Don't worry, in a few years this walking piece of S**t will be shot by his own...
Warfare Russia/Ukraine War
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M
Mordoror
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It is always fun to see an answer of a "unbiased" poster
what we see right now is that Ukrainian casualties are rising toward a parity with russian losses. They have a lot of road to catch up but it is not anymore 4-5 to 1 like we had during the first month clusterfuck
what we see is that the defensive lines are hit hard, pierced in some areas and that the ukrainians are rushing all new stuff they get to try to slow down the process
War is a volatile event. The ukrainians are learning. The russian are learning (see the speech of the austrian officer). But you are reading the things only with your preconceived bias.
Discarding a few facts like russian superiority in artillery (including ammunitions that seem to become scarce on ukrainian side) and air support
In a war of position, if you are on the receiving end of 3x more tubes able to lobb 10 more ammo than your own arty, who takes the most attrition ?
Ah and BTW this is not a "out of my ass" post. All these assessments come from various OPSINT ressources, but not just the YT BS footages this thread has become.
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M
Mordoror
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@Fluff
Learn a few things
Analysis of a retired french colonel
Recall that the only operational objective displayed by the Russians at the end of March is to complete the complete conquest of the Donbass, which is associated with the capture of areas of the two provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk still under Ukrainian control.
The facts of the problem
In practice, this means taking the port of Mariupol and 250 km further north of the two pairs of cities Sloviansk-Kramatorsk (SK) and Severodonetsk-Lysystchansk (SL), which are 80 km apart.
The battle of Mariupol will be analyzed separately. At this stage, let's remember that it involved about 12 different battle groups (BGs), the Russian army, the Chechen National Guard, the 1st DNR (Donetsk People's Republic) Army Corps and one or two artillery brigades, for seven weeks. The Russian forces, no doubt very worn out, were able to start being withdrawn in the last ten days of April and reinjected elsewhere after two or three weeks of reconstitution.
We will concentrate on the battle of the quadrilateral of four cities of 100,000 inhabitants (SK and SL) to be conquered and which constitute the "major effect" of the "Donbass operation". Once the conquest of these four cities is assured, with perhaps the easier conquest of Propovsk - a crossroads in the central-western part of the Donetsk oblast, with 65,000 inhabitants - it will be possible to say that the Russian mission has been accomplished, at least in this phase of the war.
This operational area is approached by at least 50 Russian battle groups (BGs), supported by probably seven artillery brigades and a hundred air sorties/day, i.e. half of the Russian expeditionary force in Ukraine, facing 12 maneuver brigades, territorial or national guard brigades (at least) and several militia battalions. The overall strength ratio can be estimated at a slight Russian numerical superiority in men, three to two in their favor for combat vehicles, and two to one for artillery and much more air support.
How much does it cost?
Most combat units on both sides are worn out from weeks of fighting, and their tactical level is diminished. Although the Russians have made some adjustments, the Ukrainian units are still on average better than the Russians at the points of contact. Benefiting from a general defensive posture and intelligence superiority, Ukrainian units most often open fire effectively first and thus also win in the majority of cases.
This is reflected in the casualties. If we consider the material losses documented by the Oryx website for the entire theater of operations, the Russians have lost 400 tanks and armored infantry vehicles in the past month. It should be remembered that these are only the documented losses and are therefore both lower than the reality (we will add an additional 30%) with perhaps a bias in favor of the Ukrainians, who provide a priori more documents than the Russians. We can therefore consider as likely the loss of about 10 Russian BGs in one month throughout the theater, including 6 or 7 in the Donbass, i.e. between 12 and 15% of the potential. Interestingly, these losses are lower than the previous month - 700 documented combat vehicle losses - which can be explained by the considerable damage of the battle of Kiev for the Russians (which we will recall is presented as a diversion in the pro-Russian narrative).
