• We are implementing a new rule regarding the posting of social media links and Youtube videos, the rule is simple if you are posting these links please say something about it rather than just dropping what we call a "drive by Link", a comment on your thoughts about the content must be included. Thank you

Politics South China Sea Thread

Following Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) devastating riots in early January 2024, Foreign Minister Justin Tkachenko told journalists that in September 2023 China had offered to provide training, equipment and surveillance technology to the PNG police force. Further, the two countries are in the early stages of negotiations over potential security cooperation. This revelation added to concerns in Australia around geopolitical competition in the Pacific region, though Tkachenko later said PNG will not ‘jeopardise or compromise relations’ with traditional security partners. Should such a deal materialise, this would be the latest in China’s expanding engagement with Pacific police forces — the main security agency in most Pacific countries.
Since 2013, China’s Ministry of Public Security has sent two police officers at a time from the Ministry and city-level bureaus on attachment to the Fiji Police Force for 3–6 months. In September 2021, China sent its first police liaison officer, based at the Chinese embassy, to Fiji. China also supplied the Fiji Police Force with vehicles, communications, surveillance and anti-riot gear prior to the 2014 national elections and further equipment in 2021, including drones.

Tuesday, January 23, 2024 - 09:27
Tonga Police received new forensics equipment and patrol car in a handover ceremony with the Embassy of China on 19 January.

They never say no thanks despite the very obvious conflict of interest. Even with the NZ police whom allowed a contigent to basically go on a PRC travel tour in China.
 
Last edited:
To view this content we will need your consent to set third party cookies.
For more detailed information, see our cookies page.
 
To view this content we will need your consent to set third party cookies.
For more detailed information, see our cookies page.
 
China: "We're not cutting cables".

To view this content we will need your consent to set third party cookies.
For more detailed information, see our cookies page.
 
465712-1024x562.webp

The Financial Times reported last week that China’s coast guard has declared China’s sovereignty over Sandy Cay, posting pictures of personnel holding a Chinese flag on a strip of sand. The landing apparently took place in mid-April.

If history is a guide, then Beijing is likely to get away with this latest fine-slicing annexation, a tactic well suited to the geography and geopolitics of the South China Sea. However, a prompt counter-assertion of sovereignty by armed forces and law enforcement personnel from the Philippines suggests that Manila will not yield sovereignty to China without resistance.

Seasoned South China Sea watchers will recognise the name Sandy Cay, a modest uninhabited sliver of land in the Spratly Islands, located a few nautical miles away from China’s largescale facilities at Subi Reef and the Philippines’ installation at Thitu Island.

This particular morsel of the South China Sea salami has been a long time in the carving. I wrote about it first in 2015 and again in 2017. For almost a decade, the Philippines and China have engaged in a low-intensity but persistent tussle over Sandy Cay.

While Sandy Cay has negligible physical value as territory, China’s lawfare experts were clearly paying attention, realising that whoever possessed the feature could potentially lay jurisdictional claim to Subi Reef, a naturally submerged feature at high tide, over which China has built a large-scale base on reclaimed land, including an airstrip and port. This apparent legalistic interest in Sandy Cay is ironic, considering that Beijing has run roughshod over international law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in so many respects.

The annexation was almost certainly long planned. Again, it comes as no surprise to seasoned South China Sea watchers to see China act at a time of international distraction. The long sweep of China’s territorial expansion in the South China Sea is replete with such moments when Beijing was able to take advantage of the international situation to press its claims, at the expense of rival Southeast Asian claimants.

Apart from heightened tensions with the Philippines, Beijing is unlikely to face punishment for its latest, bloodless annexation. Relations with Manila are already at a low point, given the breadth and severity of China’s maritime coercion and interference in the Philippines. Meanwhile, China is strengthening its relations with the rest of Southeast Asia.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations is unlikely to make much of a fuss, despite the occupation of new features running contrary to the 2002 Declaration on a Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and ongoing code of conduct negotiations. Beijing likely judges that ASEAN members will turn a blind eye, provided China does nothing further to develop Sandy Cay. Despite the Trump administration’s professed focus on competition with China and expressions of alliance solidarity with the Philippines—such as exercises between US marines and the Philippines armed forces in northern Luzon—the United States appears similarly unlikely to take a stand over the status of such a small, unoccupied feature. The inter-agency Philippines operation to reassert sovereignty at Sandy Cay and two other small features, conducted on 27 April, does not appear to have been directly supported by the US military.

One of Beijing’s diplomatic aims will be precisely to highlight, to the Philippines and others, the US’s alleged failure to act in support of its ally. But the failure to push back and impose costs against China’s successful revision of the status quo in the South China Sea is not just a US policy issue; it is a collective and cumulative failure of much of the international community interested in upholding international law, sovereign equality among states and access to the maritime commons. Australia, for one, should promptly make clear that China’s actions are provocative and destabilising, and its sovereignty claims to Sandy Cay are baseless.

Whether China encroaches in slow motion or acts in high gear to further its territorial claims in the South China Sea, the key point is that it only rolls forward—never back. Isolated shows of force, such as Scarborough Shoal in 2015, may temporarily hold its ambitions in check. But Beijing has learned that it can afford to pick its preferred time and place in the South China Sea.

Would a large-scale US show of force in response to China’s initial reclamation activities in the Spratly Islands have made a difference in 2013? The answer to that may well be affirmative, but that is water long under the bridge. In 2025, it seems most unlikely that the international response to China’s coast guard landing on Sandy Cay and proclaiming sovereignty will be significantly different to China’s actions in Scarborough Shoal in 2012, or the more serious clashes at Johnstone Reef in 1988 and the Paracels in 1974.

What sets this incident apart is the prompt counter-assertion of sovereignty by the Philippines, underlining Manila’s resolve to resist further Chinese encroachment and demonstrating its strengthened maritime policy coordination under the Marcos administration. Such resolve deserves tangible support from Manila’s allies and partners.

But the Philippines and other Southeast Asian claimants face a problem: the sparsely populated scraps of coral and sand that make up most of the contested features in the South China Sea are ideally suited to a salami-slicing strategy. Beijing has repeatedly shown that steady encroachment can successfully transform the status quo over time, without precipitating an armed response or incurring significant punishment.

China pursues a similar array of pressure tactics against Taiwan, which also has remote territory in the South China Sea at Pratas Reef and Itu Aba. Yet the annexation of Taiwan remains on a vastly different order of scale. However appetised China’s leaders may be by the thinly cut hors d’oeuvres on offer in the South China Sea, consuming the sausage whole is likely to induce indigestion, or worse.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/b...utm_term=Beijing finally slices off Sandy Cay
 
To view this content we will need your consent to set third party cookies.
For more detailed information, see our cookies page.
 
To view this content we will need your consent to set third party cookies.
For more detailed information, see our cookies page.
 
Taiwan on Friday condemned Beijing’s “provocative” actions after China conducted a patrol around the island, a day after a call between US and Chinese leaders.

Taipei’s defense ministry said it detected 21 Chinese military aircraft, including fighters and drones, of which 15 crossed the median line of the Taiwan Strait in a “combat readiness patrol.”

“The relevant actions are highly provocative… bring instability and threats to the region, and are a blatant violation of the regional status quo,” the ministry said in a statement.
https://www.reuters.com/world/china...ative-military-patrol-near-island-2025-06-06/
 

Similar threads

Back
Top