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[BravoZulu]

This is no time to be thinking of jumping from the plan to build nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) with Britain and into a doubtful alternative of constructing US Virginia-class boats in Australia.

Doing so would be to move from a plan with definite but understood risk to one that would have risks that haven’t been examined. Moreover, Britain’s commitment to developing the SSN-AUKUS design and building submarines of the class should not be doubted.

James Curran’s ‘Questioning AUKUS’ series in The Australian Financial Review launches a broadside against the $368 billion project amid claims that the ambitious plan ‘is a mess and risks leaving Australia with no submarine capability’. It reviews domestic construction of Virginias as a Plan B.

But the series of articles fails to present a catastrophic failing of the Optimal Pathway, the course of action which we’re following and which was identified as best by the three AUKUS countries.

There is risk, but managing risk is a key element of any complicated defence project and has been acknowledged upfront by the current and former governments, alongside Defence.

Two points in the Australian Financial Review series warrant immediate challenge. The first is the characterisation of the United Kingdom’s ability to support AUKUS and the second is the proposal of the so-called Plan B.

AUKUS is a critical project for the UK, and Australia needs the UK’s support for it to succeed. Curran is right to highlight the stresses on the UK submarine industrial base, and UK officials have consistently highlighted that the production of the country’s replacement ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) is its priority, followed by AUKUS.

Currently, the UK operates four SSBNs commissioned during the 1990s. These submarines are critical to its defence strategy, as they are the sole arm of its strategic nuclear deterrent.

The UK’s ageing Vanguard-class submarines are being replaced by four Dreadnought-class vessels. The construction of three of the four is under way, and the first is expected to be operational in the early 2030s. Despite Curran’s assertion that the delivery timeframe has not been updated in six years and might have slipped, the 2022–23 UK Ministry of Defence annual report lists the Dreadnought program as on track for delivery in the early 2030s.

As much as the replacement of its nuclear deterrent is rightly the top priority for the UK, the AUKUS SSN is also crucial to the British nuclear strategy. To have a submarine-based nuclear deterrent capability, you need SSNs to protect it.

Not only is the UK’s AUKUS SSN, given its SSBN protection role, at the core of the country’s defence strategy, but also the partnership with the UK and Australia will alleviate some of the pressures on the British submarine industrial base. The significance here is that the UK is a deeply invested party to AUKUS Pillar 1, because that part of AUKUS is also at the core of the British defence strategy.

It is tempting to jump to the counterargument that there is nothing in this for Australia, and that it is being used to prop up the submarine industrial base of the UK. Not true. The UK is essential to Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines for several reasons.

The UK was critical in convincing the US to allow the technology to be transferred, and its remains a critical balance to any changing US political whims. A bilateral arrangement for the transfer of nuclear-powered submarines is more easily abandoned than a trilateral one that includes an invested partner such as the UK. And let’s not forget that the UK’s nuclear deterrent is also a critical part of NATO’s deterrence strategy. The UK’s involvement in AUKUS complicates any potential future exit strategy by the US. Think of it as insurance.

Curran’s investigation series appears to promote a nuclear-powered submarine pathway Plan B. The point that is ignored in the platforming of a Plan B is that the Plan B carries with it greater risk than the Optimal Pathway. The Optimal Pathway has involved heavy consultation and has been agreed upon at the highest levels of government and defence in all three AUKUS partners. Its endorsement by all three partners is an important risk-reduction measure in itself.

The so-called Plan B, which relies on Australia being supported to build the United States’ close-hold Virginia class submarines in Australia within the next decade is untested and—based on Australia’s difficult journey of attempting to obtain a licence to produce US missiles under its Guided Weapons Enterprise—is simply unlikely to gain agreement and support in the near to medium term.

More importantly, although the Optimal Pathway is complex and hence unlikely to run exactly to plan, there is no evidence to date of a catastrophic failing of the pathway, nor the development of a level of extreme risk that cannot be managed.

That is not to say this won’t manifest in future. None of us has a crystal ball, but there is no such indication to date. Without a catastrophic failure of an element of the Optimal Pathway or the generation of an unmanageable risk level, any knee-jerk reaction of Australia to change the pathway within two years of its announcement would disastrously undermine confidence in its commitment to AUKUS Pillar 1 and probably drive its AUKUS partners to question its ability to support the ambitious project.

