The Japanese government has decided to acquire submarine-launched long-range missile capability, The Mainichi reported. The decision, to be detailed in three security documents, will be approved soon. The underwater capability is part of Tokyo’s “counter-strike” strategy to take out enemy missile launch sites before attack.

The missiles to be installed are an improved version of the domestically produced "Type 17 (SSM-2) " with a range of more than 1,000 kilometres, and foreign-made missiles such as the "Tomahawk" cruise missile purchased from the United States.
South Korea approved major projects Wednesday to upgrade combat capabilities of its F-15K fighters and import aerial refueling tankers, the state arms procurement agency said, in a move to counter evolving North Korean threats.

The Defense Project Promotion Committee passed a 3.46 trillion won (US$2.73 billion) project to strengthen the mission capabilities and survivability of the F-15K jets from 2024-2034, according to the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA).

The project includes replacing the current F-15Ks' old radar system with the advanced Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar and installing integrated electronic warfare equipment and an up-to-date mission computer.

The committee also gave the green light to a 1.2 trillion won project to purchase foreign-made refueling tankers from 2024-2029.

DAPA did not disclose how many tankers will be imported, but it is expected to buy two tankers. Potential candidates for the project could include Boeing's KC-46 and Airbus A-330 MRTT, observers said.

The commission, in addition, approved a 673 billion won project to improve combat capabilities of the Navy's 4,400-ton KDX-II destroyers from 2024-2033. It is designed to replace old components with new, advanced ones, such as a towed array sonar system.
According to the Defense Buildup Program, the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) will increase the number of Aegis destroyers (DDG) from the current eight to ten. In addition, two Aegis system-equipped vessels (ASEV), which specialize in ballistic missile defense (BMD), will be deployed separately from these. Thus, by the end of the decade, the JMSDF will have 12 ships equipped with Aegis Weapon System (AWS). JMSDF plans to replace its aging destroyers (DE, DD) with Mogami class FFMs, presumably not only with FFMs but also with DDGs to replace two of these vessels.

Presumably, it was thought necessary to increase the number of Aegis destroyers to protect the fleet from Chinese anti-ship missiles in the event of a future armed conflict with China. The Japanese government has also decided to purchase 500 Tomahawk cruise missiles, which will be installed on JMSDF Aegis destroyers. The FY2023 defense budget request announced on December 23 already includes 211.3 billion yen (about $1.57 billion) for the Tomahawk purchase, which will procure 500 Tomahawks at once. Deployment of the Tomahawk is scheduled to begin in FY2026.

Another 110.4 billion yen (about $820 million) is also requested for the budget to add the necessary modifications to Aegis destroyers to carry Tomahawk. Although it is not specified what specific modifications will be made, it is likely that the Tactical Tomahawk Weapons Control System (TTWCS) from Lockheed Martin will be integrated into the Aegis destroyer.
South Korea's military is considering the purchase of an Israeli "electric eye" as part of efforts to bolster its capabilities to detect small North Korean drones, a defense source in Seoul said Sunday.

The move comes as the South's defence authorities have come under fierce criticism for the failure to counter the penetration of five North Korean drones into its airspace late last month. It was belatedly revealed that one of them even intruded into the no-fly zone, called P-73, near the presidential office in the central district of Yongsan.

In order to beef up its airspace defence system, the military is considering pushing for the speedy acquisition of the Sky Spotter system, according to the source.

Built by Rafael Advanced Defence Systems, it is designed for the early detection and tracking of such aerial objects, including drones, as well as balloons and kites, that are used for terrorist attacks.

The military plans to decide whether to formally request the purchase of the system following a review in the coming weeks on its effectiveness in countering the North's drone threats, especially in making up for the radars and thermal observation devices currently in operation.
In the DPRK, the military received 30 sets of giant MLRS with a caliber of 600mm, which can also be used to launch tactical nuclear missiles. There are no technical details of the settings. It is known that MLRS data missiles have a high ability to bend around the terrain, as well as maneuverability and high speed. On January 1, 2023, the North Korean military performed a training launch from a single installation. The projectile covered 350 kilometers with a maximum flight altitude of 100 kilometers and hit a given area of the Sea of Japan east of the Korean Peninsula. In the DPRK, there are two more variants of the 600mm MLRS on an 8 = 8 wheeled chassis.