At the same time, the ratio of losses between Russians and Ukrainians has hardly changed from one battle to the other. The Ukrainians have lost 100 combat vehicles in the last month, i.e., 1 for every 4 Russians, compared to 150 in the previous month, i.e., 1 for every 4.7, which shows that, despite wear and tear, the difference in tactical level has been maintained. On the other hand, the Ukrainians hit the Russian rear - artillery and logistics - three times less than in the previous month, which is explained by better Russian protection of this rear compared to the battle of Kiev, where the long and thin Russian axes of penetration could be attacked by Ukrainian forces.
Behind these material losses, there are obviously men who are suffering. Human losses are very difficult to estimate. After noting the correlation between documented vehicle losses and human losses estimated by unofficial sources, we will take as a basis for calculation that the documented loss of a Russian combat vehicle is correlated (not the cause of) that of 24 definitive losses (dead, seriously wounded, prisoners) for 35 on the Ukrainian side. The difference between the two sides is explained by the greater Russian material density, with a very high ratio of armored vehicles to men, and a difference in the source of human losses
It is indeed very likely that the majority of Ukrainian losses come from artillery fire and aerial fire and not from direct combat, which is less the case on the Russian side.
With these empirical parameters, we can estimate that the Russians have at this stage definitively lost between 9 and 10,000 men in the Donbass offensive against 3 to 4,000 Ukrainians, excluding the battle of Mariupol which balances this ratio a little. These losses are mostly concentrated on both sides in the melee units, especially those of the Russians, who are multiplying the attacks of 2 to 3 BG on 5 km of front and about three out of four are repulsed with losses. But it was the 1 in 4 that succeeded that allowed the Russians to advance, in the manner of the Allied forces pounding - with much greater success - the German front from July to November 1918.
While the ground conquered can hardly be taken back by the Ukrainians and that the 1 in 4 tends to become 1 in 3, the Russians thus keep the hope to eventually win.
The hammering of the front
The area of action can be divided from west to east into four combat zones running largely along the river Donets and the forest area around it: Izium, Lyman, northwest Severodonetsk, East Severodonetsk and Popasna.
With at least twenty BGs, the Izium pocket was undoubtedly considered the main area of action with the Russian will to push in all directions. The first attack took place first towards the west, probably to protect the main line of communication to Belgorod and conversely to cut the P78 axis between Kharkiv and Barvinkove then Sloviansk. The attack in this direction progressed for several kilometers before stopping in the face of good Ukrainian resistance. It continued south towards Barvinkove, facing the 3rd armored brigade, probably with the intention of enveloping the area of operation from the west. The attack seems to have reached its peak at the end of April, without reaching Bervinkove. Instead, attacks shifted eastward against the 81st Air Assault Brigade in converging attacks toward Sloviansk, with little success to date but perhaps more in the days ahead.
The most significant Russian advances have been in the area within a 20 km radius of Lyman, a town of 20,000 people, 20 km northeast of Sloviansk. Lyman is a key point north of the Sviati Hory Nature Park and the Donets River, which commands the northern axis between Sloviansk and Severodonetsk. The conquest of this whole area against the 57th motorized brigade and the 95th and 79th air assault brigades took the whole month of April. The Russians achieved a significant success on 30 April by breaking through towards Ozerne on the Donets River and then taking Yampi a few kilometers south-east of Lyman. Since the beginning of May, Russian efforts were focused on taking the villages northwest of Lyman, which was increasingly threatened with encirclement. Once Lyman, the main lock north of Sloviansk, is taken, Russian forces will be able to reach the northern defenses of Sloviansk, which are rather strong on the Donets River in the east, the forest in the north and the chain of settlements from Barvinkove in the west.
