Photos Navies Of All Nations
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Japan:
Oyashio II-class diesel-electric attack submarine loading Type 89 heavyweight torpedo.
Taigei-class attack submarine JS Hakugei (SS-514) arrived at the Kure Naval Base for the first time. 7th April, 2023
Oyashio II-class diesel-electric attack submarine loading Type 89 heavyweight torpedo.
Taigei-class attack submarine JS Hakugei (SS-514) arrived at the Kure Naval Base for the first time. 7th April, 2023
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USN:
On Eternal Patrol - USS Thresher (SSN-593). 60 years ago USS Thresher (SSN-593), the lead boat of her class of nuclear-powered attack submarines, was lost with all hands during deep diving tests beyond the continental shelf east of Cape Cod, Massachusetts.
Launched on July 9, 1960, the USS Thresher represented a massive leap forward in submarine technology. Built as a replacement to the Skipjack-Class subs, she was the first in a new generation of nuclear attack submarine developed by the U.S. Navy. Even by the standard of the early 60’s, the Thresher was a remarkable submarine; at least on paper. Capable of diving to depths of up to 1,300 ft and equipped with next generation sonar arrays, fire-control systems, and a new generation of nuclear reactor, she was a formidable foe to any enemy combatants. Her sleek hull and narrow sail (the smallest ever fitted to a American SSN) gave her an impressive top speed of 33 knots.
On 9 April 1963, Thresher, commanded by Lieutenant Commander John Wesley Harvey, left from Kittery, Maine, at 8:00 a.m. and met with the submarine rescue ship Skylark at 11:00 a.m. to begin her initial post-overhaul dive trials, in an area some 220 mi; 350 km (190 nmi) east of Cape Cod, Massachusetts. That afternoon, Thresher conducted an initial trim-dive test, surfaced, and then performed a second dive to half of her 1,300-foot test depth. She remained submerged overnight and re-established underwater communications with Skylark at 6:30 a.m. on 10 April to commence deep-dive trials. Following standard practice, Thresher slowly dove deeper as she traveled in circles under Skylark – to remain within communications distance – pausing every 30 m (100 ft) of depth to check the integrity of all systems. As Thresher neared her test depth, Skylark received garbled communications over underwater telephone indicating " ... minor difficulties, have positive up-angle, attempting to blow," and then a final, even more garbled message that included the number "900". When Skylark received no further communication, surface observers gradually realized Thresher had sunk.
Deep-sea photography, recovered artifacts, and an evaluation of Thresher's design and operational history permitted a court of inquiry to conclude that the submarine had probably suffered the failure of a salt-water piping system joint that relied heavily on silver brazing instead of welding. Earlier tests using ultrasound equipment found potential problems with about 14% of the tested brazed joints, most of which were determined not to pose a risk significant enough to require repair. But on 30 November 1960, nearly three years prior to the accident, USS Barbel suffered such a silver-braze joint failure near test depth while on an exercise, flooding the engine room with an estimated 18 tons of water in the 3 minutes it took to surface under power and with blown tanks. This incident was followed months later by more silver-braze failures aboard the ballistic missile submarine USS Abraham Lincoln during trials. High-pressure water spraying from a broken pipe joint may have shorted out one of the many electrical panels, causing a shutdown ("scram") of the reactor, which in turn caused loss of propulsion.
The inability to blow the ballast tanks was later attributed to excessive moisture in the submarine's high-pressure air flasks, moisture that froze and plugged the flasks' flowpaths while passing through the valves. This was later simulated in dockside tests on Thresher's sister sub, Tinosa. During a test to simulate blowing ballast at or near test depth, ice formed on strainers installed in valves; the flow of air lasted only a few seconds. Air dryers were later retrofitted to the high-pressure air compressors, beginning with Tinosa, to permit the emergency blow system to operate properly. Submarines typically rely on speed and deck angle (angle of attack) rather than deballasting to surface; they are propelled at an angle toward the surface. Ballast tanks were almost never blown at depth, as doing so could cause the submarine to rocket to the surface out of control. Normal procedure was to drive the submarine to periscope depth, raise the periscope to verify that the area was clear, and then blow the tanks and surface the submarine.
