Whoa.
 
Turkey:
Sea acceptance tests have started for Turkey’s multi-purpose amphibious assault ship and flagship-to-be, the TCG Anadolu, the head of the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) said Saturday.

Ismail Demir shared the update about the TCG Anadolu, which was built at the Sedef Shipyard in Istanbul within the scope of the project initiated for the Naval Forces Command, on his Twitter account.

Stating that "the countdown has begun," Demir said, “We have started the sea acceptance tests, which is the last stage of the project, on our Anadolu ship, and we are conducting tests for various systems.”

“We will further strengthen our presence in the seas with Anadolu, which we will take into inventory after the verification and certification activities,” he said.

TCG Anadolu is a landing helicopter dock (LHD) type vessel modeled on Spain's LHD Juan Carlos.

The vessel is set to be equipped with various domestic systems.
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Egypt:
The US State Department approved a potential Foreign Military Sale to Egypt for 23 CH-47F helicopters.

The package is worth up to $2.6 billion and Egypt will be requesting to buy 56 T-55-GA-714A engines to power the helicopters.

If the sales go ahead, seven US Government and six contractors will be assigned to Egypt to facilitate the delivery of the helicopters.
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Turkey

Previously, the missile has already been tested, the result of hitting it in the photo, according to the Turkish side, the missiles are not very susceptible to the effects of most electronic warfare systems. The ground installation of the complex has four launch containers and is placed on the chassis of the Russian KamAZ (8X8). The new Atmaca rocket is subsonic and is equipped with a Safran (Turbomeca) TR140 turbojet engine and a solid rocket booster. In the future, the rocket engine will be replaced by a Turkish small-sized KALE 3500 turbojet engine. The warhead of the rocket is a high-explosive fragmentation unit weighing 250 kg. The missile is equipped with an active radar seeker, as well as an inertial satellite guidance unit and two-way data transmission equipment. During the flight, the missile can be given new targets to hit. The missile range is 250 kilometers, weight -750 kg. Rocket length from 4.3 - 5.2 m.

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Qatar:
Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri has delivered the second of two Musherib-class offshore patrol vessels to the Qatar Emiri Navy.

The vessel is named Sheraouh and was delivered six months after the hand-over of the first ship in January this year.

Qatar bought the two ships as part of a wider 4 billion euro contract signed in 2016 that envisions the delivery of a total of seven ships. In addition to the OPVs, Fincantieri is delivering four Al-Zubarah-class corvettes by 2023, as well as a landing platform dock ship that is expected to be similar in design to the Italian Navy’s San Giorgio-class amphibious transport dock.

The OPVs are about 63 meters long, 9.2 meters wide, and have a maximum speed of 30 knots with a crew of 38. The propulsion systems have four variable pitch propellers, two to starboard and two to the left, each in line with a diesel propulsion engine. Furthermore, the vessels will be capable of operating a RHIB (rigid hull inflatable boat) through a crane located at the stern.

In addition to a 76mm main gun, the OPVs will feature 8-cell VLS cells for the employment of surface-to-air missiles, while anti-ship capability will be provided by Exocet anti-ship missiles.

In a separate ceremony on July 6, Qatar received four landing craft from the Anadolu Shipyard in Tuzla, Turkey.

The Al-Ebrar Project ships, named Fuwarit, Broog, Ishat and Al-Aaleya, were delivered within 22 months from the contract signing. According to the shipbuilder, they will be sent to Qatar after six weeks of tactical shakedown trainings.
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https://defbrief.com/2022/07/07/qatar-receives-2nd-opv-from-italy-new-landing-craft-from-turkey/
 
New Bayraktar Akinci UAVs entered the Turkish troops. In addition, contracts for delivery abroad have already been concluded. The Turkish Ministry of Defense does not disclose the number of drones received by the troops. The Akıncı UAV belongs to the class of "heavy" drones and is equipped with a phased array radar. Akıncı is controlled by six computers and an artificial intelligence guidance system. The drone is capable of carrying both conventional and guided weapons. The Bayraktar Akinci is also equipped with air-to-air guided missiles, allowing it to attack aerial targets as well. The wingspan of Bayraktar Akinci is 20 meters, the length of the device is 12.2 meters, the size of the drone is huge and this makes it vulnerable to many air defense systems. The maximum takeoff weight of the UAV is 6000 kg, the maximum payload weight is 1350 kg. The operating altitude of the drone is approximately 9150 meters, the practical ceiling is 12,200 meters. UAV Akıncı can stay in the air for 24 hours and fly, take off and land in a fully automatic mode. UAV maximum speed - 360 km/h