The north-western part of Severodonetsk is the area where the fighting has been the most difficult. The fighting began in early March, especially by the army of the Luhansk People's Republic, LNR (14,000 men in total), which is taking advantage of the weakness of the Ukrainian army in the region to seize the rest of Luhansk province with the help of the Russian 8th Army. The line did not move much until April, when the joint Russian-Chechen-LNR effort focused on conquering the city of Rubizhne (56,000 inhabitants, 37 km2), which was definitively conquered on 13 May, after more than a month of fighting. While trying to extend the attack further west, two brigades of the 41st Army crossed the Donets River to approach Lysysychansk, immediately west of Severodonetsk, and one of them lost a complete BG on May 9 near Bilohorivka.
Little can be said about the eastern part of Severodonetsk, where the forces of the 127th Russian Motorized Infantry Division and 3 LNR brigades are making little progress. There is a high concentration of Russian artillery, including the recent arrival of 240mm 2S4 Tyulpan batteries.
The most spectacular Russian advance took place in Popasna (22,000 inhabitants), 50 km south of Sverodonetsk, taken on 7 May after six weeks of fighting. Popasna is clearly the new axis of effort after the failure at Izium. About ten
Popasna is clearly the new axis of effort after the failure at Izium. About ten BGs are gathered there, including Russian naval infantry and air assault units, a sign of priority, but also the 150th motorized infantry division, present in Marioupol. The capture of the city, a high point, allows for observation and therefore artillery strikes on all Ukrainian movements, especially between the road junction of Bakhmut (77,000 inhabitants) and Lysytchansk-Severodonetsk. The Russian and LNR forces then succeeded in continuing in all directions at a rate of several kilometers per day, unseen since the Battle of Kiev. The advance to the north already threatens to encircle Ukrainian forces in the small towns of Zolote and Hirske along the front line, before reaching Lysychansk-Severodonetsk (LS) and in the west the main supply axis of LS in the region of Soledar, or even Bakhmut.
Prospects
One month after the official announcement of the main phase of the battle of Donbass, and in fact already two months of attacks, the Russians are still far from the operational victory. After having envisaged a total envelopment, they have reduced their ambition to the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk and the capture of Lyman before tackling Sloviansk, which they also hope to encircle and take.
This implies first of all to be able to continue to carry a sustained effort for several weeks at the cost of significant losses. It will also be necessary to be able to resupply the forces as they advance within the zone between LS and SK, a mission that is always difficult when one moves away from the railroads and exposes one's logistical axes to Ukrainian harassment. The problem is much the same for the seven Ukrainian brigades in the cauldron, very worn and difficult to supply.
It is difficult to imagine that the Ukrainians will remain without reaction to the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk and will undoubtedly come to dispute the terrain, perhaps by trying to retake Popasna. It remains to be seen whether this reinforcement will come at the cost of weakening other sectors and, above all, what effect it will have.
Assuming that the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk is achieved, it will be necessary to take these two localities, which have been preparing for a siege for two months and have forces superior to those defending Marioupol. It is difficult to see how, at the cost of a lot of effort and unless there is a Ukrainian collapse, the Russians could take the two cities before the end of July. Will they be able to sustain a parallel fight to encircle Sloviansk-Kramatorsk, which will probably not happen before the end of June at this rate, and then an investment of the two cities that is even more difficult than in Lysysychansk-Severodonetsk, because they are even better defended and especially close to Ukrainian forces?
All this seems difficult, but not insurmountable if the other fronts - Kharkiv, Zaprozhia, Kherson - hold up against Ukrainian attacks. If one of them breaks down, especially on the Kherson side, the whole economy of forces in the theater of operations will be in question. The Donbass operation will be compromised. If the other fronts hold and if the Russian army is able to supply the theater with a rotation of units reconstituted in Belgorod or Rostov with sufficient equipment and relatively well-trained volunteers, and by innovating (for example, by changing the structure of the battle groups), the conquest of the Donbass may be a reality at the end of August. At that time, the losses on both sides will be very heavy and more balanced than at present with the prisoners of the captured cities. It is likely that Russia will then consider shifting to a general defensive posture with perhaps a negotiated peace proposal, at least until it is possible to restart an offensive towards Odessa.
