Politics South China Sea Thread

[BravoZulu]

In the ‘differ where we must’ dimension of dealing with China, Australia is wielding a new nomenclature stick. (Schtick?)

Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles talks about the ‘West Philippine Sea’, not just the ‘South China Sea’.

Kicking away some of the dashes in China’s nine-dash line claiming the whole of the South China Sea certainly pokes the dragon.

The ‘West Philippine Sea’ was first used by Manila in 2011 in expressing its disagreement with Beijing’s claim. The ‘West Philippine Sea’ refers only to waters in the Philippines’ 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, not the whole of the South China Sea.

Australia’s previous Liberal-National Party government stuck to using only the ‘South China Sea’ in its dealings with the Philippines. Marles shifted usage during his visits to the Philippines last year. At a press conference in Zambales in August, Marles referred to the importance of Manila’s victory over Beijing in the arbitral award under the UN Law of the Sea: ‘The 2016 arbitral award is profoundly important in terms of what it says about the West Philippine Sea and we support the 2016 arbitral award.’

In May this year in Hawaii, Marles joined defence ministers from the US, Japan and the Philippines in saying that ‘they strongly objected to the dangerous use of coast guard and maritime militia vessels in the South China Sea. They reiterated serious concern over the People’s Republic of China’s repeated obstruction of Philippine vessels’ exercise of high seas freedom of navigation and the disruption of supply lines to Second Thomas Shoal, which constitute dangerous and destabilizing conduct.’

The statement pledged maritime cooperation in the Philippines’ EEZ but did not refer to the West Philippine Sea, reflecting caution by both Japan and the US. In backing its treaty ally, the Philippines, the United States has avoided the ‘West Philippine Sea’ phrase.

Not so Marles, who told the Hawaii press conference of the ‘challenge to the global rules‑based order in the East China Sea, in the South China Sea, in the West Philippine Sea. And our four countries are utterly committed to asserting freedom of navigation, to asserting the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, to asserting the global rules‑based order around the oceans of the world, including in the West Philippine Sea.’

At the Shangri-La dialogue in Singapore at the weekend, Marles questioned China’s strategic behaviour and the signals it sent, offering this as his first example: ‘Actions by Chinese vessels in the West Philippine Sea, such as the use of water cannons and the ramming of Philippine vessels, are a serious escalation of tensions and inconsistent with UNCLOS and the final and binding 2016 South China Sea arbitration ruling.’

Two of the strongest speeches attacking Chinese behaviour were from Marles and the keynote address from the Philippines’ President Ferdinand Marcos Junior.

Marcos said China aimed to ‘propagate excessive and baseless claims through force, intimidation, and deception. In the West Philippine Sea, we are on the frontlines of efforts to assert the integrity of the UNCLOS as a Constitution of the Oceans. We have defined our territory and maritime zones in a manner befitting a responsible and law-abiding member of the international community. We have submitted our assertions to rigorous legal scrutiny by the world’s leading jurists. So, the lines that we draw on our waters are not derived from just our imagination, but from international law.’

The response from Chinese Defence Minister Admiral Dong Jun was to claim that the Philippines, backed by the US, had ‘abandoned bilateral agreements, broken its promises, and taken premeditated action to stir up incidents’. China’s restraint, he said, ‘has its limits’.

Canberra embraces Marcos far more than it did his predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte. The warmth is encouraged by a consensus in Manila that Duterte’s attempt to cosy up to China failed. Duterte tried to play nice; Beijing kept playing nasty. Tough talk from Marcos rhymes with much coming from Canberra.

Prime Minister Albanese visited Manila in September and welcomed Marcos to Canberra in February. Albanese called the Philippines a close friend and strategic partner: ‘Australia sees the Philippines as a central player and a crucial partner for us in Southeast Asia.’

Marcos says that as a senator he was a co-sponsor of an Archipelagic Baselines Law, which defines the basis of the Philippines’ maritime jurisdiction. As president, he intends to sign ‘a Maritime Zones Law, which will clarify the geographic extent of our maritime domain’.

Australia’s call on that domain definition is in. Australia is the second country, after the US, to commit to joint patrols with the Philippines in its waters.

