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Mike1976

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There is a NATO summit coming up in June. Unclear what the EU will come up with concretely before that and if individual members will make decisions prior to it, or wait it out to see what the response should be. And possibly the EU is taking that approach as well?

Increased defence spending for at least some NATO members to appease Trump was in the cards, but that imo shows the problem of the past decades. To get a president off your back instead of deterrence. Doing the bare minimum isn't the mindset of a winner.

Imo the priority shouldn't just be about deterrence from adversaries, but also on vastly reducing US influence not just through a reduction in troops levels and bases but also by breaking away from the US military-industrial complex for new purchases as much as possible and especially for consumables. Buying from non-aligned countries in the interim would likely become a problem when Trump pressures countries like Israel and South-Korea not to sell in order to protect his own industry.

Force levels are an issue, limited conscription seems unavoidable imo, but a major political hot potatoes. Way too much of the budget right now is being spent on pensions and the salaries of high ranking officers. The UK having more admirals than major combatants being only the latest example of a bloated head on an undersized body.

Then there's the issue of forward deploying the limited resources currently available. Right now placement is based on choosing what you want to lose least of all.
 
I propose a draft for the tens of millions of military aged males from North Africa and the Middle East in order to earn EU/UK citizenship
 
Way too much of the budget right now is being spent on pensions and the salaries of high ranking officers. The UK having more admirals than major combatants being only the latest example of a bloated head on an undersized body.

This is the n. 1 issue. And coming up with idea how to stop countries inflating their defence spending numbers with nonsense like rent paid for the state.

I've always wondered how countries with 10x the budget end up with similar amounts of equipment than we have here. At the time I thought it was the air force spending, but those are not that large either. Is It the navies or nuclear arsenal? Only two have the latter.

Edit: ok they have more development projects, but that much?
 
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The greatest threat to Europe's military is bankruptcy.
 
Unclear what the EU will come up with concretely before that and if individual members will make decisions prior to it
What concrete power EU has in this respect? The current ReArm Europe plan works in the framework of the EU legislation with deficit escape clause, 150 billion in loans and possibility to use EU budget funds for short term investments.
EU wont dictate to individual nations what they must do, we still operate inside nato plans. So it's up to individual nations.

Force levels are an issue, limited conscription seems unavoidable imo, but a major political hot potatoes. Way too much of the budget right now is being spent on pensions and the salaries of high ranking officers. The UK having more admirals than major combatants being only the latest example of a bloated head on an undersized body.

Then there's the issue of forward deploying the limited resources currently available. Right now placement is based on choosing what you want to lose least of all.


Unless there's a pearl harbor esq event in europe I believe there won't be a wide reintroduction of conscription.
Im going to guess that the big ticket items will be air defense systems and logistics and military infrastructure.

Given that the theater of operation is bigger physically than it was during the cold war for western europe.
 
What concrete power EU has in this respect? The current ReArm Europe plan works in the framework of the EU legislation with deficit escape clause, 150 billion in loans and possibility to use EU budget funds for short term investments.
EU wont dictate to individual nations what they must do, we still operate inside nato plans. So it's up to individual nations.

In other words, something akin to the current NATO situation, just limited to the EU.

Which limits the prospects even more.
 
What concrete power EU has in this respect? The current ReArm Europe plan works in the framework of the EU legislation with deficit escape clause, 150 billion in loans and possibility to use EU budget funds for short term investments.
Exactly, the EU can make it easier for countries to get their affairs in order.
 
The greatest threat to Europe's military is bankruptcy.
I don't see us spending upwards of 40% of our budget on defence any time soon, so I'm sure it'll be fine. Spending 3,5% wasn't a problem during the Cold War either.
 
I don't see us spending upwards of 40% of our budget on defence any time soon, so I'm sure it'll be fine. Spending 3,5% wasn't a problem during the Cold War either.

Context wise, and though things were not that great for the Western part of Europe, we had it much easier than now.
Europe was, arguably more stable and didn't have all of the social and demographic crisis it is currently having. Economy wise, though indebted, the individual deficit, along with the collective one, weren't as crushing as they are now.

Now, with a larger Europe, we have to take into consideration the individual situation of all of the other countries, in addition to the collective crisis that crippled all of the social, political, demographic and political landscapes.

And that's without even alluding to the security risks and the looming fear of a global war on the European territory due to a sweeping Warsaw pact invasion. Which are, first of all, not entirely the same as the present, if not daily, risks of radical-islam and refugees-linked acts of terrorism, though yes there also was political terrorism during the Cold War; and the risks of a nuclear war are much less dire than during the Cold War on a few select occasions.

Back then the risk was existential, and one of the goal of the Cold War was to over-compete the enemy in the arms race.

