviet armored vehicles were revealed. She was poorly protected from explosions by mines and land mines. The low angle of elevation of tank guns made it impossible to fire at targets on the tops of the mountains. They tried to solve this problem by driving tanks onto the slopes and lifting towers to the sky. Based on the experience of using the machine in Afghanistan, the T-62M appeared. He received additional protection from defeat from an RPG, but it was not possible to solve the problem with explosions. It is noteworthy that often during the marches, the crews of the T-62, with the exception of the driver, moved on the armor of the vehicle, fearing death from a mine explosion.
In general, tank losses during the Afghan war were quite moderate. In just 9 years, 147 cars were irretrievably lost. Not all losses were combat losses; in rough terrain, tanks often fell into the abyss. At the end of the war, the Mujahideen received a large number of anti-tank weapons (RPGs, recoilless guns and even ATGMs - the Chinese counterparts of the Soviet "Babies"), which led to a slight increase in the number of damaged vehicles. So, during 1988, the 40th Army lost 22 tanks, which were irretrievably destroyed. If at the beginning of the 80s the mujahideen had one RPG for about 10 people, then by the end of 1987 the share of grenade launchers in their detachments had doubled. However, the command of the 40th Army quite competently used tanks in mountainous areas. The firing points of the Mujahideen were destroyed by tankers who did not enter the zone of destruction of enemy anti-tank weapons.
Summing up the results of the use of tanks during the war in Afghanistan, it can be emphasized that despite the fact that the country's terrain was absolutely not suitable for the use of tank units, the main strike force of the ground forces, to the best of its capabilities, provided effective fire support to motorized rifle, and subsequently to airborne divisions. The experience of Afghanistan led to the need to include in their tank companies and battalions. Unfortunately, after the end of the war, this practice was again abandoned for a long time. And in general, by the beginning of the 1990s, the experience of fighting in the highlands of Afghanistan was actually lost in the Russian army, which led to unnecessary losses during the First Chechen campaign.