To view this content we will need your consent to set third party cookies.
For more detailed information, see our cookies page.
A cross-agency task force created to select a team of uncrewed aerial vehicle (UAV) manufacturers yesterday said a national UAV fleet could be established administratively in the latter half of the year after it picks the lead manufacturer for the program this month.

About 3,000 UAVs are to be used for military purposes despite not being made to military specifications, and are expected to be delivered to the military by next year, the task force said.

The UAVs would primarily provide support or be used in field operations, it said.

Taiwan has been focused on developing its aerospace industry, under the broader “five plus two” innovative industries and “six core strategic industries” policies.

“Five plus two” refers to plans to develop an “Asian Silicon Valley,” biotechnology, green energy, smart machinery and defense, as well as innovative agriculture and the circular economy.

The six core strategic industries are information technology, cybersecurity, precision health, renewable energy, national defense and strategic stockpiling.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs said nine firms have been reviewed, and by July are expected to produce prototypes for shipborne reconnaissance, land-based reconnaissance and general reconnaissance, as well as prototypes of miniature drones and drones with target-acquisition capabilities.

The Ministry of National Defense is set to launch a limited bidding period in August to select prototypes, the task force said.

Active and passive radars and drone-interference systems have been selected, but the manufacturers for those would not be chosen until after the Lunar New Year, the economic affairs ministry said.

For decades, Japan has based its international clout on economic competitiveness, not military might. But, with China’s lengthening shadow darkening its doorstep, Japan now seems to be abandoning its pacifist post-war security policy—which capped defence spending at about 1% of GDP and shunned offensive capabilities—in favour of assuming a central role in maintaining security in the Indo-Pacific region.

Last month, Japan unveiled a bold new national security strategy, which includes a plan to double defence expenditure within five years. That spending—amounting to some US$320 billion—will fund Japan’s largest military build-up since World War II, and implies the world’s third-largest defence budget, after the US and China. Importantly, the new strategy includes acquisition of pre-emptive counterstrike capabilities, such as Tomahawk cruise missiles from the US, and the development of its own hypersonic weapons.

Japan began laying the groundwork for this shift under former prime minister Shinzo Abe, who was assassinated last July. On Abe’s watch, Japan increased defence spending by about 10% and, more significantly, reinterpreted (with parliament’s approval) the country’s US-imposed ‘peace constitution’ to allow the military to mobilise overseas for the first time since World War II. Abe also sought to amend Article 9 of the constitution, which renounces ‘the threat or use of force’ by Japan, but his efforts were stymied by popular protests.

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has not run into the same resistance. On the contrary, opinion polls show that a majority of Japanese support the military build-up. A similar shift has taken place in Kishida himself, who was widely considered a dove when he was foreign minister—a label that he publicly embraced.

The impetus for this shift is clear. In 2013, the year Xi Jinping became China’s president, Japan’s national security strategy called China a strategic partner. According to the updated strategy, by contrast, China represents ‘an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge in ensuring the peace and security of Japan’. China’s incremental but unrelenting expansionism under Xi has rendered Japan’s pacifist stance untenable.

This is more apparent than ever in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which has intensified fears that China could pursue a military option against Taiwan, which, in geographical terms, is effectively an extension of the Japanese archipelago. Last August, five of the nine missiles China fired during military exercises in the waters around Taiwan landed in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. Japan understandably views Taiwan’s security as vital for its own.

Japan is not the only once-conciliatory power to respond to Xi’s muscular revisionism with a newfound determination to bolster its defences and forestall the emergence of a Sinocentric Indo-Pacific. Australia and India have embarked on the same path.

A similar trend toward militarisation has emerged among Japan’s other partners. Germany, another pacifist country, has pledged to boost its defence spending to 2% of GDP (the same level Kishida is targeting) and accept a military leadership role in Europe. The United Kingdom has already surpassed the 2%-of-GDP level, yet aims to double its defence spending by 2030. The US has just hiked its already-mammoth military spending by 8%. And Sweden and Finland are joining a reinvigorated NATO.