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Saudi Arabia:
The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia of PATRIOT MIM-104E Guidance Enhanced Missile-Tactical Ballistic Missiles (GEM-T) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $3.05 billion. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has requested to buy three hundred (300) PATRIOT MIM-104E Guidance Enhanced Missile-Tactical Ballistic missiles (GEM-T).
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/ma...t-mim-104e-guidance-enhanced-missile-tactical
 
UAE:
The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has requested to buy ninety-six (96) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile rounds; two (2) THAAD Launch Control Stations (LCS); and two (2) THAAD Tactical Operations Stations (TOS). Also included are repair and return, system integration and checkout, and spare and repair parts; support and testing equipment; publications and technical documentation; construction activities; encryption devices; secure communication equipment; other required COMSEC equipment; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The total estimated program cost is $2.245 billion.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/ma...minal-high-altitude-area-defense-thaad-system
 
Turkey:
It’s easy to attribute all the problems and changes in Turkey to the whims of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s strongman largesse. His foreign-policy adventurism has led to increasing regional and international isolation and a transactional relationship with foreign partners, including NATO and the EU. In addition, loyalists and patronage networks have embedded themselves in think tanks, businesses and the foreign-policy bureaucracy. Turkey’s foreign policy these days is mainly about maintaining power at a growing economic and political cost to Turkish citizens.

Turkish foreign policy mandarins, however, have watched the changes in the past few years and are aware that the international order is shifting. The isolationist rhetoric of ‘America first’, combined with US domestic political apprehension towards further military engagement in the Middle East, has put constraints on fixing the ongoing problems in the US–Turkey alliance. The relationship has been deteriorating for quite some time and Turkey has sought support for its interests outside of its traditional Western-oriented relationships.

With a spiralling economy and low poll numbers for the ruling coalition, Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) has been searching for new partners to help it stave off economic disaster and the possible end of its 20-year tenure following elections scheduled for 2023.

As the global community focuses on the war in Ukraine, there’s another growing partnership of particular concern that should be viewed with caution: the increasing closeness between Beijing and Ankara.

China has entered into strategic partnerships with Saudi Arabia, Iran and other Gulf states. While most of Beijing’s engagement in the Middle East has centred on hydrocarbon resources, Turkey’s relationship with China is unique. China and Turkey find themselves among a growing bloc of authoritarian countries in the global order, and Beijing sees Ankara as an important player in changing the rules-based order given its influence and strategic position between the Mediterranean, Middle East and Eurasia.

China has played an integral part in Turkey’s foreign-policy vision for a while. Since the 2016 coup attempt in Turkey, its new executive presidential system and the Eurasianist tilt in Turkish foreign policy have allowed Ankara to deepen its economic, security and military relationship with Beijing. Chinese power presents a viable alternative for economic and political support for Turkey’s ambitions in the world, without the baggage that relations with Russia bring.

Turkey’s pursuit of ties with other regional power groupings that China plays a definitive part in, such as the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, is one example of this tilt. These recalibrations signify the paradigm shifts within the Turkish political and foreign policy establishment over the two decades of AKP rule.

Closer relations with Turkey present China with an opportunity to effectively engage with and influence politics in the Middle East and to expand its influence and economic integration in the Mediterranean. Ties between Turkey and China can potentially affect Turkey’s relationships with the EU, NATO and the US more broadly, mainly because Turkey can use its relations with China as a balancer in what has become an increasingly transactional foreign policy with its traditional alliances.

NATO recently declared China a strategic priority given the systemic challenges China brings to the rules-based order, its confrontational stance towards Taiwan and its close ties with Russia. China responded by calling the NATO alliance a source of instability in the world and prone to Cold War thinking. Gaining leverage over Turkey gives China favourable circumstances to undermine the solidarity within NATO that has arisen with the Ukraine war. Turkey’s relations with Russia are a current example of this.

China doesn’t have the conditions attached to economic aid and human rights that are found in Turkey’s partnerships with the EU and US and so is very attractive to Erdogan for maintaining his authoritarian ‘new Turkey’. If Turkey were to embrace China, that could unhinge whatever leverage the EU, NATO and the US have on Turkey in human rights engagement, minority rights and stopping the rise of authoritarian politics in Turkey and the broader Middle East region.

Turkey has been a prominent voice of support for Uyghur rights throughout the world and was once a sanctuary for Uyghur dissidents from Xinjiang. As Turkey seeks economic benefits from China and gains an advantageous foothold with Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, activists are being deported and Turkey is no longer a haven.

The AKP could use Turkey’s position in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation to champion Uyghur rights. Yet it has been reluctant to do so given the growing closeness between Ankara and Beijing. The AKP’s timidity means that the West loses one of the most prominent supporters of Uyghur rights in the Muslim world. Notwithstanding Albania’s contribution, this leaves countries like the US and Australia to continue to be vocal against China’s policies in Xinjiang.

