air defense of Georgia at the first stage of operation was is underestimated that led to big losses in aircraft
After the beginning of application of means of radio electronic fight of air defense of Georgia were suppressed. After 10.08.08 losses of aircraft of Russia weren't
The greatest efficiency during fighting was shown by an onboard complex of radio-electronic fight
SU-34 airplane,
and helicopters of radio of electronic fight (An-12PP, Mi-8PPA, Mi-8 of SMV-PG)
Forces of REB carried out radio-electronic suppression of radar station of Georgia by P-36D6, P-37, 5A87, P-18, 19Zh6, PRV-9 — 11 — 13, ASR-12 in regions of the cities of Gori, Tbilisi and Marneuli. At the same time in the course the RAP of RES of the opponent noises and the Russian radar stations of the A84, 5A87, P-18, P-37 type, placed at a distance of 100 – 120 km from zones of setting of noises by the AH-12PP planes were watched.
Still highly inferior to Russian Air Force!
I know this is a little old but I want to take this opportunity and add my part on this discussion because a lot of facts are consisntantly overlooked on the August war.
While those events are undisputed and show the general efficiency of EW / ECM there are a few circumstances to consider:
1.The Russian airforce and forces involved in general with the single exception of artillery were
very lucky they had to face a military force that was in overall far worse shape, condition and extremely poorly lead and organized on command level to the point I almost wished we had a guerilla force instead. The GAF was virtualy lead and directed by gov officials who used cellphones to coordinate single operations and those commands got inrecepted. I am not aware how much the Russian military used that to it's advantige but nevertheless all those facts combined make a disastrous testimony.
2. The Georgian air defence was not a meaningful threat to Russia even on paper and that is why based on intelligence the Russian military was not wrong on that assessment at any time during the conflict. The Russian air elements in the area had all means to take it out pretty quickly. Despite decent presence on the battlefield, the numbers were limited and most of the Soviet radars were old and vulnerable to even the Su-34. Losses will still happen. It is simply calculated, the sacle and order can however be unexpected. The most advanced ( as of range ) anti-air systems the Buk M1 managed to down a low altitude flying Tu-22 "recon" and the 2nd most advanced system, the Israeli Spyder ( short-mid range ) - one unit that was manned by trained officers, an all-female crew - managed to down another 1, arguably 2 aircraft and damage a few more. This is where the success and activities of the air defence ceased. The other losses and almost losses were inflicted by Soviet and Polish manpads on Su-24 and Su-25 bombers in classic fashion after they completed the dive. While this is still impressive all things considered in particular the lack of qualified personnel and terrible deployment order, more could have been achieved if decent and better direction and attention was invested on that particular elements of the military forces beforehand.
By now, the air defence - which is one of the most crucial components - is a qualified force in it's capabilities and limitations and in the recent years the gov has taken the right steps, the really noteworthy progress. Cadres of officers were sent to the respective countries which' those systems have been / are being acquired from to have them trained properly so they can also train new personnel. France is currently training officers on the new radars, which may or may not be GM-200 / 400 far superior over what we have now. Other than financial issues, this is the main reason why this particular stage of reforms is taking so long and that is a good thing. People always want to have everything instantanously but it does not work that way. Everything requires serious, carefull consideration and planning, plus you can only do so much in time - as much as the budget allows.
You'd think It should have been but it wasn't and those are not my words but those of your military commanders and also a matter of facts and events that went down. Despite the heavy short-comings of the GAF which' only advantige was initiative - which climaxed 2-3 days into the conflict and completly faded as soon as Russian military got involved full scale, said military had to struggle against a retreating Georgian army after enduring unnecessary losses during early engagements in the air and very clumsy setbacks on ground. August 9 was almost text book disaster and we are talking about a foe that casualy walked through the streets of a town while hundreds of armed opponents were waiting at every corner to pick off their tanks one by one. Which is exactly why you don't just move enmasse into a town especialy with armor. Not the way it was done and not when a town is not considered absolutly pacified in the first place. Virtualy everyone learned that lesson. Yet you still see that in the current conflicts. Russian ground forces were almost in equaly bad shape but still had the better equipment, especialy artillery and ofc satellites were essential. However I still don't understand how it was considered a good idea to simply rush in with huge columns. If the Georgian artillery and countless ambush opportunities had been utilized consequently and properly like the NAF did against the UA forces Russia would have suffered significant losses, but what happened instead were delaying action by isolated units when the army was already retreating. For example, you know that one video where some Russian vehicles are being attacked and destroyed. That attack was caused by one or two Fagot ATGM teams hiding in the nearby forest and one artillery observer who directed artillery strikes on the column. That attack came so out of nowhere it caused heavy confusion and inproper response, which in the end did result in the forest being cleared out and those poor guys eliminated but it proved how efficient even an ambush in a desperate situation can be.
To not go further into it, yes the GAF was beaten and demoralized but most of it didn't even see action and where it stood it offered a good fight. I think August 9 is the best example and the isolated events. Direct clashes were rare. Most GAF elements that took losses were beaten by artillery or air raids, that inflicted dramatic losses which blew out of proportion and luckily most of it was not directly lethal, but a lot of servicemen did die as a consequence of wounds later on. Some GAF elements were also caught in an ambush. Like for instance a small engineer column was dismantled near the village of Shindisi during the ceasefire. They were allowed to pass through Russian lines but then got attacked at a railway station by some BMD-1s, one got destroyed but most of the Georgians I think over a dozen got killed where they stood, a few still in their vehicles. Idk if that was a tragic misunderstanding or on porupse but yeah, such things happened. There was even an instance where Russian BMPs were advancing into Tskhinvali and a Georgian squad simply kept walking towards them hailing because they thought it were Georgian vehicles.
Considering the catastrophic state of the GAF and execution of the entire operation the August War should have gone much worse for Georgia but the Russian side despite numerous advantiges also displayed a level of incompetence and almost same level clumsiness that really surprsied me. If the GAF had been in slightly better shape and commanded properly and stood instead of chaoticaly retreating leaving a lot of stuff behind because our former president was fearing for his life .... and balls, I honestly don't think the Russians would have remembered this war as the same success as they do now. But on the other hand ofc the more you resist, the more you cause your own destruction, so in the end you can only appreciate that the war ended quickly.
Thanks for bearing with me.