The problem for the Russians is that the Ukrainians will not let themselves be pushed around and that with their human mobilization and American material aid, they can also feed the front in a similar disorder as the Russians, but above all consider forming new units, battalions at first and new brigades in a few months' time, and thus have a strong offensive capacity that they will not fail to use.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
Learn a few things
Analysis of a retired french colonel
Recall that the only operational objective displayed by the Russians at the end of March is to complete the complete conquest of the Donbass, which is associated with the capture of areas of the two provinces of Luhansk and Donetsk still under Ukrainian control.
The facts of the problem
In practice, this means taking the port of Mariupol and 250 km further north of the two pairs of cities Sloviansk-Kramatorsk (SK) and Severodonetsk-Lysystchansk (SL), which are 80 km apart.
The battle of Mariupol will be analyzed separately. At this stage, let's remember that it involved about 12 different battle groups (BGs), the Russian army, the Chechen National Guard, the 1st DNR (Donetsk People's Republic) Army Corps and one or two artillery brigades, for seven weeks. The Russian forces, no doubt very worn out, were able to start being withdrawn in the last ten days of April and reinjected elsewhere after two or three weeks of reconstitution.
We will concentrate on the battle of the quadrilateral of four cities of 100,000 inhabitants (SK and SL) to be conquered and which constitute the "major effect" of the "Donbass operation". Once the conquest of these four cities is assured, with perhaps the easier conquest of Propovsk - a crossroads in the central-western part of the Donetsk oblast, with 65,000 inhabitants - it will be possible to say that the Russian mission has been accomplished, at least in this phase of the war.
This operational area is approached by at least 50 Russian battle groups (BGs), supported by probably seven artillery brigades and a hundred air sorties/day, i.e. half of the Russian expeditionary force in Ukraine, facing 12 maneuver brigades, territorial or national guard brigades (at least) and several militia battalions. The overall strength ratio can be estimated at a slight Russian numerical superiority in men, three to two in their favor for combat vehicles, and two to one for artillery and much more air support.
How much does it cost?
Most combat units on both sides are worn out from weeks of fighting, and their tactical level is diminished. Although the Russians have made some adjustments, the Ukrainian units are still on average better than the Russians at the points of contact. Benefiting from a general defensive posture and intelligence superiority, Ukrainian units most often open fire effectively first and thus also win in the majority of cases.
This is reflected in the casualties. If we consider the material losses documented by the Oryx website for the entire theater of operations, the Russians have lost 400 tanks and armored infantry vehicles in the past month. It should be remembered that these are only the documented losses and are therefore both lower than the reality (we will add an additional 30%) with perhaps a bias in favor of the Ukrainians, who provide a priori more documents than the Russians. We can therefore consider as likely the loss of about 10 Russian BGs in one month throughout the theater, including 6 or 7 in the Donbass, i.e. between 12 and 15% of the potential. Interestingly, these losses are lower than the previous month - 700 documented combat vehicle losses - which can be explained by the considerable damage of the battle of Kiev for the Russians (which we will recall is presented as a diversion in the pro-Russian narrative).
At the same time, the ratio of losses between Russians and Ukrainians has hardly changed from one battle to the other. The Ukrainians have lost 100 combat vehicles in the last month, i.e., 1 for every 4 Russians, compared to 150 in the previous month, i.e., 1 for every 4.7, which shows that, despite wear and tear, the difference in tactical level has been maintained. On the other hand, the Ukrainians hit the Russian rear - artillery and logistics - three times less than in the previous month, which is explained by better Russian protection of this rear compared to the battle of Kiev, where the long and thin Russian axes of penetration could be attacked by Ukrainian forces.