Perhaps it is part of the goal now as well, with the nuclear dimension put on the back burner.

But economically speaking, considering all of the reforms and budgetary cuts various sectors have been imposed, I doubt an increase in the defense budget will be something the people will accept with much enthusiasm.
 
Context wise, and though things were not that great for the Western part of Europe, we had it much easier than now.
Europe was, arguably more stable and didn't have all of the social and demographic crisis it is currently having. Economy wise, though indebted, the individual deficit, along with the collective one, weren't as crushing as they are now.

Now, with a larger Europe, we have to take into consideration the individual situation of all of the other countries, in addition to the collective crisis that crippled all of the social, political, demographic and political landscapes.

And that's without even alluding to the security risks and the looming fear of a global war on the European territory due to a sweeping Warsaw pact invasion. Which are, first of all, not entirely the same as the present, if not daily, risks of radical-islam and refugees-linked acts of terrorism, though yes there also was political terrorism during the Cold War; and the risks of a nuclear war are much less dire than during the Cold War on a few select occasions.

Back then the risk was existential, and one of the goal of the Cold War was to over-compete the enemy in the arms race.

Perhaps it is part of the goal now as well, with the nuclear dimension put on the back burner.

But economically speaking, considering all of the reforms and budgetary cuts various sectors have been imposed, I doubt an increase in the defense budget will be something the people will accept with much enthusiasm.
I truly believe youre a pessimist overall without cause. And the reason i say that is that when push comes to shove nations move rabidly. Europe has just been asleep (or western europe more rather)

I believe this because i have personal experience about this, twice in the last few years actually.
1. Nato membership was a big no no forever, even the last pm stated, that under her it will never happen.
But 2022 happened and things moved very rabidly

2. Closing borders to third world migrants, was incomprehensible because of leftist reasoning. But when Russia started to push them onto our border the borders closed very rabidly.


Today this was the news
 
I truly believe youre a pessimist overall without cause. And the reason i say that is that when push comes to shove nations move rabidly. Europe has just been asleep (or western europe more rather)

I believe this because i have personal experience about this, twice in the last few years actually.
1. Nato membership was a big no no forever, even the last pm stated, that under her it will never happen.
But 2022 happened and things moved very rabidly

2. Closing borders to third world migrants, was incomprehensible because of leftist reasoning. But when Russia started to push them onto our border the borders closed very rabidly.


Today this was the news

I am indeed a pessimist.

And that pessimism is built upon observing and recognizing patterns. Based on what has been done up until now, the various calls made up until now, the projects that got brainstormed and the few that got launched up until now, the way crisis have been dealt with up until now, etc... unless there is a real and genuine will behind that one project of building a European defense nothing will change.

I wouldn't say Europe has been asleep, though the effects are the same in the end, but there rather was a general disinterest regarding the issue. When the topic was brought up it was mostly for electoral purposes. Back in 2012 one of the big talk during the French presidential campaign was getting a second nuclear carrier; the main candidates were in favor of it. It never went farther than that. They are careerists, first and foremost.
And recent crisis have shown us a recurring pattern in the way things are dealt with. Take COVID for instance, in many ways that was a wake-up call for the health system especially with regards to PPE and drugs available in pharmacies. We got presented with the fact that decentralizing our manufacturing apparatus to other countries wasn't a good thing. Sure it is cheaper, but it makes us dependent on these countries, and, incidentally, the gains we were supposed to get by having the stuff made for cheaper were not capitalized on.
So, that created a big outrage, even more so since we were in a very serious crisis. Pledges were made about changing how things were because "we" had realized how vital for a country to be able to be self-sufficient to some extent. The crisis passed, and no changes were made. Since the end of the "pandemic" France still finds itself going through months-long period of a variety of drugs running very low on stock (antibiotics, antidepressants, painkillers, etc...) because they are made abroad.
Point being: we talk about solutions to a crisis when the crisis is there, once the crisis is over the urgency for a solution fades away and is simply not considered anymore.

I am not well versed with Finland, so I won't pronounce myself on it. However the trend with eastern countries, when it comes to defense, seems to be different in a rather radical way, from western and central European standards that is.
Where does this difference stems from, I don't know. As I said, I am not well versed on these countries. But if their approach can emulate spirits in other countries, then good. Hopefully that will happen.

And hopefully they also emulate eastern countries approach on third world migrants. But here, again, is an issue. Borders with Russia and Belarus can be closed without creating a huge impact on other things.
The rest of Europe, on the hand, has to deal with Turkey and we can't close our borders with Turkey as it has been exemplified with the migrants/refugees crisis. Turkey is holding Europe by the balls, or what's left of them, and our leaders lack said balls to stand up to Erdogan.
 