It is simply nonsensical to abandon without a reason or catalyst an agreed plan with known risk that is being treated and instead go for a plan that so far has not gone through a consultation process and would have significant risk.

Debate on AUKUS is important. Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines will not go exactly to plan; you simply cannot predict the next 34 years. But right now, the risk is known, it appears that it is being managed, and all three partners have demonstrated their commitment to the process.

The measure of success here is not whether the Optimal Pathway hits every milestone exactly on time; rather, it is whether, 10 years from now, Australia is operating a nuclear-powered submarine capability. At present, there is no strong reason to believe this won’t be the case.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/w...erstood and managed SSN-AUKUS is our best bet

 

[BravoZulu]

Australia’s plan to acquire Virginia-class submarines from the United State is looking increasingly improbable. The US building program is slipping too badly.

This heightens the need for Australia to begin looking at other options, including acquiring Suffren-class nuclear attack submarines (SSNs) from France.

The Covid-19 pandemic dramatically disrupted work at the two shipyards that build Virginias, General Dynamics Electric Boat at Groton, Connecticut, and Huntington Ingalls Industries’ yard at Newport News, Virginia. It badly hindered output at many companies in the supply chain, too. With too few workers, the industry has built up a backlog, and yards are filling with incomplete submarines.

Within six years, the US must decide whether to proceed with sale of the first of at least three and possibly five Virginias to Australia, a boat that will be transferred from the US Navy’s fleet.

Nine months before the transfer goes ahead, the president of the day must certify that it will not diminish USN undersea capability. This certification is unlikely if the industry has not by then cleared its backlog and achieved a production rate of 2.3 a year—the long-term building rate of two a year for the USN plus about one every three years to cover Australia’s requirement.

The chance of meeting that condition is vanishingly small.

The situation in the shipyards is stark. The industry laid down only one SSN in 2021. It delivered none from April 2020 to May 2022. The USN has requested funding for only one Virginia in fiscal year 2025, breaking the two-a-year drumbeat, ‘due to limits on Navy’s budget topline and the growing Virginia class production backlog’.

As of January 2025, five of 10 Block IV Virginias ordered are in the yards, as are five of 12 Block Vs for which acquisition has been announced. (Work has not begun on the other seven Block Vs.)

The building time from laying down until delivery has increased from between 3 and 3.5 years before the pandemic to more than 5 years. The tempo is still slowing: the next Virginia, USS Iowa, is due to be delivered on 5 April 2025, 5.8 years after it was laid down.

On the original, pre-pandemic schedule, all the Block IVs could probably have been delivered to the USN by now. This is a gap that cannot be recovered in a few years, despite all the expensive manpower training and retention programs in hand.

Exacerbating the problem for the yards, the Block V submarines are 30 percent larger, and more complex to build, making a return to shorter build times unlikely. Speaking to their shareholders in October, the chief executives of Huntington Ingalls and General Dynamics blamed their slowing delivery tempo on supply chain and workforce issues. HII says it is renegotiating contracts for 17 Block IV and Block V Virginias.

Furthermore, Electric Boat has diverted its most experienced workers to avoid further slippage in building the first two ballistic missile submarines of the Columbia class, the USN’s highest priority shipbuilding program, in which the Newport News yard also participates.

It gets worse. Many USN SSNs that have joined the US fleet over the past few decades are unavailable for service, awaiting maintenance. The pandemic similarly disrupted shipyards that maintain the SSNs of the Los Angeles and Virginia classes. In September 2022, 18 of the 50 SSNs in commission were awaiting maintenance. The Congressional Budget Office reports lack of spending on spare parts is also forcing cannibalisation and impacting the availability of Virginia class SSNs.

Australia’s SSN plan must worsen the US’s challenge in recovering from this situation, adding to the congestion in shipyards and further over loading supply chains already struggling to deliver SSNs to the USN.

A US decision not to sell SSNs to Australia is inevitable, and on current planning we will have no stopgap to cover withdrawal of our six diesel submarines of the Collins class, the oldest of which has already served for 28 years.