While Japan’s rearmament is more widely accepted than ever—and for good reason—it is unlikely to be enough to deter China’s expansionist creep. After all, despite having the world’s third-largest defence budget, India has been locked in a military standoff with China on the disputed Himalayan border since 2020, when stealth encroachments by the People’s Liberation Army caught it by surprise. Clashes continue to erupt intermittently, including just last month.

Unlike Russia, which launched a full frontal assault on Ukraine, China prefers ‘salami’ tactics, slicing away other countries’ territories with a combination of stealth, deception and surprise. The PLA’s so-called three warfares concept, which focuses on the psychological, public-opinion and legal aspects of conflict, has enabled China to secure strategic victories in the South China Sea—from seizing the Johnson South Reef in 1988 to occupying the Scarborough Shoal in 2012—while barely firing a shot.

Because China generally avoids armed conflict, it incurs minimal international costs for its actions, even as it unilaterally redraws the geopolitical map of the South China Sea and nibbles away at Bhutan’s borderlands, one pasture at a time. The government in Beijing managed to decimate Hong Kong’s autonomy without facing significant Western sanctions.

All this impunity has only emboldened Xi, who is now seeking to replicate the South China Sea strategy in the East China Sea by escalating maritime and aerial incursions to strengthen its claims to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands. It has even tried to police the waters off the Senkakus.

Japan’s response to China’s provocations has so far remained restrained, to say the least: no Japanese defence minister has so much as conducted an aerial inspection of the Senkakus, lest it anger China. Yet Japan’s embrace of Tomahawk missiles and hypersonic weapons doesn’t necessarily represent an effective means of resisting China’s hybrid warfare, either. For that, Japan must find ways to frustrate China’s furtive efforts to alter the status quo while avoiding the risk of open combat.

Japan’s push to become more self-reliant on defence should be welcomed. Improved defence capabilities will translate into a more confident and secure Japan—and a more stable Indo-Pacific. But if Japan is to ‘disrupt and defeat’ threats, as the national security strategy puts it, Japanese leaders must move proactively to beat China at its own game. limits of Japans military awakening
The United States and the Philippines vowed Friday (Jan 20) to "invigorate" defence cooperation to address shared security concerns including disputes over the South China Sea.

Manila hosted a high-level security dialogue with its top defence ally as part of efforts by President Ferdinand Marcos to restore a seven-decade partnership that was unsettled by his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte.

The allies agreed "to invigorate defence and security cooperation and ensure the alliance adapts effectively to face new and emerging challenges", a joint statement said.

"I can assure you that during our conversations, the important issues related to the South China Sea were central to our conversations," US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink told a news conference.

China and the Philippines are at odds over the South China Sea, with Beijing claiming sovereignty over almost the entire area despite an international court ruling that its claims have no legal basis.

The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei have overlapping claims to parts of the sea.

"We agreed on several important initiatives that demonstrate our unwavering commitment to our alliance and partnership," Philippine Foreign Undersecretary Maria Theresa Lazaro told the news conference.

The two countries, bound by a 1951 mutual defence treaty, agreed to hold talks in mid-2023 that would allow their governments to "plan ahead for and ensure more coordinated responses to potential flashpoints".

They also agreed to speed up the completion of projects that allow US forces to store equipment at select Philippine military bases, as well as to identify "additional agreed locations" for the purpose.

Washington will host a "maritime dialogue" with Manila this year to identify potential joint maritime activities.

France invented the attack helicopter in 1956. Sixty-seven years later, Japan has decided that the idea has had its day.

‘Elimination of obsolete equipment’ is the cruelly decisive headline above photos of a Bell AH-1 Cobra and a Boeing AH-64D Apache, both attack helicopters, in a Japanese Ministry of Defense policy update published in December.

Uncrewed aircraft will replace them. The reason isn’t budget stress. On the contrary, plenty of money would have been available for the ministry’s formerly planned Cobra replacement program, because Japan is doubling its defence budget’s share of the economy.

This further calls into question Australia’s 2021 decision to renew the Australian Army’s attack helicopter force by buying 29 Apaches of the AH-64E version.

If fact, the Australian government and Department of Defence already may have lost interest in placing an immediate order.