Adopting the notion of the West Philippine Sea, Australia embraces a geographic term that has found little favour with countries other than the Philippines in the Association of South East Asian Nations. The ASEAN language of neutrality and non-alignment trumps solidarity with the Philippines. It’s the South China Sea to ASEAN members—apart from Vietnam, which calls it the East Sea.

The Marcos administration is getting more explicit support on the West Philippine Sea from Australia than it does from ASEAN.

Sticking with the Philippines’ map, Australia is sticking it to China. That’s a pointy schtick.

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a...he West Philippine Sea in the South China Sea

 

[BravoZulu]

Manila and Beijing agreed to “de-escalate tensions” in the South China Sea following a tense standoff last month at a disputed shoal, Philippine officials said Tuesday after both sides held bilateral talks on the waterway.

Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro met with Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Chen Xiaodong behind closed doors in Manila for the 9th Bilateral Consultation Mechanism on the South China Sea, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs said in a statement.

The two sides “had a frank and constructive discussion on the situation in the South China Sea,” the statement said, adding that both “affirmed their commitment to de-escalate tensions without prejudice to their respective positions.”

Lazaro, however, told Chen that Manila would remain “relentless in protecting its interests and upholding its sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the West Philippine Sea,” the statement said, using Manila’s name for South China Sea waters within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone.

Both sides “affirmed their commitment to de-escalate tensions without prejudice to their respective positions,” the statement also said.

Lazaro and Chen, who headed their respective delegations at the talks in Makati, Manila’s financial district, committed to implementing a “maritime communication mechanism” between their countries’ coast guards and to form a joint committee to discuss such incidents, according to the statement.

It gave no further details on this point, and the two senior diplomats did not hold a joint press conference after their meeting. Similar agreements in the past to set up a South China Sea “hotline” to quickly address bilateral problems as they arise have not been effective.

“There was substantial progress on developing measures to manage the situation at sea, but significant differences remain,” the statement said.

Chinese coast guard personnel (left, right) aboard inflatable boats block Philippine navy boats (center) during a confrontation at Second Thomas Shoal in the South China Sea, in this screengrab from a handout video filmed on June 17, 2024, and released by the Philippine military on June 19
https://www.rfa.org/english/news/so...g agreed to,Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Ma.

 

[BravoZulu]

Deployments of ships and aircraft to challenge China’s illegal claims in the South China Sea are increasing. European ships are appearing more often, while Asia-Pacific countries are increasingly conducting activities in areas that China regards as sensitive.
Several nations have claims in the South China Sea, but China’s claim is the most extensive and controversial. Beijing seeks to enforce sovereign rights and jurisdiction over all features within the nine-dash line, including the islands, rocks and atolls that make up the Paracel and Spratly Islands. China claims this territory despite a 2016 ruling that found that China’s claims had no basis in international law.
With international law doing little to curb China’s ambitions, more countries are using their militaries to challenge China’s claims. In 2024, more European navies operated in the South China Sea than previously in recent years, with Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands all sending ships to the region. Meanwhile regional counties, such as Japan, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, stepped up their engagement, including via joint sailings with the Philippines in the South China Sea.
Different countries take different approaches to challenging China’s illegal claims in the South China Sea. Some militaries are operating within the nine-dash line. Others sail naval ships directly through the Spratly Islands. Some advertise their activities; others do not.
Only a few have conducted activities close to the Paracels, because doing so is unusually risky. A 2022 incident in which a Chinese pilot dumped chaff in front of an Australian P-8 Poseidon surveillance aircraft is an example of the risk.
The US is the only country to send aircraft or ships within 12 nautical miles of claimed features. By doing so, it would be entering territorial waters if China did in fact own the territory.
Apart from countries around the South China Sea, which must routinely operate on or over it, the US has by far the most public and active military presence. In 2023, the US military conducted 107 activities, including six specific operations to challenge China’s illegal claims under the US Freedom of Navigation program. US activities are always accompanied by strong public statements.
France and Canada are both active in the region, including within the Spratlys. Both advertise their military presence and actions. Canada now carries journalists on some South China Sea transits. It has operated close to the Paracel Islands, but, as demonstrated when a Chinese fighter fired flares near a Canadian helicopter in 2023, doing so comes with risks. In 2015, France boldly exercised its right to freedom of navigation by sailing a task force through the Paracels.
Australia has an active military presence in the South China Sea. There’s evidence that Australia operates close to China’s illegal claims. However, the tempo and nature of its military challenges are hard to determine, because Canberra does not advertise them. China’s military has been aggressive in seeking to deter Australia from operating near the two island groups by engaging in unsafe intercepts.
New Zealand has a semi-regular presence inside the nine-dash line, commensurate with the size of its armed forces. Meanwhile, Japan has a growing military presence in the region and is increasingly working with partners, such as the US, Australia and the Philippines. As with Australia, there are signs that Japan and New Zealand operate close to, or within, the Spratly group, but neither publicise specific actions, so the nature of them is hard to determine.
Britain sent a carrier strike group through the South China Sea in 2021 and intends to do so again next year. The British military operates close to the Spratly and Paracel Islands and uses public messaging to reinforce the importance of sailing in these areas.
Signalling growing European interest in the region, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy sent navy ships to the area in 2024. But none seems to have overtly challenged China’s claims within the Spratlys or Paracels.
The most notable regional absentee is South Korea. In 2018, a South Korean destroyer, Munmu the Great, took refuge from a typhoon in the Paracel Islands. But Seoul quickly clarified that the ship was not there to challenge China’s claims. Likewise, when the littoral states of South East Asia routinely operate there, they do not directly challenge China’s claims via freedom of navigation transits.
The growing presence of European navies in the South China Sea and stepped-up activity of Asia-Pacific countries there is welcome. It’s helping to push back on China’s growing aggression and reinforce longstanding rules and norms that underpin regional prosperity.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/military-challenges-to-beijings-south-china-sea-claims-are-increasing/?utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Weekly The Strategist&utm_content=Weekly The Strategist+CID_305da398a6a25bcc23511b0738f52231&utm_source=CampaignMonitor&utm_term=Military challenges to Beijings South China Sea claims are increasing