In the end, Australia’s unwise reliance on the US will have weakened the combined capability of the alliance. And Australia’s independent capacity for deterrence will be weakened, too.

As I wrote in December, it is time to look for another solution. One is ordering SSNs of the French Suffren class. The design is in production, with three of six planned boats delivered. It is optimised for anti-submarine warfare, with good anti-surface, land-strike, special-forces and mining capability. It is a smaller design, less capable than the Virginia, but should be cheaper and is a better fit for Australia’s requirements.

Importantly, it requires only half the crew of a Virginia, and we should be able to afford and crew the minimum viable force of 12 SSNs.

Let’s build on the good progress in training, industry and facility preparations for supporting US and British SSNs in Australia, all of which should continue, and find a way to add to the alliance’s overall submarine capability, not reduce it.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/virginia-we-have-a-problem/?
utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Weekly%20The%20Strategist&utm_content=Weekly%20The%20Strategist+CID_f69adb695b60f7c8eaf201183f0805da&utm_source=CampaignMonitor&utm_term=Virginia%20we%20have%20a%20problem
Peter Briggs is a retired submarine specialist and a past president of the Submarine Institute of Australia.

 

[BravoZulu]

Canberra, Feb 19 (Reuters) - Australia's military is being targeted by foreign intelligence over its AUKUS nuclear submarine partnership with the United States and Britain, and faces growing espionage and sabotage threats, Australia's spy chief said on Wednesday.
Warning of a deteriorating national security outlook, director general of security Mike Burgess said the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) had identified foreign services, including those friendly to Australia, targeting AUKUS to determine its capabilities, learn how Australia intends to use the submarines, and undermine the confidence of its allies.

"Multiple countries are relentlessly seeking information about our military capabilities. Defence personnel are being targeted in person and online," he said in an annual threat assessment speech at ASIO headquarters.
"Some were recently given gifts by international counterparts. The presents contained concealed surveillance devices," he said, without naming the countries involved.
ASIO forecast foreign interference efforts would try to undermine support for AUKUS and engage in potential sabotage if regional tensions escalate.

Australia's security environment will degrade over the next five years, he said, borrowing from the popular Hollywood film to summarise the multiple risks as "everything, everywhere, all at once".
"ASIO assesses authoritarian regimes are growing more willing to disrupt or destroy critical infrastructure to impede decision-making, damage war-fighting capabilities and sow social discord," he said.
Cyber sabotage was a particular threat, he said.
"Cyber units from at least one nation state routinely try to explore and exploit Australia’s critical infrastructure networks, almost certainly mapping systems so they can lay down malware or maintain access in the future," he said.

In an apparent reference to Volt Typhoon, a Chinese hacking group named by the U.S. and Australia as infiltrating U.S. critical infrastructure in 2024, Burgess shed new light, saying "ASIO worked closely with our American counterpart to evict the hackers and shut down their global accesses, including nodes here in Australia".
Over the next five years foreign intelligence services will exploit artificial intelligence and deeper online pools of data, enabling disinformation and deepfakes - realistic, but fake, portrayals of people - and eroding trust in institutions, he said.
The national terrorism threat level was raised in 2024 to probable, with ASIO and police disrupting five plots last year, he said.
A growing new problem is extremists self-radicalising faster, with unique "choose your own adventure" belief systems, he said.

Most of the terror plots investigated involved mixed nationalist and racist ideologies, and minors, he said.
There had been an increase in anti-Semitic violent incidents in Australia and ASIO is concerned the targeting of the Jewish community has not eased.
Ahead of a national election, in which border security fears have traditionally been fanned by politicians, he said people-smuggling was unlikely to become a major threat.
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-...australia-intelligence-chief-says-2025-02-19/

 

[TheKiwi]

APSI really don't like the US build SSN idea do they. And seem very ready to recommend French builds. Hmmm....

 

[Jake84]

Good luck Aussies, you’ll need it against China…

 

[Hiryu2.0]

‘Vandals in the White House’ no longer reliable allies of Australia, former defence force chief says

Chris Barrie says it’s too soon to say whether we should end our Aukus partnership, but called Donald Trump in his second term ‘irrecoverable’

www.theguardian.com

 

[BravoZulu]

Since the announcement in September 2021 that Australia intended to acquire nuclear-powered submarines in partnership with Britain and the United States, the plan has received significant media attention, scepticism and criticism.

