- Joined
- Feb 29, 2004
- Messages
- 1,625
- Points
- 248
1966 McNamara claims that war is progressing satisfactorily
Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara declares at a news conference in Saigon that he found that military operations have "progressed very satisfactorily since 1965."
McNamara had arrived in Saigon on October 11 for his eighth fact-finding visit to South Vietnam. He conferred with General William Westmoreland, the senior U.S. military commander; Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge; various military leaders; and South Vietnam's Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and President Nguyen Van Thieu. McNamara said he was pleased with the overall progress in South Vietnam, but he later revealed to President Lyndon Johnson in private that he thought progress was "very slow indeed" in the pacification program.
McNamara wrote after the war that he realized early on "the complexity of the situation and the uncertainties of our ability to deal with it by military means." Though he did understand the obstacles, he was dedicated to the U.S. commitment to preventing Communist takeover of South Vietnam. By the end of 1965, however, even McNamara had begun to doubt that a military solution in Southeast Asia could be achieved. Still, as late as July 1967, he told President Johnson that the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces were making headway in the war. Johnson tired of McNamara's vacillation and eventually replaced him with Clark Clifford in February 1968.
1970 Sir Robert Thompson advises President Nixon
In a report prepared at the request of President Nixon, counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson explains that smashing the Viet Cong is a prerequisite for solving the political troubles of South Vietnam. After a five-week secret mission to Saigon in September and early October at the request of the president, Thompson reported that U.S. and Allied intelligence and police efforts had failed to destroy the Communist subversive apparatus in South Vietnam. His report concluded that success in other areas of pacification could not solve the basic political problems of South Vietnam after the withdrawal of the bulk of U.S. forces as long as the Viet Cong apparatus remained virtually intact.
Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara declares at a news conference in Saigon that he found that military operations have "progressed very satisfactorily since 1965."
McNamara had arrived in Saigon on October 11 for his eighth fact-finding visit to South Vietnam. He conferred with General William Westmoreland, the senior U.S. military commander; Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge; various military leaders; and South Vietnam's Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and President Nguyen Van Thieu. McNamara said he was pleased with the overall progress in South Vietnam, but he later revealed to President Lyndon Johnson in private that he thought progress was "very slow indeed" in the pacification program.
McNamara wrote after the war that he realized early on "the complexity of the situation and the uncertainties of our ability to deal with it by military means." Though he did understand the obstacles, he was dedicated to the U.S. commitment to preventing Communist takeover of South Vietnam. By the end of 1965, however, even McNamara had begun to doubt that a military solution in Southeast Asia could be achieved. Still, as late as July 1967, he told President Johnson that the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces were making headway in the war. Johnson tired of McNamara's vacillation and eventually replaced him with Clark Clifford in February 1968.
1970 Sir Robert Thompson advises President Nixon
In a report prepared at the request of President Nixon, counterinsurgency expert Sir Robert Thompson explains that smashing the Viet Cong is a prerequisite for solving the political troubles of South Vietnam. After a five-week secret mission to Saigon in September and early October at the request of the president, Thompson reported that U.S. and Allied intelligence and police efforts had failed to destroy the Communist subversive apparatus in South Vietnam. His report concluded that success in other areas of pacification could not solve the basic political problems of South Vietnam after the withdrawal of the bulk of U.S. forces as long as the Viet Cong apparatus remained virtually intact.