Subsequent study of SOSUS (sound surveillance system) data from the time of the incident has given rise to doubts as to whether flooding preceded the reactor scram, as no impact sounds of the high pressure water in the compartments of the submarine could be detected on instrument recordings from SOSUS at the time. Such flooding would have caused a significant sonic event, and no evidence of such may be found in the recorded data.
At the time, reactor-plant operating procedures did not allow for a rapid reactor restart following a scram, or even the ability to use steam remaining in the secondary system to propel the submarine to the surface. After a scram, standard procedure was to isolate the main steam system, cutting off the flow of steam to the turbines providing propulsion and electricity. This was done to prevent an overly rapid cool-down of the reactor. Thresher's reactor control officer, Lieutenant Raymond McCoole, was not on the boat during the fatal dive; his trainee, Jim Henry, fresh from nuclear power school, probably followed standard operating procedures and gave the order to isolate the steam system after the scram, even though Thresher was at or slightly below its maximum depth. Once closed, the large steam system isolation valves could not be reopened quickly. Reflecting on the situation in later life, McCoole was sure that he would have delayed shutting the valves, thus allowing the boat to "answer bells" and drive itself to the surface, despite the flooding in the engineering spaces. Admiral Rickover noted that the procedures were for normal operating conditions, and not intended to restrict necessary actions in an emergency involving the safety of the ship. After the accident, Rickover further reduced plant restart times, which had already been gradually improving with new technology and operating experience, in addition to limiting factors that could cause a shut down. The Fast Recovery Startup involves an immediate reactor restart and allows steam to be withdrawn from the secondary system in limited quantities for several minutes following a scram.
In a dockside simulation of flooding in the engine room, held before Thresher sailed, the watch in charge took 20 minutes to isolate a simulated leak in the auxiliary seawater system. At test depth with the reactor shut down, Thresher would not have had 20 minutes to recover. Even after isolating a short circuit in the reactor controls, it would have taken nearly 10 minutes to restart the plant.
It was believed at the time that Thresher likely imploded at a depth of 400–610 m (1,300–2,000 ft), though 2013 acoustic analysis concluded implosion occurred at 730 meters.
The U.S. Navy has periodically monitored the environmental conditions of the site since the sinking and has reported the results in an annual public report on environmental monitoring for U.S. naval nuclear-powered craft. These reports provide results of the environmental sampling of sediment, water, and marine life, which is performed to ascertain whether Thresher's nuclear reactor has had a significant effect on the deep-ocean environment. The reports also explain the methodology for conducting deep-sea monitoring from both surface vessels and submersibles. The monitoring data confirm that there has been no significant effect on the environment. Nuclear fuel in the submarine remains intact.
Following the sinking of Thresher, the class that she was supposed to represent was changed to the Permit-Class, after the second boat commissioned. Due to the Thresher disaster, almost everything onboard the Permit and her sisters were overhauled and redesigned, to the point that the Permit-Class boats barely resembled the Thresher in almost every respect. The navy created the SUBSAFE program to ensure that future submarine hulls would stay watertight and that they can recover from unanticipated flooding.
While other submarines far larger have sunk, such as the Kursk in 2001, the Thresher still holds the unwanted record for the highest casualty number of any submarine disaster in history; with 129 souls aboard at the time of sinking.
Having been lost at sea, and in the tradition of the U.S. Navy Thresher has never been decommissioned and remains on "Eternal Patrol".
On Eternal Patrol - USS Thresher (SSN-593). 60 years ago USS Thresher (SSN-593), the lead boat of her class of nuclear-powered attack submarines, was lost with all hands during deep diving tests beyond the continental shelf east of Cape Cod, Massachusetts.