There are four major risks to the AUKUS national enterprise: the political will of all partners; delivery schedule; the cost of acquiring and sustaining the capability (including its impact on Australia’s broader Defence budget); and workforce challenges, both for uniformed personnel and within the submarine-building industry.

While these risks remain significant, the progress so far demonstrates a commitment to proactive mitigation. On the political front, the partnership demands considerable backing from Britain, the US and Australia amid global upheaval.

Yet despite changes in government across all three nations since AUKUS was first announced, the initiative has retained bipartisan support, a point reinforced by the US Congress supporting it through the passing of the National Defence Authorisation Act in December 2023, including the sale of three Virginia-class submarines to Australia.

The political will was further reinforced by the agreement of all three partners on the optimal pathway for Australia’s acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines within 18 months of its announcement and the signing of the trilateral AUKUS treaty in August last year, which came into effect in January.

Although the treaty was finalised before US President Donald Trump’s election, the new US administration has since shown strong support, with Secretary of State Marco Rubio calling AUKUS ‘something that I think you’re going to find very strong support for in this administration’ and a ‘blueprint’ for co-operation.

The new US secretary of defense stated in February that ‘the president is very aware, supportive of AUKUS, recognises the importance of the defence industrial base’.

Regarding the cost risk, while it is undeniably substantial, it is not orders of magnitude higher than the ill-fated conventional Attack-class submarine project. Senate estimates from October 2021 put that project’s acquisition and sustainment costs at almost $235 billion through to 2080.

In last year’s budget, the Australian government included money in the Defence allocation to cover the expected costs of acquiring nuclear-powered submarines over the next decade. While the overall defence budget remains a significant concern, this measure has been an important step in mitigating the cost risks of AUKUS.

Australia has been steadily increasing nuclear-submariner training in the US and Britain, and since mid-2024, shipbuilders from South Australia and Western Australia have been training on nuclear-powered submarines in Hawaii.

Whether these measures will prove sufficient remains to be seen, but it is a promising start.

Schedule risks remain a key concern, particularly for the phase two sale of three Virginia-class submarines set to begin in 2032. The Collins-class vessels are already beyond their intended service life, meaning the entire plan hinges on the Virginias arriving on time—or at least only slightly delayed.

The 2023 National Defence Authorisation Act, which lies at the heart of Malcolm Turnbull’s concerns, mandates that in 2031—270 days before the sale of the first Virginia-class submarine—the US president certifies that certain conditions are met. Notably, the transfer of the submarines will not degrade US undersea capabilities.

As Turnbull correctly notes, the US submarine industrial base is already struggling to meet its planned production rate of two Virginia-class submarines per year and is unlikely to reach its goal of 66 attack submarines by 2054.

However, this does not mean that the US president in 2031 would seek to undermine Australia’s submarine program by refusing to sell three submarines. Undersea warfare effectiveness hinges on more than raw submarine numbers; it depends on having the right submarines in the right place at the right time.

This is where access to Australia’s western naval base, HMAS Stirling—and the maintenance facilities it will provide for US nuclear submarines—becomes crucial. It will help ensure US submarines can be deployed effectively when and where they are needed.

Australia’s broader contributions, including the continued support of the Harold E. Holt Communications Station north of Exmouth, further bolster US undersea warfare capabilities by facilitating secure communications with nuclear-powered submarines in the region.

It is imperative for Australia to make clear to the US just how vital submarines are to our national security, and to emphasise that the extensive support we provide, including access to Australia’s strategically important geography, is part of the deal. This is especially important given the more transactional nature of the current US administration and alliance framework.

In response to Turnbull’s call for an ‘urgent assessment’, the answer is that Australia’s plan to acquire nuclear-powered submarines remains on track.