Japan is also getting rid of scout helicopters—essentially, light attack helicopters that put more design emphasis on sensors instead of firepower. This decision is less radical than ditching helicopters for the attack mission, since reconnaissance and surveillance are among the first tasks shifted to uncrewed vehicles of any kind.

Japan will begin operating uncrewed replacements for attack helicopters this year, says the Yomiuri newspaper, citing several unnamed official sources. General deployment is to follow in 2025, the Yomiuri has said.

The 48 Cobras were already due for retirement. The ministry assessed possible crewed replacements for them in 2018 but omitted acquisition from its defence plan for 2019–2023.

Judging from reported plans for the trials, replacements will include loitering munitions (also referred to internationally as ‘kamikaze drones’). There will also be ordinary reusable drones of various sizes, such as have been appearing in armies in greater numbers for decades, often taking over the roles of crewed helicopters.

Australia’s intended order for Apaches has been part of the army’s plan to thoroughly re-equip itself for intense combined-arms ground combat.

As the risk of a maritime and air war involving China has become Australia’s overwhelming security concern, the army’s costly equipment plans have looked ever less relevant.

Now we have the judgement of Japan, a close friend, that attack helicopters are not worthwhile even for its capability requirements, which include land fighting to defend territory.

The attack helicopter was invented when the French Army, fighting in Algeria, took a step beyond simply bolting machine guns onto rotorcraft airframes. In 1956 it variously equipped Alouette II light utility choppers with anti-tank missiles or unguided rockets. Two years later, Bell Helicopter in the US saw that an ideal helicopter configuration for the attack mission would include a slim body with two crew members sitting in tandem; the US Army ordered the concept into production in 1966 as the AH-1.

The Australian Army didn’t participate in this revolution until 2004, when it began taking deliveries of 22 Airbus Tigers. They were so troublesome that they did not become fully operational until 2016 but since then have been performing well. The former government decided to replace them with Apaches.

Weapon categories rarely become suddenly obsolete. Usually, they progressively lose application as people devise increasingly effective countermeasures to them. In the fight to stay relevant, they often become more elaborate and costly. In some cases, a new, cheaper weapon category appears as a replacement.

All that has been happening to the attack helicopter. Short-range weapons for use against fleeting, low-level air targets have improved—and these weapons are largely designed to knock down jet aeroplanes flying several times faster than helicopters. Even unsophisticated guns and rockets intended for ground targets can be alarmingly effective against helicopters.

As lessons from wars such as the Iraq conflict 20 years ago have sunk in, decisions on the use of attack helicopters have become more prudent, meaning that sometimes they’re not used at all.

Russian attack helicopters have suffered badly in Ukraine. The Royal United Services Institute in London finds that at least 37 were lost between the 24 February invasion and 7 November last year.

Portable air-defence systems, or manpads, imposed heavy losses on attack helicopters that penetrated Ukrainian-held territory on search and destroy missions, RUSI says. Russia resorted to keeping such rotorcraft on its own side of the battle area, from where they could safely lob rockets.

No doubt Japan would imagine that its Apaches and the formerly planned Cobra replacements, if it had bought them, would have performed better than Russia’s attack helicopters—but not well enough, it seems.

Attack helicopters have also become more complex as armies have demanded more robustness, situational awareness, and weapon range, for safety. Compared with the Cobra, which is smaller, the Apache is an astonishingly high-performance machine.

And the cost these days? Well, the budget for Australia to buy 29 Apaches and make them operational is more than $5.5 billion—$190 million each.

Meanwhile, cheap battlefield drones are proliferating. They’ve also suffered badly in Ukraine, but they’re much cheaper and don’t have anyone in them when they crash. The Turkish-made Baykar Bayraktar TB2 drone, with a gross weight of 700 kilograms, reportedly costs US$1–2 million. For fair comparison with the Australian Apache acquisition, we could double that figure to include the cost of making them operational, with weapons, training and so on.

All this doesn’t mean that the attack helicopter is useless or that drones can replace it in every mission. But each of the trends discussed here is undermining its competitiveness in terms of value for money.

Japan has evidently judged that the competitiveness has now been damaged too much.