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I don't see us spending upwards of 40% of our budget on defence any time soon, so I'm sure it'll be fine. Spending 3,5% wasn't a problem during the Cold War either.
 
You might not get it from that article from europhile DutchNews (NLTimes is the same), but the objection is against the massive collective debt structure. Just like the 2008 crisis the EU is attempting to use another crisis to transfer wealth from northern Europe to the debt-ridden countries in southern Europe. As Omtzigt said this collective debt isn't needed either, the less the EU is directly involved in financing the better. The only thing they need to do is restructure legislation.
 
The far-right PVV and pro-countryside BBB have both said they do not support the Dutch decision to allocate a further €3.5 billion to Ukraine either, and want the measure to be part of the ongoing negotiations on the government’s spring financial statement.
The PM promised that money without consulting 3 out of 4 coalition parties, rather going behind their back to make a deal with the opposition. The coalition ministers had to find found out about it in the news.
 

Earlier this month, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen presented the new €800 billion defense plan at a press conference. The underlying plan is nowhere to be seen and details are being negotiated behind closed doors, but that did not stop members of the House of Representatives from voicing their opinions about it in a loud voice. The cabinet is ‘suffering from it’ and has scheduled an extra coalition meeting for this morning.
Especially since the Lower House adopted the Eerdmans motion (JA21) in which the government is asked not to allow the Netherlands to participate in ReArm Europe, because these are ‘partly financed by joint debt issuances’ and ‘defense expenditure must remain a national competence’.

The right-wing liberals of JA21 have been critical of the idea of Eurobonds - war bonds - for years because they fear that the French defense industry in particular will profit from them. French President Emmanuel Macron is a warm advocate of war bonds, as is former French European Commissioner Thierry Breton (recently dismissed after a somewhat too hasty attempt to tackle Elon Musk and X).

After the United States, France is the largest arms exporter in the world, but due to the high national debt of 112% (3,000 billion euros), it is less able to invest in that same industry. In contrast to the Netherlands, the French state is a shareholder in large defense companies of its own, such as the Naval Group, Thales Group and KNDS. France does have the industrial potential but due to its high national debt, it has less international credibility to release capital (this is in contrast to Germany, for example).
800 billion from her high hair

In her press conference, Von der Leyen talked about 150 billion euros through joint loans (the member states could release 650 billion if they relaxed the European rules for proper household budgets), and this is precisely what the majority in the House of Representatives spoke out against. It is not just a matter of standing surety for countries with a higher national debt, you also want to know exactly what you are standing surety for. Because while the average citizen does not yet have to submit a DNA swab to the bank before being able to obtain a mortgage of 1.5 tons (and nowadays they want to register every transaction of 100 euros), Commission President Von der Leyen spoke about 'an expected 800 billion euros' without making clear where exactly those euros come from, and on what basis she conjures up this figure from her high hair.

There has been underproduction and underinvestment in the (own) defense industry on the European continent for years, so it is not surprising that this political necessity is felt now that the United States is making its own plans - and Brussels therefore sees its chance -. Minister of Finance Eelco Heinen (VVD) called the motion 'premature' because the plans were not yet final, but the motion was more about the method of financing those plans than about the plans themselves.

There is still a lot of uncertainty about the latter. Because for which industry and who does the Netherlands actually guarantee? The European Commission will - on behalf of the member states - enter into the loans, but also distribute them among joint European defense projects with a minimum of three European countries, or two European countries plus Ukraine. Which companies are involved? From which countries exactly? But even more importantly: which hardware exactly falls under those 'strategic enablers' that Von der Leyen mentions. 'Electronics' and 'cyber' do not say much. With a little imagination, Mark Rutte's NATO Nokia also falls under a 'strategic enabler', after all.

And perhaps a strange question, but: who exactly is going to operate all that military equipment?

It is precisely these preconditions and how these details are negotiated that make the crucial difference between a possible boost for industry (which Dutch SMEs also benefit from) and the slurping sounds of a money pit. You may expect members of the House of Representatives - whose primary task is to be the accountant for tax money - to get a clear picture of that difference before voting for (or against) something.
This is where it gets interesting. I don't know the details (yet), and neither do you - but inquiries with the parliamentary groups show: neither do the members of parliament. For the time being, we all have to sail on the very brief press conference of Von der Leyen.

