On the current mood in Russia:
FOM Institute has run a survey on how Russians view their future in the short and medium term. As the questionnaire put before them was fairly neutral, it can be assumed the pollees answered without fear of prosecution. According to FOM's findings, 37% expect a positive change in their conditions in the short term (i.e. 6-12 months), 33% believe everything will remain the same, and 11% think their lives will get worse. Overall, the proportion of pessimists has fallen compared to previous years.
As far as future developments are concerned (beyond 12 months), 43% expect positive changes; however, this represents a drop of 10% compared to the last such survey back in April. 19% expect no changes, and 14% fear things will get worse (this figure has doubled compared to the April survey). Overall, a relative majority is optimistic; this is mostly a statistical effect attributable to pensioners and the wealthy, though. Younger generations and the poor are more skeptical and even pessimistic in comparison. (
Source)
This supports the impression that there is no desire for change in Russian society, though it also explains why the Kremlin continues to rely on volunteers instead of forcing young men to serve on the frontlines (despite the considerable financial burden associated with enlistment bonuses).
As to the military situation:
According to President Selenskyi, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have formed an operational reserve of fourteen brigades. Russian Z-bloggers confirm this through their observations. Sukonkin identifies (
source) the formations held in reserve as Mechanised Brigades 150 through 154; Infantry Brigades 155 through 159; 3rd Armoured Brigade; and a whole host of separate infantry battalions. Should they be at their designated strength (quite likely given their reserve status and the overall situation picture), the Ukrainians would have a quick reaction force of between 50,000 and 70,000 well-rested troops at their disposal. Not enough to turn the tide, but more than enough to plug any hole.
Going with conventional military wisdom, the Russians would have to muster an offensive force of between 150,000 and 210,000 troops in order to overcome this reserve – which is roughly the same as their entire combat arms force in Ukraine. If the Ukrainians organise their defence as a delaying battle, Russia would need an even bigger force (all the way up to 7:1). They simply do not have this kind of manpower, not without implementing general mobilisation first. In other words, no substantial change is to be expected anytime soon.