Launched on July 9, 1960, the USS Thresher represented a massive leap forward in submarine technology. Built as a replacement to the Skipjack-Class subs, she was the first in a new generation of nuclear attack submarine developed by the U.S. Navy. Even by the standard of the early 60’s, the Thresher was a remarkable submarine; at least on paper. Capable of diving to depths of up to 1,300 ft and equipped with next generation sonar arrays, fire-control systems, and a new generation of nuclear reactor, she was a formidable foe to any enemy combatants. Her sleek hull and narrow sail (the smallest ever fitted to a American SSN) gave her an impressive top speed of 33 knots.
On 9 April 1963, Thresher, commanded by Lieutenant Commander John Wesley Harvey, left from Kittery, Maine, at 8:00 a.m. and met with the submarine rescue ship Skylark at 11:00 a.m. to begin her initial post-overhaul dive trials, in an area some 220 mi; 350 km (190 nmi) east of Cape Cod, Massachusetts. That afternoon, Thresher conducted an initial trim-dive test, surfaced, and then performed a second dive to half of her 1,300-foot test depth. She remained submerged overnight and re-established underwater communications with Skylark at 6:30 a.m. on 10 April to commence deep-dive trials. Following standard practice, Thresher slowly dove deeper as she traveled in circles under Skylark – to remain within communications distance – pausing every 30 m (100 ft) of depth to check the integrity of all systems. As Thresher neared her test depth, Skylark received garbled communications over underwater telephone indicating " ... minor difficulties, have positive up-angle, attempting to blow," and then a final, even more garbled message that included the number "900". When Skylark received no further communication, surface observers gradually realized Thresher had sunk.
Deep-sea photography, recovered artifacts, and an evaluation of Thresher's design and operational history permitted a court of inquiry to conclude that the submarine had probably suffered the failure of a salt-water piping system joint that relied heavily on silver brazing instead of welding. Earlier tests using ultrasound equipment found potential problems with about 14% of the tested brazed joints, most of which were determined not to pose a risk significant enough to require repair. But on 30 November 1960, nearly three years prior to the accident, USS Barbel suffered such a silver-braze joint failure near test depth while on an exercise, flooding the engine room with an estimated 18 tons of water in the 3 minutes it took to surface under power and with blown tanks. This incident was followed months later by more silver-braze failures aboard the ballistic missile submarine USS Abraham Lincoln during trials. High-pressure water spraying from a broken pipe joint may have shorted out one of the many electrical panels, causing a shutdown ("scram") of the reactor, which in turn caused loss of propulsion.
The inability to blow the ballast tanks was later attributed to excessive moisture in the submarine's high-pressure air flasks, moisture that froze and plugged the flasks' flowpaths while passing through the valves. This was later simulated in dockside tests on Thresher's sister sub, Tinosa. During a test to simulate blowing ballast at or near test depth, ice formed on strainers installed in valves; the flow of air lasted only a few seconds. Air dryers were later retrofitted to the high-pressure air compressors, beginning with Tinosa, to permit the emergency blow system to operate properly. Submarines typically rely on speed and deck angle (angle of attack) rather than deballasting to surface; they are propelled at an angle toward the surface. Ballast tanks were almost never blown at depth, as doing so could cause the submarine to rocket to the surface out of control. Normal procedure was to drive the submarine to periscope depth, raise the periscope to verify that the area was clear, and then blow the tanks and surface the submarine.
Subsequent study of SOSUS (sound surveillance system) data from the time of the incident has given rise to doubts as to whether flooding preceded the reactor scram, as no impact sounds of the high pressure water in the compartments of the submarine could be detected on instrument recordings from SOSUS at the time. Such flooding would have caused a significant sonic event, and no evidence of such may be found in the recorded data.
