Frankly, I find myself increasingly irritated by the headlines which maps like the ones above prompt in Western media. Most commentators engage in what Popper described as the 'poverty of historicism', resigning themselves to the fallacy that history repeats itself ("graveyard of empires"). Our strategy, they say, was "naïve". Was it, though? Let's not confound sugary soundbites intended for the press with official strategy.
But enough of "our" mistakes for a change, how about we look at what the Afghans should've been able to achieve over the past twenty years (according to historical precedent?). In the West they try to avoid that very discussion because it would inevitably draw accusations of a neo-colonialist or even racist mindset, simply due to the answer being: The Afghans failed themselves.
The Afghan people suffers from debilitating structural deficiencies which are all but self-inflicted. How could external influence possibly make a difference in a country where those in charge of protecting it constantly embezzle their subordinates‘ salaries or refuse to cooperate with one another because of their tribal affiliations? And these are far from being the only issues.
I know a couple of people who were involved in ANSF recruit training; they likened their experience to having to deal with toddlers. But even the average Afghan officer can't be trusted to grasp basic concepts of professional conduct (like punctuality, i.e. appreciating the necessity to show up in time for a planned operation). The special forces kandaks seem to be the only dependable force over there.
Foreigners invested blood, sweat and truckloads of money into Afghanistan's future. What investments were made by the locals? None – at least not collectively. That's because there is no collective. The Taliban are not smarter, more courageous or better equipped; the main difference between them and their domestic opponents is the former have the cohesion of which the latter are in desperately short supply.
So, we don't have to talk about Vietnam or even the Soviet-Afghan War all the time. ISAF neither repeated America's Vietnam-era mistakes, nor did it replicate the Soviet strategy of wiping every insurgent village off the map, creating a river of blood that swept the entire country into resisting them. The cardinal error made by NATO – the failure no one talks about – was not assuming political control.
Nation-building can work and has worked before. But it requires dependable institutions. If the country in question is unable to provide such institutions, they must be provided by outsiders – particularly if said outsiders are perceived as being the ones actually in charge. (The Hague Conventions actually charge an occupying force with establishing an effective civil administration, by the way.)
And no, I'm not thinking of post-war Germany or Japan, in case you're wondering. You needn't look no further than Bosnia to get a glimpse of a modus operandi that might've yielded a better outcome. But Bosnia, that was the 1990's. The Bush'esque pathos of "enduring freedom" hadn't crept into the decision-making process yet.
P.S.: Forgetting to mind the time, I ended up converting a tuna pizza into charcoal whilst writing this comment. This had better be worth it.
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