Behind these material losses, there are obviously men who are suffering. Human losses are very difficult to estimate. After noting the correlation between documented vehicle losses and human losses estimated by unofficial sources, we will take as a basis for calculation that the documented loss of a Russian combat vehicle is correlated (not the cause of) that of 24 definitive losses (dead, seriously wounded, prisoners) for 35 on the Ukrainian side. The difference between the two sides is explained by the greater Russian material density, with a very high ratio of armored vehicles to men, and a difference in the source of human losses
It is indeed very likely that the majority of Ukrainian losses come from artillery fire and aerial fire and not from direct combat, which is less the case on the Russian side.
With these empirical parameters, we can estimate that the Russians have at this stage definitively lost between 9 and 10,000 men in the Donbass offensive against 3 to 4,000 Ukrainians, excluding the battle of Mariupol which balances this ratio a little. These losses are mostly concentrated on both sides in the melee units, especially those of the Russians, who are multiplying the attacks of 2 to 3 BG on 5 km of front and about three out of four are repulsed with losses. But it was the 1 in 4 that succeeded that allowed the Russians to advance, in the manner of the Allied forces pounding - with much greater success - the German front from July to November 1918.
While the ground conquered can hardly be taken back by the Ukrainians and that the 1 in 4 tends to become 1 in 3, the Russians thus keep the hope to eventually win.
The hammering of the front
The area of action can be divided from west to east into four combat zones running largely along the river Donets and the forest area around it: Izium, Lyman, northwest Severodonetsk, East Severodonetsk and Popasna.
With at least twenty BGs, the Izium pocket was undoubtedly considered the main area of action with the Russian will to push in all directions. The first attack took place first towards the west, probably to protect the main line of communication to Belgorod and conversely to cut the P78 axis between Kharkiv and Barvinkove then Sloviansk. The attack in this direction progressed for several kilometers before stopping in the face of good Ukrainian resistance. It continued south towards Barvinkove, facing the 3rd armored brigade, probably with the intention of enveloping the area of operation from the west. The attack seems to have reached its peak at the end of April, without reaching Bervinkove. Instead, attacks shifted eastward against the 81st Air Assault Brigade in converging attacks toward Sloviansk, with little success to date but perhaps more in the days ahead.
The most significant Russian advances have been in the area within a 20 km radius of Lyman, a town of 20,000 people, 20 km northeast of Sloviansk. Lyman is a key point north of the Sviati Hory Nature Park and the Donets River, which commands the northern axis between Sloviansk and Severodonetsk. The conquest of this whole area against the 57th motorized brigade and the 95th and 79th air assault brigades took the whole month of April. The Russians achieved a significant success on 30 April by breaking through towards Ozerne on the Donets River and then taking Yampi a few kilometers south-east of Lyman. Since the beginning of May, Russian efforts were focused on taking the villages northwest of Lyman, which was increasingly threatened with encirclement. Once Lyman, the main lock north of Sloviansk, is taken, Russian forces will be able to reach the northern defenses of Sloviansk, which are rather strong on the Donets River in the east, the forest in the north and the chain of settlements from Barvinkove in the west.
The north-western part of Severodonetsk is the area where the fighting has been the most difficult. The fighting began in early March, especially by the army of the Luhansk People's Republic, LNR (14,000 men in total), which is taking advantage of the weakness of the Ukrainian army in the region to seize the rest of Luhansk province with the help of the Russian 8th Army. The line did not move much until April, when the joint Russian-Chechen-LNR effort focused on conquering the city of Rubizhne (56,000 inhabitants, 37 km2), which was definitively conquered on 13 May, after more than a month of fighting. While trying to extend the attack further west, two brigades of the 41st Army crossed the Donets River to approach Lysysychansk, immediately west of Severodonetsk, and one of them lost a complete BG on May 9 near Bilohorivka.
Little can be said about the eastern part of Severodonetsk, where the forces of the 127th Russian Motorized Infantry Division and 3 LNR brigades are making little progress. There is a high concentration of Russian artillery, including the recent arrival of 240mm 2S4 Tyulpan batteries.