At the time, reactor-plant operating procedures did not allow for a rapid reactor restart following a scram, or even the ability to use steam remaining in the secondary system to propel the submarine to the surface. After a scram, standard procedure was to isolate the main steam system, cutting off the flow of steam to the turbines providing propulsion and electricity. This was done to prevent an overly rapid cool-down of the reactor. Thresher's reactor control officer, Lieutenant Raymond McCoole, was not on the boat during the fatal dive; his trainee, Jim Henry, fresh from nuclear power school, probably followed standard operating procedures and gave the order to isolate the steam system after the scram, even though Thresher was at or slightly below its maximum depth. Once closed, the large steam system isolation valves could not be reopened quickly. Reflecting on the situation in later life, McCoole was sure that he would have delayed shutting the valves, thus allowing the boat to "answer bells" and drive itself to the surface, despite the flooding in the engineering spaces. Admiral Rickover noted that the procedures were for normal operating conditions, and not intended to restrict necessary actions in an emergency involving the safety of the ship. After the accident, Rickover further reduced plant restart times, which had already been gradually improving with new technology and operating experience, in addition to limiting factors that could cause a shut down. The Fast Recovery Startup involves an immediate reactor restart and allows steam to be withdrawn from the secondary system in limited quantities for several minutes following a scram.
In a dockside simulation of flooding in the engine room, held before Thresher sailed, the watch in charge took 20 minutes to isolate a simulated leak in the auxiliary seawater system. At test depth with the reactor shut down, Thresher would not have had 20 minutes to recover. Even after isolating a short circuit in the reactor controls, it would have taken nearly 10 minutes to restart the plant.
It was believed at the time that Thresher likely imploded at a depth of 400–610 m (1,300–2,000 ft), though 2013 acoustic analysis concluded implosion occurred at 730 meters.
The U.S. Navy has periodically monitored the environmental conditions of the site since the sinking and has reported the results in an annual public report on environmental monitoring for U.S. naval nuclear-powered craft. These reports provide results of the environmental sampling of sediment, water, and marine life, which is performed to ascertain whether Thresher's nuclear reactor has had a significant effect on the deep-ocean environment. The reports also explain the methodology for conducting deep-sea monitoring from both surface vessels and submersibles. The monitoring data confirm that there has been no significant effect on the environment. Nuclear fuel in the submarine remains intact.
Following the sinking of Thresher, the class that she was supposed to represent was changed to the Permit-Class, after the second boat commissioned. Due to the Thresher disaster, almost everything onboard the Permit and her sisters were overhauled and redesigned, to the point that the Permit-Class boats barely resembled the Thresher in almost every respect. The navy created the SUBSAFE program to ensure that future submarine hulls would stay watertight and that they can recover from unanticipated flooding.
While other submarines far larger have sunk, such as the Kursk in 2001, the Thresher still holds the unwanted record for the highest casualty number of any submarine disaster in history; with 129 souls aboard at the time of sinking.
Having been lost at sea, and in the tradition of the U.S. Navy Thresher has never been decommissioned and remains on "Eternal Patrol".
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Russia:
Periscope picture of a Project 877 Paltus (NATO Kilo) class SSK after surfacing taken by Royal Norwegian Navy's Kobben (Type 207)-class KNM Skolpen (S-306) during a patrol in the Barents Sea, 1991.
Project 941 Akula (NATO Typhoon) class SSBN with open SLBM hatches. Possibly TK-208, future "Dmitriy Donskoy"
Periscope picture of a Project 877 Paltus (NATO Kilo) class SSK after surfacing taken by Royal Norwegian Navy's Kobben (Type 207)-class KNM Skolpen (S-306) during a patrol in the Barents Sea, 1991.
Project 941 Akula (NATO Typhoon) class SSBN with open SLBM hatches. Possibly TK-208, future "Dmitriy Donskoy"
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Russia:
April 7, 1989. Project 685 Plavnik (NATO Mike) class SSN "Komsomolets" (K-278) sank in the Barents Sea off the coast of Norway due to fire onboard, killing 42 crewmembers.
April 7, 1989. Project 685 Plavnik (NATO Mike) class SSN "Komsomolets" (K-278) sank in the Barents Sea off the coast of Norway due to fire onboard, killing 42 crewmembers.