One aspect of its decision should stand out for Australia. Tokyo did not conclude that attack helicopters would still be viable if they had the highest capability available—which is to say, if they were AH-64Es. And it took that view even though its possession of 12 AH-64Ds would have greatly cut the cost of introducing the newer version.

That newer version is precisely the one that Australia decided on.

In May 2022, then–prime minister Scott Morrison said the government had ‘finalised’ the ‘investment’ to acquire AH-64Es.

But is Australia still planning to purchase new crewed attack helicopters at all?

In preparing this article, I asked the Defence Department about the status of the AH-64E program.

Defence did not provide an answer, not even a ‘no comment’, which would be most unusual for a program of no great secrecy that was proceeding more or less as intended. The department may be awaiting the outcome of the government’s defence strategic review.

On 4 January, Chinese President Xi Jinping clasped hands with his Philippine counterpart under very different circumstances from the last time he welcomed a Philippine leader to Beijing.
During that September 2019 visit, which Xi hailed as a ‘milestone’, Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s predecessor, Rodrigo Duterte, told a crowd in the Great Hall of the People: ‘I’ve realigned myself in your ideological flow’ and ‘I announce my separation from the United States’.
Almost four years later, China’s incessant bullying and unsafe brinksmanship towards the Philippines and other Southeast Asian nations over rival claims and privileges in the South China Sea have scuttled Duterte’s era of good feelings and drawn Manila even closer to Washington. Before landing in Beijing, Marcos admitted that ‘maritime issues … do not comprise the entirety of our relations’ but emphasised that sabre-rattling in the South China Sea remained a ‘significant concern.’
Practising the art of the geopolitical pivot, Xi largely side-stepped the South China Sea conflict during his meeting with Marcos and doubled down on previous promises of greater economic interdependence. A slew of initiatives emerged from the summit, including joint oil and gas development projects, renewable energy investment, increased trade and a crisis hotline to resolve maritime disputes.
This course correction towards calmer seas underpins Beijing’s decision to rehabilitate relations with Manila and other neighbours by reverting to its old narrative of non-interference and inter-Asian ‘cooperation’. Recent actions and statements, like a pledge that China would never use its military might to ‘bully’ smaller nations, reflect China’s acknowledgment that its decade-long pugnacious campaign to dominate the South China Sea has done more harm than good. By embracing ‘peaceful outcomes’, Beijing seeks to recast itself as a regional force for good, a hegemon that can spread economic growth and ensure Asian affairs are settled by Asian countries—not ‘aggressive’ foreigners like the US.
In doing so, this kinder, gentler China pledges to embrace cooperation, not confrontation, benevolence not belligerence, in pursuit of ‘win–win outcomes’. These outcomes, according to the Global Times, will usher in a ‘new golden age’ in Sino-Philippine relations. But as the saying goes, all that glitters is not gold. If the Marcos administration is committed to upholding its South China Sea claims in the face of Chinese revanchism, it cannot grow too comfortable with Beijing’s ‘cooperation’ approach.
China has pressed its expansive maritime sovereignty claims in the South China Sea since the late 1940s; it wasn’t until the early 2010s that these claims (often unfounded) gained a sharp set of teeth. In accordance with Xi’s ‘national rejuvenation’ goal, Xi-era Chinese military doctrine stresses control of the ‘near seas’, which these sovereignty claims support.
‘Near seas’ control offers manifold benefits. It would enable China to actualise its anti-access/area-denial concept, solidify power projection throughout the first island chain, and raise the counter-intervention risk calculus for Washington and its allies, all while expanding a security buffer zone to protect the mainland. In addition, unrivalled ‘near seas’ (or South China Sea) control legitimises access to vast and untapped natural resources while safeguarding critical sea lines of communication, which China’s leadership believes could be threatened in a conflict with the West.
Yet after a decade of dredging disputed reefs into military bases, forcing sovereignty showdowns, sinking fishing vessels, harassing survey and resupply vessels, and touting its sovereignty over nine-tenths of the South China Sea, China’s ‘sea control’ campaign has come at a steep geostrategic cost.
In Manila alone, the security establishment has mounted a fierce resistance to China’s maritime encroachments, even pressuring Duterte to reverse rapprochement with China and rescind plans to slacken ties with the US military. The same goes for other Southeast Asian nations. According to the 2022 State of Southeast Asia survey report, which gauges Southeast Asian leaders’ temperature on a range of regional policy issues, only 26.8% of respondents trusted China to ‘do the right thing’. Of those respondents who didn’t trust China, half of them attributed it to China using its economic and military power ‘to threaten my country’s interests and sovereignty’. Concurrently, some ASEAN countries have distanced themselves from Beijing by strengthening partnerships within ASEAN and with the Quad alliance. Other states, like Malaysia, have increased their defence budgets to protect their South China Sea territory.