 

[BravoZulu]

Indonesia said on Thursday (Oct 24) it drove out a Chinese coast guard vessel from contested waters in the South China Sea twice in recent days, the latest move by a Southeast Asian nation against Beijing's actions in the strategic waterway.

Chinese vessels have occasionally entered Indonesia-claimed areas of the North Natuna Sea at the southern edge of the South China Sea, drawing protests from Jakarta.

"The China Coast Guard ship re-entered the Indonesian jurisdiction in the North Natuna Sea on Wednesday," Indonesia's Maritime Security Agency said in a statement on Thursday.

An Indonesian coast guard ship intercepted the boat and drove it from the area, it said.

The agency said the vessel first entered contested waters on Monday and when an Indonesian ship tried to contact the Chinese boat by radio, the Chinese coast guard said the area was part of Beijing's jurisdiction.

The ship was "disturbing the activity of a survey" being conducted by state-owned oil company Pertamina, it said.

An Indonesian coast guard ship shadowed the ship and drove it away.

Huge unexploited oil and gas deposits are believed to lie under the South China Sea's seabed, though estimates vary greatly.

An Indonesia coast guard ship and a China coast guard vessel in the background, in the waters of Indonesia's North Natuna Sea in November 2021. (File photo: Indonesian Coast Guard)
https://www.channelnewsasia.com/asi...nese-coast-guard-ship-south-china-sea-4699406

 

[BravoZulu]

China is testing Prabowo Subianto’s new administration, with three successive incursions by China Coast Guard vessels into Indonesia’s exclusive maritime jurisdiction—the first occurring on the new president’s inaugural day in office.

Jakarta urgently needs to recalibrate its South China Sea diplomacy and to revisit its basic assumptions about China. China’s move south should also be a wake-up call to Canberra that its pursuit of supposed bilateral ‘stabilisation’ with Beijing is irrelevant to China’s strategic intentions.

These incursions are more than a test of Prabowo’s mettle. They are hard evidence that the economics-first, neutrality-based approach of Prabowo’s predecessor, Joko Widodo, fundamentally failed to temper China’s maritime expansionism in the southernmost reaches of the South China Sea. China is making it crystal clear to Prabowo that it still claims ownership over all waters and seabed resources within the dashed-line claim, including part of Indonesia’s continental shelf and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) around the Natuna Islands.