- K-278 before launch at SEVMASH Shipyard, 1983
- At sea
- Rescued crewmembers, April 1989
- Wreck of K-278 resting at the bottom of the Barents Sea in ~1700m of water
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IJN Yamato
The Yamato (大和,) was the lead ship of her class of battleships built for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) shortly before World War II. She and her sister ship, Musashi, were the heaviest and most powerfully armed battleships ever constructed, displacing nearly 72,000 tonnes (71,000 long tons) at full load and armed with nine 46 cm (18.1 in) Type 94 main guns, which were the largest guns ever mounted on a warship.
Named after the ancient Japanese Yamato Province, Yamato was designed to counter the numerically superior battleship fleet of the United States, Japan's main rival in the Pacific. She was laid down in 1937 and formally commissioned a week after the attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Throughout 1942, she served as the flagship of the Combined Fleet, and in June 1942 Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto directed the fleet from her bridge during the Battle of Midway, a disastrous defeat for Japan. Musashi took over as the Combined Fleet flagship in early 1943, and Yamato spent the rest of the year moving between the major Japanese naval bases of Truk and Kure in response to American threats. In December 1943, Yamato was torpedoed by an American submarine which necessitated repairs at Kure, where she would also be refitted with additional anti-aircraft guns and radar in early 1944. Although present at the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June 1944, she played no part in the battle.
The only time Yamato fired her main guns at enemy surface targets was in October 1944, when she was sent to engage American forces invading the Philippines during the Battle of Leyte Gulf. While threatening to sink American troop transports, they encountered a light escort carrier group of the U.S. Navy's Task Force 77, "Taffy 3", in the Battle off Samar. The Japanese turned back after American air attacks convinced them they were engaging a powerful US carrier fleet.
During 1944, the balance of naval power in the Pacific decisively turned against Japan, and by early 1945, its fleet was much depleted and badly hobbled by critical fuel shortages in the home islands. In a desperate attempt to slow the Allied advance, Yamato was dispatched on a one-way mission to Okinawa in April 1945, with orders to beach herself and fight until destroyed, thus protecting the island. The task force was spotted south of Kyushu by US submarines and aircraft, and on 7 April 1945 she was sunk by American carrier-based bombers and torpedo bombers with the loss of most of her crew.
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Germany:
Type 212 attack submarine U-33 (S-183) coming into Kiel, Germany - April 19, 2023
Type 212A Batch I-class U-32 (S-182) at the 1st Submarine Squadron Base at Eckernfoerde, Germany. 19th Apr 2023
Type 212 attack submarine U-33 (S-183) coming into Kiel, Germany - April 19, 2023
Type 212A Batch I-class U-32 (S-182) at the 1st Submarine Squadron Base at Eckernfoerde, Germany. 19th Apr 2023
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USN:
PHILIPPINE SEA (April 15, 2023) U.S. Sailors aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108) conduct an underway replenishment with the Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo ship USNS Washington Chambers (T-AKE 11).
The beginning of the career of the final Freedom-class USS Cleveland (LCS-31) experiences a glitch as she collides with a tug during launch, Fincantieri Marinette Marine shipyard, Wisconsin, 16 Apr 2023
USS Daniel Inouye (DDG 118) off Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. April 16, 2023. The ship recently conducted a successful SM-6 Dual II engagement during the Stellar Hydra exercise.
USS North Dakota (SSN 784) Virginia-class Block III attack submarine in the Chesapeake Bay off of Annapolis, Maryland - April 18, 2023
PHILIPPINE SEA (April 15, 2023) U.S. Sailors aboard the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Wayne E. Meyer (DDG 108) conduct an underway replenishment with the Lewis and Clark-class dry cargo ship USNS Washington Chambers (T-AKE 11).
