Photos US Forces

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Col. Robin Olds and Operation Bolo.... The Perfect Victory
Led by Col. Robin Olds, Operation BOLO used a brilliant deception tactic that destroyed half of the North Vietnamese MiG-21 fighter force, with no USAF losses.
In late 1966, the USAF was not permitted to bomb North Vietnamese airfields and could only destroy enemy fighters in the air. Complicating the problem, enemy MiGs focused on bomb-laden F-105s and only initiated combat when they had a clear advantage. Col. Robin Olds, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW) commander, and the wing's tactics officer, Capt. John "J.B." Stone, devised a masterful plan to lure and trap North Vietnamese MiG-21s by mimicking an F-105 bombing formation.
On Jan. 2, 1967, 8th TFW F-4s entered North Vietnam from the west using the same route, altitude, and formation as an F-105 bomb strike. They also carried and operated electronic jamming pods used by F-105s. The North Vietnamese took the bait, and the MiGs came up to intercept what they thought was an F-105 strike. At the same time, 366th TFW F-4s came into North Vietnam from the east to block the MiGs' escape to China and to orbit their bases, preventing the MiGs from landing.
Despite some problems caused by the overcast weather, OPERATION BOLO was triumphantly successful. During the 12-minute engagement, seven North Vietnamese MiG-21s -- about half of their operational force -- were shot down with no USAF losses. Four days later, another ruse, this time mimicking an F-4 reconnaissance flight, shot down two more MiG-21s. These crippling losses greatly reduced MiG activity for several months.
In the future photo below Col. Robin Olds (left) and Capt. John Stone after Operation Bolo. Three other 8th Tactical Fighter Wing officers, 1st Lt. Joseph Hicks, 1st Lt. Ralph Wetterhahn and Maj. James Covington, also worked on planning the mission details. (U.S. Air Force photo)
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Original description and photo sourced by: www.nationalmuseum.af.mil

 

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Huey that went down near Signal Hill in the Ashau Valley

Napalm and bombs by a Skyraider-Ashau

 

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Negative of a Marine RTo,In the Que son Valley Mountains

 

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Col. (later Maj. Gen.) Robert Maloy (left) and Capt. William S. Paul (right) of the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing after being rescued by an H-3E Jolly Green Giant from the 37th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Squadron on Oct. 15, 1967. Enemy fire hit their F-4 Phantom over North Vietnam, but they reached open water before ejecting. Maloy fractured his back, and Pararescueman (PJ) Airman 1st Class Roger Klenovich (center, wearing red PJ beret) went into the water to help him. (U.S. Air Force photo)

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Original description and photo sourced by:
https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil

 

