For the West, there is a risk that, given Russia’s military position on the ground, mobilisation is met with complacency. In practice, however, it means that new Ukrainian manoeuvre units must be trained and equipped to counter new Russian formations in the spring. It also means that improving Russian troop levels will force Ukraine to expend more materiel to make progress. There is, therefore, a need to reinforce success now by continuing to expand training and equipping of Ukrainian troops. There is also a need to transition defence industry to be able to sustain production of equipment and ammunition throughout 2023. This is both to meet Ukraine’s needs and to reinforce a deterrence posture against China.
The decision point to make such preparations is now. If those decisions are not taken, Western governments – like Putin – may find that when they come to pull the lever, there is a considerable lag between when the resources are needed and when they become available. The cost for Kyiv of such complacency would be severe. It is also possible that if new waves of Russian recruits, forcibly mobilised, fail to improve Russia’s position on the battlefield, then the political backlash in Russia may provide the best means of compelling Moscow to shift its policy.