The most spectacular Russian advance took place in Popasna (22,000 inhabitants), 50 km south of Sverodonetsk, taken on 7 May after six weeks of fighting. Popasna is clearly the new axis of effort after the failure at Izium. About ten
Popasna is clearly the new axis of effort after the failure at Izium. About ten BGs are gathered there, including Russian naval infantry and air assault units, a sign of priority, but also the 150th motorized infantry division, present in Marioupol. The capture of the city, a high point, allows for observation and therefore artillery strikes on all Ukrainian movements, especially between the road junction of Bakhmut (77,000 inhabitants) and Lysytchansk-Severodonetsk. The Russian and LNR forces then succeeded in continuing in all directions at a rate of several kilometers per day, unseen since the Battle of Kiev. The advance to the north already threatens to encircle Ukrainian forces in the small towns of Zolote and Hirske along the front line, before reaching Lysychansk-Severodonetsk (LS) and in the west the main supply axis of LS in the region of Soledar, or even Bakhmut.
Prospects
One month after the official announcement of the main phase of the battle of Donbass, and in fact already two months of attacks, the Russians are still far from the operational victory. After having envisaged a total envelopment, they have reduced their ambition to the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk and the capture of Lyman before tackling Sloviansk, which they also hope to encircle and take.
This implies first of all to be able to continue to carry a sustained effort for several weeks at the cost of significant losses. It will also be necessary to be able to resupply the forces as they advance within the zone between LS and SK, a mission that is always difficult when one moves away from the railroads and exposes one's logistical axes to Ukrainian harassment. The problem is much the same for the seven Ukrainian brigades in the cauldron, very worn and difficult to supply.
It is difficult to imagine that the Ukrainians will remain without reaction to the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk and will undoubtedly come to dispute the terrain, perhaps by trying to retake Popasna. It remains to be seen whether this reinforcement will come at the cost of weakening other sectors and, above all, what effect it will have.
Assuming that the encirclement of Lysychansk-Severodonetsk is achieved, it will be necessary to take these two localities, which have been preparing for a siege for two months and have forces superior to those defending Marioupol. It is difficult to see how, at the cost of a lot of effort and unless there is a Ukrainian collapse, the Russians could take the two cities before the end of July. Will they be able to sustain a parallel fight to encircle Sloviansk-Kramatorsk, which will probably not happen before the end of June at this rate, and then an investment of the two cities that is even more difficult than in Lysysychansk-Severodonetsk, because they are even better defended and especially close to Ukrainian forces?
All this seems difficult, but not insurmountable if the other fronts - Kharkiv, Zaprozhia, Kherson - hold up against Ukrainian attacks. If one of them breaks down, especially on the Kherson side, the whole economy of forces in the theater of operations will be in question. The Donbass operation will be compromised. If the other fronts hold and if the Russian army is able to supply the theater with a rotation of units reconstituted in Belgorod or Rostov with sufficient equipment and relatively well-trained volunteers, and by innovating (for example, by changing the structure of the battle groups), the conquest of the Donbass may be a reality at the end of August. At that time, the losses on both sides will be very heavy and more balanced than at present with the prisoners of the captured cities. It is likely that Russia will then consider shifting to a general defensive posture with perhaps a negotiated peace proposal, at least until it is possible to restart an offensive towards Odessa.
The problem for the Russians is that the Ukrainians will not let themselves be pushed around and that with their human mobilization and American material aid, they can also feed the front in a similar disorder as the Russians, but above all consider forming new units, battalions at first and new brigades in a few months' time, and thus have a strong offensive capacity that they will not fail to use.