China’s renewed goodwill campaign should not be taken at face value. Cooperation doesn’t mean China will bury its ambitious South China Sea interests. It means China will try pursuing those interests peacefully to quell tensions until it can no longer achieve those interests without reverting to an aggressive posture—just like the last time it swapped ‘win–win’ cooperation for win–lose brinkmanship.
The Philippines will then find itself between a reef and a hard place. China will likely offer savoury economic carrots to Manila. In exchange, it may seek Manila’s tacit approval to militarise Scarborough Reef, remove the embarked marine detachment on Second Thomas Shoal, or permit Chinese hydrocarbon survey and drilling operations in the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone, thus making it neither exclusive nor economically beneficial.
But Chinese control of the South China Sea is not a foregone conclusion, despite what Duterte believed. Beijing has already adjusted its risk calculus when the price of international opprobrium outweighed the benefits of maritime belligerence. The Philippines, ASEAN nations and the Quad alliance can continue imposing and signalling that cost. It will require the usual antidote of hard-power prescriptions: jets, corvettes, patrol boats, littoral craft and missiles.
Holding Chinese warships and activities at risk, however, demands more than just a platform and a weapon. The missile must be capable of striking the target. Quad partners should begin integrating the Philippines (and other willing countries) into parts of the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness to provide improved joint awareness, information-sharing and targeting solutions. Quad leaders should also offer economic programs to counterpoise China’s overtures.
Already, Marcos’s decision this month to grant the US temporary and rotational access to four military bases and resume joint maritime patrols in the South China Sea was a wise one because it will help strengthen the Philippines’ defence capabilities, interoperability with allies and commitment to resisting Beijing’s aggressive maritime behaviour. More of that cooperation and coordination is needed, although Marcos has made it clear that the burgeoning US–Philippine military ties pose no direct threat to China, despite being a direct response to China’s militarisation and disruption of the South China Sea.
For now, Marcos is right to balance China and the West with economic agreements for the former and military pacts with the latter. Frank, clear dialogue can cool tensions. But all parties interested in upholding a rules-based order in the South China Sea must keep fielding an appropriate defence of that order, regardless of what ‘win–win outcomes’ China may promise. Then, and only then, can everybody win. relations sail on calmer seasfor now
Nick Danby is an intelligence officer in the US Navy, where he is assigned to a forward-deployed carrier strike group based out of Japan. The views expressed in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the position of the US Navy or US Department of Defense. Image: Shen Hong/Xinhua/Getty Images.
In the capital of the DPRK, Pyongyang, on February 8, a night military parade was held in honor of the 75th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army. The parade, along with his wife and daughter, was hosted by North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. The parade is not particularly different from all past parades, except that a record number of military personnel took part in it and an unknown new DPRK tank was again shown. This tank has been noticed at parades for more than a year, but so far nothing is known about it. The tank does not even have a name, it is called differently, the M-2020 tank, the Storm tank. Visually, the M2020 tank is similar to the American M1 Abrams tank and the Russian T-14 Armata. The tank has enhanced armor in the lateral projection and on the sides. The gun of the tank is a 125-mm Russian 2A46 cannon, the tank has a machine gun coaxial with the gun and an AGS-30 grenade launcher. The tank has two Bulsae-3 ATGMs, it is believed that it was developed on the basis of the Russian Fagot and Kornet ATGMs. For the first time on the tanks of the DPRK, an active protection system for tanks was installed, it can be seen at the base of the tank turret, visually the complex resembles the Russian Afghanit system installed on the T-14 Armata tank, sensors of possible active protection systems are located in the front corners of the tower. Panoramic sights are located on the roof of the turret, it is possible that the tank has a thermal imager. It is not excluded that many systems are still props. It is assumed that the M2020 tank is equipped with an engine with a capacity of 1200 horsepower, the estimated mass of the tank is about 55 tons. There are suggestions that the tank was created using the technology of Russia and China.