Nevertheless, Eerdmans' motion - which was clearly about the financing mechanism of shared debts - was immediately provided with hysterical opposition subtitles, such as: 'at the pivotal point of history you don't need an accountant' (CDA), 'grocer's mentality' (CDA), 'stupid and irresponsible' (D66) and 'The Netherlands is in European isolation together with Hungary. This cabinet is drifting aimlessly on the waves. Unprecedented' (ChristenUnie).
The media could not suppress their sentiment either: RTL Nieuws called the adoption of the Eerdmans motion ‘remarkable’. The word ‘remarkable’ was however remarkable since the Netherlands - together with Germany - is known in the European Union as a ‘frugal state’. A worthwhile article on EurActiv (not exactly an anti-EU website) pointed out before Eerdmans had submitted his motion that the Netherlands would probably object to the element of a shared debt burden. Incidentally, Germany is also traditionally against it, although they have not yet expressed their opinion. Anyway, everyone expected the Netherlands to fall over this, except the Netherlands itself.

Jaap Jansen (BNR) - like the Christian Union - could not resist emphasizing that the Netherlands is now siding with Hungary. While Hungary’s veto was about a joint text from the European Council for military assistance to Ukraine. That is really something different than ‘800 billion euros for the European defense industry’ from the European Commission. Because the European Council voted unanimously for this last point on 5 March (including Hungary), and so Von der Leyen can work out her defence plans for further discussion on 20 and 21 March. That an opposition party such as the Christian Union and CDA are messing up these matters for political gain, okay - but you can expect journalists to see and explain this difference.

Even the tweeters I normally consider to be stable minds were talking about ‘learning Russian’, ‘The Hague is 10 May 1940 again’ and ‘it’s great that we are entering a new world war without debts’.
In addition, defence spending has always been a national matter: having it run through the European Commission is a step that Von der Leyen (as well as her predecessors) has dreamed of for a long time, but which is also an unmistakable step towards European federalism.

You can be for or against that - fine, but as a political party, be honest that you also agree with this institutional change, including the associated consequences, and that you are not just cowardly hiding behind Ukraine. Joint procurement of resources through the European Commission will also determine your military deployment to a certain extent and limit your own policy freedom.

If the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown one thing, it is that European security interests are miles apart. In practice, the military opt-in - instead of a lock-in - appears to be the most workable.
The political advocates of European war bonds are just as clear and explicit about how they see European military cooperation in the future as Von der Leyen is about her 800 billion euros. Two possibilities: either they haven't thought about it thoroughly or they don't dare to show their federalist buttocks.

Because to quickly free up money - including for Ukraine and their own industry - there are also less drastic options possible. Such as adjusting VAT rates, relaxing the rules for bank loans, or what about the remaining money from the corona funds. Or, another option, use the brand new Defence, Security and Resilience (DSR) Bank. Then there are the frozen Russian assets that could be used (that amounts to many billions), but France is against that (I wonder why?).

Finally, a short-term solution (freeing up more money) is not the same as long-term stability (keeping debts under control). After all, you still want to have a free market to defend later.

Wars are not paid for in wartime, the bill comes later, Benjamin Franklin already stated. The only ones who drift aimlessly on the waves are really the members of parliament and opinion makers who cannot get their emotional Cold War incontinence under control and, like a headless chicken, plead for faster, faster, more, more, more, without having a clear idea of what exactly.
 
^^^
And of course the politicians, parties and media from left to (some) right who are now screeching for immediate massive unchecked defense expenditures are the exact same who ridiculed troops for decades about the state of the armed forces, that they were coming for the jobs of the last remaining warmongering fascists too, that anyone suggesting higher defence spending was a warmongerer seeing imaginary enemies to line their own pockets.

Absolute scum.
 
The PM is refusing to veto the ReArm scheme despite a majority of parliament voting for him to do so.

He argues that it will weaken his image in Europe if he has to go back to Brussels and change his position. Should have thought about that before you made promises without any sort of mandate authorizing you to do so bozo.
 
^^^
And of course the politicians, parties and media from left to (some) right who are now screeching for immediate massive unchecked defense expenditures are the exact same who ridiculed troops for decades about the state of the armed forces, that they were coming for the jobs of the last remaining warmongering fascists too, that anyone suggesting higher defence spending was a warmongerer seeing imaginary enemies to line their own pockets.

Absolute scum.

Are we then seeing these increases defense spending bills in Netherlands?

Also that is just one problem. Another even bigger one is getting people engaged in the defense. We should start seeing some plans from countries with smallish professional militaries, be it via conscription, voluntary service, militias, college lessons etc. to bring up the needed manpower.

The PM is refusing to veto the ReArm scheme despite a majority of parliament voting for him to do so.

He argues that it will weaken his image in Europe to change his position. Should have thought about that before you made promises without any sort of mandate authorizing you to do so bozo.

Why send these guys to these meetings without a mandate to negotiate. 🙄
 

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