Turkish opposition parties such as the Republican People’s Party and the Good Party have championed the Uyghur cause and could become a prominent voice against further Chinese integration if they were to win next year’s elections against Erdogan and the AKP.

Militarily, Turkey’s domestic arms industry is slowly replacing its need for NATO military hardware. Turkey’s endogenous Bayraktar TB2 drones have been critical in destroying Russian military hardware and have shifted the dynamics in the Ukraine conflict. Turkey may seek cheaper and more cost-effective military hardware or technology from China for its defence industry if relations with the US and NATO continue to deteriorate. Growing military and security ties between Ankara and Beijing have met challenges, and Chinese military equipment is still no match for US and NATO hardware.

Continued economic woes, unorthodox economic policy and terrible poll numbers could create the conditions for a change in government in 2023 in Turkey. Erdogan, however, will likely try to maintain power at all costs. Support from other authoritarian countries like Russia and China could ease the blowback from any election manipulation or chicanery. It’s unlikely that a change in government would undo the years of mistrust between Turkish policymakers and its traditional allies in NATO and the US. It will be difficult to bring Turkey entirely back into the Western fold. This makes it very likely that there will be further development and entrenchment of ties between Ankara and Beijing.

With NATO’s attention on the Russia–Ukraine conflict, and the EU and US dealing with their own authoritarian movements, the relationship between China and Turkey will likely fly under the radar. However, stronger ties between China and Turkey present a genuine and existential problem to Western cohesiveness in NATO, the EU’s stability, US power in the region and the balance of power in the Mediterranean. As China’s footprint grows in the Middle East and beyond, this developing relationship may become an issue sooner rather than later.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/b...ra create an existential problem for the West
 
Saudi Arabia:
The King Faisal Naval Base in the city of Jeddah on the Red Sea coast, witnessed the arrival of the 2200-class corvette “Al Jubail” , coming from the manufacturing headquarters in Spain.

The Saudi Naval Forces held an official reception for HMS Al-Jubail, the first ship to enter service as part of the “Sarawat Project”, which includes the construction of five naval vessels with advanced capabilities to conduct various combat missions with high efficiency.

According to the Saudi Press Agency (SPA), HMS Al-Jubail (Corvette Avante 2200) is the latest of its type in the world, with capabilities of handling air, surface, or subsurface targets.
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https://hodhodyemennews.net/en_US/2...made-corvette-vessel-arrives-in-saudi-arabia/
 
Iran:
Brigadier General Hamid Vahedi, commander of the Iranian Air Force, told Borna news agency on Sunday that Iran is seeking to purchase fighter aircraft.

Vahedi announced that purchase of Sukhoi Su-35 fighters from Russia is on the agenda of the air force.

He said the purchase of Sukhoi Su-35 is currently being discussed, rather than Sukhoi Su-30. “This issue is on the agenda and we hope to be able to get these 4++ generation fighters in the future.”

The commander of the air force also emphasized that the final decision on purchase of Sukhoi Su-35s from Russia rests with the Army and the Armed Forces General Staff Headquarters.
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https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/476406/Iran-to-purchase-Sukhoi-Su-35-from-Russia-report

**Hmmn, Iranian drones to Russia and Flankers for Iran ;) **
 

Taliban forces are increasingly using air assets to support their operations in the Andarab and Panjshir but this is unlikely to have a decisive strategic effect. The Taliban Air Force has been using Mi-17 transport helicopters to ferry troops and supplies around mountainous terrain within the Panjshir and Andarab Valleys.[20] The Taliban have also used Mi-24 attack helicopters on at least one occasion to carry out airstrikes on NRF positions in Eastern Baghlan Province.[21] The NRF shot down a Taliban-operated Mi-17 in mid-June 2022, despite lacking any man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS).[22] The Taliban Air Force continued to use American-made helicopters, including at least four MD-500 light attack helicopters, during Zakir’s Augustoffensive into Khenj District, Panjshir Province.[23] Taliban Chief of Army Staff Fasihuddin stated recently that the Taliban Air Force has 60 working aircraft in service, an increase from the 40 claimed in January.[24] The Taliban government is clearly prioritizing the air force and will likely continue to keep some aircraft operational for the foreseeable future. Despite these additional aircraft, the Taliban Air Force is still less than half the size of the former Afghan Air Force.[25] The addition of a few more helicopters will help Taliban operations against the NRF on a tactical level but is unlikely to result in significant strategic effects due to the limited number of airframes and constraints surrounding securing additional spare parts to keep aircraft operable.
 
So we'll see how this plays out. Looks like the Taliban might be conducting a conventional war against guerrilla forces.
 

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