The beginning of the career of the final Freedom-class USS Cleveland (LCS-31) experiences a glitch as she collides with a tug during launch, Fincantieri Marinette Marine shipyard, Wisconsin, 16 Apr 2023
USS Daniel Inouye (DDG 118) off Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. April 16, 2023. The ship recently conducted a successful SM-6 Dual II engagement during the Stellar Hydra exercise.
USS North Dakota (SSN 784) Virginia-class Block III attack submarine in the Chesapeake Bay off of Annapolis, Maryland - April 18, 2023
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USN:
USS Iowa (BB-61) underway in the Pacific, March 2, 1986
The explosion of the No. 2 16-inch gun turret aboard the battleship USS Iowa (BB-61), 330 miles northeast of Puerto Rico. 47 sailors were killed by the blast. 19 April 1989
During a gunnery exercise, at 0955 on 19 April 1989, an explosion ripped through the Number Two 16-inch (406 mm) gun turret, killing 47 crewmen. A gunner's mate in the powder magazine room quickly flooded the No. 2 powder magazine, likely preventing catastrophic damage to the ship. At first, Naval Investigative Service (NIS, later renamed Naval Criminal Investigative Service or NCIS) investigators theorized that one of the dead crewmen, Clayton Hartwig, had detonated an explosive device in a suicide attempt after the end of an alleged affair with another sailor. To support this claim, naval officials pointed to several different factors, including Hartwig's life insurance policy, which named Kendall Truitt as the sole beneficiary in the event of his death, the presence of unexplained materials inside turret 2, and his mental state, which was alleged to be unstable.
Although the Navy was satisfied with the investigation and its results, others were unconvinced, and in October 1991, amid increasing criticism, Congress forced the Navy to reopen the investigation. This second investigation, handled by independent investigators, was hampered as most of the original debris from Iowa had been cleaned up or otherwise disposed of by the Navy before and after the first investigation, but it did uncover evidence pointing to an accidental powder explosion rather than an intentional act of sabotage.
While Iowa was undergoing modernization in the early 1980s, her sister ship New Jersey had been dispatched to Lebanon to provide offshore fire support. At the time, New Jersey was the only commissioned battleship anywhere in the world, and it was found that, in an effort to get another battleship commissioned to relieve New Jersey, the modernization of Iowa was stepped up, leaving her in poor condition when she recommissioned in 1984. It was also determined that Captain Fred Moosally was more concerned with the maintenance of the missiles than the training and manning of guns.
Powder from the same lot as the one under investigation was tested at the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division. Spontaneous combustion was achieved with the powder, which had been originally milled in the 1930s and improperly stored in a barge at the Navy's Yorktown, Virginia, Naval Weapons Station during a 1988 dry-docking of Iowa. As it degrades, gunpowder gives off ether gas, which is highly flammable and could be ignited by a spark. This revelation resulted in a shift in the Navy's position on the incident, and Admiral Frank Kelso, the Chief of Naval Operations at the time, publicly apologized to the Hartwig family, concluding that there was no real evidence to support the claim that he had intentionally killed the other sailors. Iowa captain Fred Moosally was severely criticized for his handling of the matter, and as a result of the incident the Navy changed the powder-handling procedures for its battleships. The incident remains one of the surface Navy's worst losses of life during peacetime operations.
USS Iowa (BB-61) underway in the Pacific, March 2, 1986
The explosion of the No. 2 16-inch gun turret aboard the battleship USS Iowa (BB-61), 330 miles northeast of Puerto Rico. 47 sailors were killed by the blast. 19 April 1989
During a gunnery exercise, at 0955 on 19 April 1989, an explosion ripped through the Number Two 16-inch (406 mm) gun turret, killing 47 crewmen. A gunner's mate in the powder magazine room quickly flooded the No. 2 powder magazine, likely preventing catastrophic damage to the ship. At first, Naval Investigative Service (NIS, later renamed Naval Criminal Investigative Service or NCIS) investigators theorized that one of the dead crewmen, Clayton Hartwig, had detonated an explosive device in a suicide attempt after the end of an alleged affair with another sailor. To support this claim, naval officials pointed to several different factors, including Hartwig's life insurance policy, which named Kendall Truitt as the sole beneficiary in the event of his death, the presence of unexplained materials inside turret 2, and his mental state, which was alleged to be unstable.