This is despite Jakarta’s longstanding official position that it has no jurisdictional dispute with China, given the legally baseless nature of the Chinese ambit claim. However, under Prabowo, Indonesia’s maritime authorities appear to be implementing greater transparency about China’s activities near the Natuna Islands, quickly releasing video and audio of the Chinese Coast Guard’s challenges to Indonesian vessels in the area.

If Jakarta thought it had obtained a diplomatic modus vivendi with Beijing despite their differences in the South China Sea, China’s leadership clearly has other ideas. One prominent Indonesian analyst has argued that Philippines-China relations deteriorated because Manila’s diplomacy was out of kilter with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) holistic and non-confrontational approach towards Beijing. In fact, China’s incursions near the Natuna Islands should prompt Jakarta to question its own diplomatic settings towards China, ASEAN and the South China Sea. By failing to support the Philippines diplomatically, the previous Indonesian administration only emboldened China’s divide-and-conquer tactics, now seen on Indonesia’s maritime doorstep.

Under Widodo, Jakarta prioritised economic benefits in its relations with Beijing, contributing to China becoming Indonesia’s largest source of inward investment. Indonesia remained party to the intractable negotiations between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations for a code of conduct in the South China Sea. But it did not invest real energy behind the effort, with the result that the process has drifted aimlessly from one ASEAN chairmanship to another, weakening the organisation’s collective resolve.

Indonesia must now belatedly put its full weight behind those negotiations, either to secure a meaningful outcome or terminate the talks if Beijing continues to stall. Jakarta should meanwhile muster diplomatic support within Southeast Asia for the Philippines, a fellow ASEAN founder member facing a clear external threat, as Indonesia did for Thailand in the 1980s. Southeast Asia’s collective security must come ahead of any single member’s economic benefit, in conformity with ASEAN’s foundational spirit and diplomatic purpose.

China has unfortunately received the message that Southeast Asia can easily be splintered by working bilaterally and exploiting its greater leverage relative to any one of the countries. Malaysia’s supplicatory position towards China under Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has only fanned Beijing’s confidence that it can divide-and-rule ASEAN with ease.

One of China’s follow-up objectives is to persuade Indonesia that it should ‘properly handle maritime issues’, contingent on broader factors in their relationship. Jakarta should be alert to China’s bad-faith intentions, including offers of dialogue, and double down instead on the code-of-conduct negotiations. In doing so, it would return to its traditional leading-from-behind role within ASEAN.

Indonesia must vocally support the Philippines and Vietnam whenever they face Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. Jakarta should prioritise efforts to reach an EEZ boundary agreement with Vietnam, building on Indonesia’s successful maritime boundary delimitation with the Philippines. This will make it harder for Beijing to exploit differences among the Southeast Asian littoral states. Prabowo’s decision to send military assets to assist the Philippines as part of a four-nation ASEAN disaster relief mission was a commendable signal of solidarity and good will.

China may justifiably feel that Southeast Asia is tipping its way overall, and that the Philippines appears isolated within ASEAN. But poking Indonesia is never an advisable strategy. By overbearingly doing so, China reveals its hubris.

Prabowo may be a mercurial figure, but he’s unlikely to be a pushover. An axis of cooperation among Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam could still obstruct Beijing’s path towards dominance in the South China Sea. But Jakarta must draw its own clear-eyed conclusions about China’s strategic intent from first principles.

Australia should take note. Beijing’s direct challenge to Indonesia’s maritime sovereign rights, despite years of favourable treatment by Widodo, calls into question the meaning of what Canberra is calling ‘stabilisation’ with China.

Beijing’s strategic behaviour continues to be deeply inimical to Australia’s security within the immediate region. China is steadily marching south, while Australia’s government seemingly obsesses over lobsters and wine exports.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/t...ina comes a-knocking at Indonesias front door

 

[Musashi]

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[primer]

Word for word Bannon about ten years ago.

Got an email from a manufacturer in PRC . They had USA products you can order, their pics were of the USA product with the brand on it.
Absolutely no shame in ripping off the west..it has and still is total merchantile war for them ignored by politicians who were simply sinophiles and only recently have they started to apply tarrifs..they should have a carbon tarrif aswell for all the coal they use while the west self suicides by windmill.

 

[Mike1976]

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