Translated with www.DeepL.com/Translator (free version)
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I guesstimate that Ukrainian losses are at least 1:2 to Russian and I believe it's been roughly like that ( and MAYBE it was 1:3 at some point, thanks to massive fugg ups in Kyiv theatre ) for some time, probably nearly matched now. I think people who want Russians to have lost 4-5 times more, even exaggerated, should buckle up for some dissapointment. What the Russians fugg up on tactical and logistical level, they can sadly compensate with sheer firepower and UA is unfortunately not beyond making mistakes either. I wish I am wrong. But always expect the worst.
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Some voices appeared demanding that Ukraine makes concessions to Putin. The world must demand Putin leave Ukraine. Today,it is not Ukraine but the Western world taking the test of whether its values mean anything,"Polish President Duda said at
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I think you confuse weight of fire, with effects of fire.
Russia has the weight, but is spending a big % of it on empty blocks of flats, and on Ukrainian fields.
Ukranian capabilities, As demonstrated by the Russian river crossing being literally obliterated, by guided fire.
As to your very long post, it appears Russia wants to conquer 4 empty towns? I think Ukraine's view is have at it, whilst bleeding the russians dry.
Russia is now trying to reach a line on the map. Funnily that line was probably put there by Stalin.
And again, bringing in an article that neatly ignores/removes the entire battle for Kiev, and Kharkiv, simply makes you sound like a russian sympathiser.
I'm not 'unbaised'. I spend a good chunk of my life preventing what we now see, coming to my home country, and its allies. But I try to look at this from both sides. I truly hope Ukraine wins, whatever that means. But in the application of military skills, I see Ukr learning new skills, their forces showing grit and for me most importantly, not sitting in place and being destroyed(much) but certainly in the first period, running a superb hit and run defense.
How many times did we hear the Ukr airforce was no more, and yet, here we are, they are flying again.
I have seen nothing 'superb' from the Russian side. Their kit is outdated, and very poorly maintained. Their troops are poorly trained, poorly motivated, and basically dont want to be there. If Russia delivered a massive and clever attack, I would credit them.
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NLAV case
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This is Ukraine´s war. They decide what they want. I hate to look like a an appeaser at this time, but what we should do is stand by Ukraine by helping Ukraine achieve its objectives: military and diplomatic. This is not Polands war, or Frances war, or Slovakias war or Americas. We support the underdog, we support a better way of life and its struggle to survive against the very primitive and brutal one that the Russians represent...and we should do it fully.
Talking without Ukraine´s approval about giving territories or fighting to the last Ukrainian is´nt right.
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I think this will be controlled by Putin.
Any sane leader, in the situation where you now hold another 5% of the enemy, than you did before, and you are struggling to man your army etc, would try for a ceasefire, and then negotiate to hold what you have. Its almost fortunate, that Putin refuses to do this.
so basically I dont think it will be up to Zelensky. In some areas the Ukr have recaptured large areas, clearly its a more old fashioned meat grinder in Donbass, but Ukraine now has 700K men under arms, and they report losing 50-100 per day in the Donbass area. Russia started with what 200K?
If Ukraine gets offered a true and workable peace deal, it should consider it, but only it can decide whether to accept or press on.
I would like to see Putin die from sudden hemorrhagic failure, Lavrov takes over, makes peace, realises Russia cant afford all these bits of other people's countries, EU etc says no to the first 6 offers of Gas. No until all these issues are resolved, absolute NO. Russia hold relatively free elections, etc.
EU taxes russian gas, 10%(out of what Russia was getting pre-war) and this is used to rebuild Ukr, in say 5 years. Ukr builds some nice resorts, and gives EU/UK 10% off. We all live happily ever after.
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I would like Zelensky to look over next year May 9th parade in Moscow
. My point is essentially that it is up to Ukraine to decide. We should be facilitators in providing weapons, intelligence and diplomacy...but not the ones setting the objectives
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A good article:
Ukrainian artillery works like Uber. The mystery of exceptional accuracy solved - GAMINGDEPUTY
… Ukrainian artillery works like Uber. The mystery of exceptional accuracy solved Read More »
www.gamingdeputy.com
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