Although the Navy was satisfied with the investigation and its results, others were unconvinced, and in October 1991, amid increasing criticism, Congress forced the Navy to reopen the investigation. This second investigation, handled by independent investigators, was hampered as most of the original debris from Iowa had been cleaned up or otherwise disposed of by the Navy before and after the first investigation, but it did uncover evidence pointing to an accidental powder explosion rather than an intentional act of sabotage.
While Iowa was undergoing modernization in the early 1980s, her sister ship New Jersey had been dispatched to Lebanon to provide offshore fire support. At the time, New Jersey was the only commissioned battleship anywhere in the world, and it was found that, in an effort to get another battleship commissioned to relieve New Jersey, the modernization of Iowa was stepped up, leaving her in poor condition when she recommissioned in 1984. It was also determined that Captain Fred Moosally was more concerned with the maintenance of the missiles than the training and manning of guns.
Powder from the same lot as the one under investigation was tested at the Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division. Spontaneous combustion was achieved with the powder, which had been originally milled in the 1930s and improperly stored in a barge at the Navy's Yorktown, Virginia, Naval Weapons Station during a 1988 dry-docking of Iowa. As it degrades, gunpowder gives off ether gas, which is highly flammable and could be ignited by a spark. This revelation resulted in a shift in the Navy's position on the incident, and Admiral Frank Kelso, the Chief of Naval Operations at the time, publicly apologized to the Hartwig family, concluding that there was no real evidence to support the claim that he had intentionally killed the other sailors. Iowa captain Fred Moosally was severely criticized for his handling of the matter, and as a result of the incident the Navy changed the powder-handling procedures for its battleships. The incident remains one of the surface Navy's worst losses of life during peacetime operations.
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RN:
E class destroyer HMS Escapade at anchor, 12 February 1945. The censor has whited-out her pennant number and the Squid mounts.
HMS Vengeance entering Sydney harbour with 450 Australian Army personnel from Labuan, Jan 1946
E class destroyer HMS Escapade at anchor, 12 February 1945. The censor has whited-out her pennant number and the Squid mounts.
HMS Vengeance entering Sydney harbour with 450 Australian Army personnel from Labuan, Jan 1946
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Italy:
Launch of Archimedes class submarine Galileo Galilei in Taranto, 19 March 1934
On 10 June 1940 the submarine, under the command of captain Corrado Nardi, was ordered to proceed to her area of operation near Aden where she arrived on 12 June. In the early morning of 16 June, while submerged, she intercepted Norwegian tanker James Stove, about 12 miles south of Aden. After surfacing and ordering the crew to leave the ship, Galileo Galilei fired three torpedoes that set the ship on fire and sank the tanker. It is likely, the explosions were heard in Aden and the smoke column rising from the burning tanker was also observed, but no British ships or planes appeared and the submarine continued her mission unmolested until the afternoon of 18 June when a Yugoslavian steamer Drava was spotted. Galileo Galilei fired a shot across the bow ordering the ship to stop, but after seeing the ship was under a neutral flag, the steamer was allowed to leave. However, the gunfire was heard by the anti-submarine warfare trawler HMS Moonstone who fired a warning signal. At around 16:30, while the submarine was still on the surface, she was attacked by an enemy plane. Galileo Galilei was forced to submerge but remained on station considering a rather weak response to her sighting. When the darkness fell, the boat resurfaced to recharge the batteries, but it was discovered by the British ship forcing the submarine to crash dive and go through a brief but intense depth-charge attack which did not cause any damage. In the morning of 19 June, while Galileo Galilei was laying immobile on seabed, the first mild symptoms of methylchloride poisoning appeared in some crew members. Meanwhile, the submarine had been detected by HMS Moonstone who launched another depth-charge attack. Captain Nardi ordered the submarine to the periscope depth, examined his adversary and noted their single 4-inch gun and a pair of machine guns. Considering possible effects of methylchloride poisoning if the submarine continued staying submerged, and the modesty of the trawler's armament, he decided to face HMS Moonstone on the surface with his two 100 mm guns and two machine guns. As the fight began, the bow gun's sighting mechanism on the Galileo Galilei failed, greatly affecting the accuracy of shooting.