Yes, it carries significant risks—as any major national endeavour does—but the challenges have been identified, and mitigation measures are in place. The progress made over the last three and a half years is substantial. Rather than repeatedly reassessing the program, we should concentrate our political and intellectual capital on ensuring it stays the course.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a...uiring nuclear-powered submarines is on track

 

[BravoZulu]

Britain once risked a reputation as the weak link in the trilateral AUKUS partnership. But now the appointment of an empowered senior official to drive the project forward and a new burst of British parliamentary engagement reveal an ambitious new posture.

This demonstration of seriousness and dynamism strengthens London’s legitimacy to secure a new era for AUKUS during the administration of US President Donald Trump.

While AUKUS addresses Australia’s existential need to acquire vital nuclear submarine technology and supports the United States’ central mission of strategic competition with China, Britain has at times struggled to craft a narrative that has secured genuine political purchase.

On one level, the British government’s previous lack of focus on AUKUS has been understandable. For the past three years, Britain has been consumed with the vital task of leading European support for Ukraine’s defence. The startling build-up of Russian troops along the Ukrainian border immediately followed the AUKUS announcement in September 2021. In the past few months, the fragility and urgency of the situation in Ukraine has necessarily forged a war-room focus on the Russian menace.

But it is hard not to feel that the fundamental issue has been that the AUKUS project has often been regarded in the British government not as an opportunity to be seized but as an allied responsibility needing to be serviced. This has sorely short-changed the national interest.

Advanced technology and innovation are central to Britain’s economic growth agenda. On this basis alone, AUKUS should be considered a national priority, as its second pillar provides the opportunity to accelerate cooperation in vital new frontiers of competition. And, while the origins of AUKUS lie in solving an Indo-Pacific problem, the capabilities it will produce are interoperable with NATO and can be deployed in Britain’s primary Euro-Atlantic security theatre.

The good news is that the winds are finally changing. Two recent announcements may shift Britain into the most active posture of the three partners.

The first is the confirmation that Sir Stephen Lovegrove has been appointed as Britain’s special representative for AUKUS. This new position will give him responsibility to drive the project forward and the authority to act as the nation’s point person for allies. Lovegrove served as the prime minister’s national security adviser during the conception of AUKUS and last year completed a landmark review into the project’s future. The review confronted past failures of governance, process and capacity and aimed to galvanise the British system to drive a new era of delivery based on a more focused set of priorities.

The second is the launch by the House of Commons Defence Select Committee of a new AUKUS inquiry, a substantive investigation into the government’s handling of the pact and the wider geopolitical context in which it is being advanced. The expansive scope and timeframe of this inquiry will enable it to serve as a mechanism of scrutiny and accountability for the government’s implementation of the AUKUS review. It will also deepen Parliament’s engagement with AUKUS, an area where Britain had previously lagged behind its American and Australian partners.

Both developments considerably enhance Britain’s stake in AUKUS and strengthen the government’s hand in its representations to the US.

There has been much anxiety as to whether Trump will remain committed to AUKUS. It is plainly unwise to assert that any project or alliance remains a sure bet in the current environment. However, there are early indications that suggest its survival, and even hint that it could be advanced with greater urgency due to the current administration’s laser focus on China and technological competition.

The Trump administration is still appointing its key AUKUS personnel. Britain and Australia will need to strike a delicate balance in highlighting the importance of the pact without drawing undue attention to its challenges. The most effective approach will be to offer a reset, to secure buy-in for its objectives through stronger alignment with the narratives and priorities of the new administration.

The revolutionary zeal of the Trump ecosystem presents opportunities to inject new energy and pace into AUKUS, in ways that would benefit all three partners. In particular, there is a chance to recognise that the current bureaucratic structures have not facilitated the delivery that deterrence demands and that the project must be recast to meet the spirit of its original intent.

Britain’s new AUKUS personnel, architecture and accountability mechanisms afford it the legitimacy to make this case in Washington. With its federal election coming in a few weeks, Australia should consider how to use the fresh start of a new political term to match Britain’s dynamism and demonstrate alignment with the pact’s strategic mission.

It is a sobering reality that AUKUS may well be one of the only meaningful allied co-creation projects, if not the only one, that secures the early commitment of the Trump administration. Britain and Australia must rise to meet this opportunity with the agility and ruthlessness this new era demands.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/b...&utm_term=Britain recasts AUKUS for a new era