To view this content we will need your consent to set third party cookies.
For more detailed information, see our cookies page.
To view this content we will need your consent to set third party cookies.
For more detailed information, see our cookies page.
Indian Navy chief Admiral R Hari Kumar awarded 21 Philippine Navy personnel their interim missile badges and pins during a valedictory ceremony for the operator training for BrahMos cruise missile as the two countries took the next step towards fulfilment of a deal signed last year. The ceremony was held after days of training that focused on the operations and maintenance of some of the most important logistics of the Shore-Based Anti-Ship Missile System that will be delivered to the Philippines this year.
Singapore will purchase eight additional F-35B fighter jets, manufactured by Lockheed Martin, to bring its incoming fleet to 12 multirole combat aircraft, DefenseNews reported Monday.

The country’s Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen told lawmakers that the acquisition followed a complete evaluation of the F-35 program, including the aircraft’s electronic systems and operational performance.

The State Department approved Singapore’s request to purchase up to a dozen units of the F-35 short-takeoff-and-vertical-landing variant under a potential $2.75B foreign military sales agreement.

The deal includes an initial order for four F-35B aircraft and an option for eight more jets.

Lockheed is set to complete the fleet delivery to Singapore by the end of the decade.
The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States of F-16 Munitions and related equipment for an estimated cost of $619 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

The Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) has requested to buy one hundred (100) AGM-88B High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missiles (HARM); twenty-three (23) HARM training missiles; two hundred (200) AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM); four (4) AIM-120C-8 AMRAAM Guidance Sections; and twenty-six (26) LAU-129 multi-purpose launchers. Also included are LAU-118A missile launchers with Aircraft Launcher Interface Computer (ALIC); HARM missile containers; AIM-120 control sections and containers; AIM-120C Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM); dummy air training missiles (DATM), integration and test support and equipment; munitions support and support equipment; spare parts, consumables and accessories and repair and return support; classified software; maintenance and maintenance support; classified publications and technical documentation; U.S. Government and contractor engineering, technical and logistics support services, studies and surveys; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total cost is $619 million.
North Korea test-fired two strategic cruise missiles from a submarine on Sunday, state news agency KCNA reported, just as US-South Korea military drills were due to begin.

“Strategic” is typically used to describe weapons that have a nuclear capability.

On Monday, KCNA said the launch confirmed the reliability of the system and tested the underwater offensive operations of submarine units that form part of North Korea’s nuclear deterrent.

South Korea’s joint chiefs of staff said the military was on high alert and the country’s intelligence agency was working with its US counterpart to analyse the specifics of the launch.

On Monday, South Korean and American troops were scheduled to begin 11 days of joint drills, dubbed “Freedom Shield 23,” which will be held on a scale not seen since 2017.

Well its from Eurasian times but still...

Pakistan Navy’s ‘Made In China’ Warships Are Failing To Fire Missiles; US Security Expert Decodes The Flaw

By Tanmay Kadam

June 20, 2022

The Pakistan Navy is facing problems with at least four of its Chinese-made multi-role frigates, according to a recent analysis by Geopolitica. Earlier, there were reports that Pakistan was facing issues with naval warships and even with JF-17 fighters that Islamabad acquired from China.

Apart from Pakistan, other customers have faced similar issues with weapons acquired from China.

For example, the Royal Jordanian Air Force had bought 6 CH-4B unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) produced by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), which it later decided to sell off reportedly due to dissatisfaction with the performance of these UCAVs.

Apart from these common problems, Fabri also reported some issues specific to individual ships in the Zulfiquar-class frigates, such as poor performance of the radar in PNS Aslat and faults in single barrel 76mm gun of the PNS Zulfiqar.

Not The First Time?

It is not the first time Pakistan has faced problems with Chinese-made defense equipment.

In February, the Pakistan Army reportedly faced quality and reliability issues with the VT 4 main battle tanks and 203 mm towed heavy artillery guns imported from China. The post-delivery tests and field firing trials ran into several problems.

Similar threads