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54 years ago, September 1966, I was the SGT E-5 Demolition Sergeant on Detachment A-422 (Camp Vinh Gia), Company D (Detachment C-4), 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), in the Mekong Delta (IV Corps) of South Vietnam.
On 6 October I had six inches of water in my room, and there was eight inches in the main room, as well as a foot-and-a-half of water in the kitchen. Early that afternoon, SFC Richard (the team Operations Sergeant) and SP4 Greene replaced Stephens and I at Giang Thanh. They arrived on one of our Vinh Gia “Navy’s” fiberglass outboard motorized assault boats. Stephens and I had prepared and had all our belongings ready to return to the “civilized world” of Vinh Gia.
The boat ride east to Vinh Gia was interesting, and sad. It was unbelievable how many of the indigenous homes were flooded. In fact, it was all of them. The canal bank was the highest elevation in the area, it being also where almost all the homes were built. They were under anywhere from one to three feet of water. In one of our outposts, the men were sitting on the roofs of their quarters.
I was happy. We arrived just in time for me to celebrate my birthday the following day, the 7th, in the sanity (?) of Vinh Gia. A nice birthday present would have been receiving the “Playboy” magazines my mother sent. Apparently, some mail clerk along the line latched on to them for himself, figuring he needed them more than we did. Had I known who was pilfering them I would gladly have wrung his neck.
SFC Richard had appointed me to act as Team Sergeant during his absence, with the support of CPT Smith, even though I was outranked by two teammates in camp. That made me feel very proud. I was also continuing as clerk/typist, Supply Sergeant, Intelligence Sergeant, Heavy Weapons Leader and Demolition Sergeant (my official title, since I could draw additional demolition pay as long as I was assigned to that slot). I was also acting camp Light Weapons Leader (since SP4 Greene was at Giang Thanh), and “Ranch Foreman.”
We had purchased a cow, that I (basically, a city boy) was put in charge of. The closest thing to a farm I had ever been to, was a friend’s goat pen in Castro Valley CA, where I had milked his two goats a few times. We also adopted a baby river otter. We named him “Squeaky.” He was 8 inches long (not counting his tail), and was cute, furry, playful as could be, and noisy. He was constantly squeaking (hence his name). He loved to be held in the hand, on his back, while his belly was rubbed. Thankfully we had no problems catching fish for him, because his stomach seemed like a bottomless pit. In fact, when we adopted him we had enough fish swimming around in our flooded team house, to feed the little critter. Squeaky, our dog, and our three small kittens played together a lot.
As acting Team Sergeant, I learned a lot about the difficulties of supervising the running of a camp. Special Forces A-teams basically had two financial funds they were responsible for. The first, and easiest fund to manage, was the Team Fund. Team funds were set up to purchase goods for the team for everyday living and entertainment. The fund was kept afloat by monthly team member donations, as well as the small profit made by selling canned beer and sodas to team members for a very slight markup.
The second fund, and most difficult to manage, was the camp Operational Fund. This fund was the responsibility of the team executive officer (XO). This fund money came from the U.S. Government, disbursed by the SFOB (5th Special Forces Group Headquarters in Nha Trang to the C-team CIDG Finance Office Fund Officer, who in turn delivered it to our A-team. This was the fund used to pay the CIDG. In addition, some of the funds were allocated for other camp purposes, such as rations for the CIDG, petroleum products, transportation, locally purchased goods and services, and various goods used daily. It was the XO’s responsibility to account for every single Piaster (Vietnamese penny). That alone was a major headache for the team XO.
The LLDB found over time that money could be made from that fund. The more dishonest the LLDB CO, the more money he could make. The LLDB had become experts at bilking the fund out of money by recruiting CIDG soldiers who never existed, except on the payroll. Another method the LLDB used, was the monthly kickback system, whereby the CIDG soldier had to “donate” a percentage of his pay to the LLDB commander.
Sometimes the LLDB would form businesses in a nearby village, the main reason for its existence being to sell goods to the camp, payable through the Operational Fund. That wasn’t very difficult for them to accomplish, since Special Forces camps attempted, as much as possible, to purchase materials, labor, and services locally.
Another headache for the XO was making sure that every CIDG soldier paid was, indeed, the named soldier. Attempts would be made by the LLDB to run a CIDG soldier through the pay line a couple times, one of the times acting the part of a fake soldier, one who was on the roster but didn’t exist. If the “non-existing” soldier did get paid, he would then give the money to the LLDB, while receiving a small percentage for himself, for managing to fake out the pay officer.
Dependent pay was also collected by CIDG men. The LLDB on occasion would pad the number of children a CIDG soldier had, to collect more pay. The LLDB would then keep that extra pay. As an example, a private 1 was paid $1,600 VN (about $10 American) per month. He was also authorized a monthly family allowance of $200 VN ($1.25 U.S.) for his wife, and $100 VN (60 cents) for each child. An unlimited number of children could be claimed. That made it possible for CIDG soldiers to receive a lot of extra pay for children.
The water level on the 7th, my 24th birthday, still hadn’t gone down much. I had 3 inches of water in my room at Vinh Gia. What a birthday! I spent the day suffering from a touch of pneumonia and a bad foot infection, similar to athlete’s foot. Everybody on the team was suffering from the foot infection, one so bad that he was restricted to bed rest. When I slept I made sure the mosquito netting was tightly tucked in under the mattress, to keep the snakes out of my bed. When I woke in the morning it was nothing to see snakes swimming around my bed.
Amazingly, on 13 October my Playboy that was mailed in San Jose CA on 11 August, more than two months prior, arrived. And, it was in pristine condition. It must have come via a VERY SLOW boat sailing the most circuitous route possible. My “Care” packages (cookies, candy, goodies, etc.) from home were apparently utilizing the same transportation system.
From my book #4 (SLURP SENDS! A Green Beret’s Experiences in Vietnam Book 4), of my four-book set of “SLURP SENDS!” Books #1 (“SLURP SENDS! On Becoming a Green Beret Book 1”), #2 (SLURP SENDS! Experiences of an A-Team Green Beret Book 2”), #3 (“SLURP SENDS! Experiences of a Green Beret in Vietnam Book 3”), and #4 are available on Amazon, or from me.
PHOTOS: Flooding on the Vinh Te Canal / “Squeaky,” our baby river otter (my photos).
SLURP SENDS!

 

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Corporal Carl J. Pedrotti watches his scout dog Wotan as he stops to test the wind while on patrol. The scout dog is from the 3d Military Police Battalion’s Scout Dog Platoon. Dog teams are used as point on patrols to give infantrymen an early warning if the enemy is nearby (official USMC photo by Private First Class Roger Nystrom).

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Photograph and original description sourced from: The Jonathan Abel Collection (COLL/3611), Marine Corps Archives & Special Collections.

 

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A-Shau valley.

 

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A 6ft 5in machine gunner with the US 9th Infantry Division is submerged except for his M-60 as he crosses a muddy stream in the Mekong delta south of Saigon on 10 September 1968

 

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Camp of "Diggers fighting with the 101st.

 

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New Zealand soldiers of W3 Company about to head out on Operation Townsville, 1970.

 

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Phuoc Tuy Province, South Vietnam. 18 February 1970. Section Commander, Corporal Joe Danyluk of Port Kembla, NSW, carrying a M79 calls a halt during a sweep through bombed out jungle after a battle in the Long Hai mountains during Operation Hamersley. His company, B Company of 8th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment (8RAR), together with other units of the Battalion, supported by armour, fought an estimated company of hard-core Viet Cong (VC) for a number of days in the mountains. The area was pounded by air strikes including a raid by giant B52 bomber aircraft, naval bombardment from HMAS Vendetta and artillery fire.
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Description and photograph sourced by: https://www.awm.gov.au/collection/C324252

 

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had rat tunnel units in vietnam war era only?

 

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had rat tunnel units in vietnam war era only?

AFAIK, yes. I’m not aware of any other conflict the US Army had to fight the enemy in such extensive tunnel systems. There were a few in the PTO but not as big and not as many as in Vietnam.