Moonstone also moved too fast for the submarine's crew to aim their guns effectively. After about ten minutes Galileo Galilei was hit for the first time, wounding commander Nardi and killing several people around him. Shortly thereafter, the bow gun was hit killing the gun crew including the second in command. The gun continued shooting, however, under command of Ensign Mazzucchi. The aft gun soon jammed, and then another salvo from Moonstone killed all those on the conning tower including Nardi. The bow gun continued shooting until HMS Kandahar arrived at the scene and Mazucchi, as the most senior on board the submarine, ordered Galileo Galilei to stop shooting and surrender. The submarine had lost 16 men: commander Nardi, four other officers, seven NCOs and four sailors. The submarine was then towed into Aden by Kandahar.
Launch of Archimedes class submarine Galileo Galilei in Taranto, 19 March 1934
On 10 June 1940 the submarine, under the command of captain Corrado Nardi, was ordered to proceed to her area of operation near Aden where she arrived on 12 June. In the early morning of 16 June, while submerged, she intercepted Norwegian tanker James Stove, about 12 miles south of Aden. After surfacing and ordering the crew to leave the ship, Galileo Galilei fired three torpedoes that set the ship on fire and sank the tanker. It is likely, the explosions were heard in Aden and the smoke column rising from the burning tanker was also observed, but no British ships or planes appeared and the submarine continued her mission unmolested until the afternoon of 18 June when a Yugoslavian steamer Drava was spotted. Galileo Galilei fired a shot across the bow ordering the ship to stop, but after seeing the ship was under a neutral flag, the steamer was allowed to leave. However, the gunfire was heard by the anti-submarine warfare trawler HMS Moonstone who fired a warning signal. At around 16:30, while the submarine was still on the surface, she was attacked by an enemy plane. Galileo Galilei was forced to submerge but remained on station considering a rather weak response to her sighting. When the darkness fell, the boat resurfaced to recharge the batteries, but it was discovered by the British ship forcing the submarine to crash dive and go through a brief but intense depth-charge attack which did not cause any damage. In the morning of 19 June, while Galileo Galilei was laying immobile on seabed, the first mild symptoms of methylchloride poisoning appeared in some crew members. Meanwhile, the submarine had been detected by HMS Moonstone who launched another depth-charge attack. Captain Nardi ordered the submarine to the periscope depth, examined his adversary and noted their single 4-inch gun and a pair of machine guns. Considering possible effects of methylchloride poisoning if the submarine continued staying submerged, and the modesty of the trawler's armament, he decided to face HMS Moonstone on the surface with his two 100 mm guns and two machine guns. As the fight began, the bow gun's sighting mechanism on the Galileo Galilei failed, greatly affecting the accuracy of shooting.
Moonstone also moved too fast for the submarine's crew to aim their guns effectively. After about ten minutes Galileo Galilei was hit for the first time, wounding commander Nardi and killing several people around him. Shortly thereafter, the bow gun was hit killing the gun crew including the second in command. The gun continued shooting, however, under command of Ensign Mazzucchi. The aft gun soon jammed, and then another salvo from Moonstone killed all those on the conning tower including Nardi. The bow gun continued shooting until HMS Kandahar arrived at the scene and Mazucchi, as the most senior on board the submarine, ordered Galileo Galilei to stop shooting and surrender. The submarine had lost 16 men: commander Nardi, four other officers, seven NCOs and four sailors. The submarine was then towed into Aden by Kandahar.
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