Politics Srebrenica massacre: Dutch troops '10% liable' for Srebrenica deaths

i would say 50% they were gutless cowards they knew what was going to happen, it had happened several times before by ALL sides in the conflict/war ... in saying that the Dutch are not renowned for there fighting prowess
 
Distribution of liability for that awful event ? Speak about a can of worm
Liabilities are distributed among bosnian serbs (obviously), Milosevic circle, muslim bosnians, UNPROFOR chain of command, nationals chain of command, politicians from the west and east and a bunch of big to small fishes. The percentage doesn't seem so important to me, everybody had his hands dirty one way or another in that event (and in the Yugoslav civil war for a broader perspective)
 
in saying that the Dutch are not renowned for there fighting prowess

There are a few people here that would dispute that from first hand experience. Me for one.

everybody had his hands dirty one way or another in that event (and in the Yugoslav civil war for a broader perspective)

ain't that the truth :(
 
Countless Croats war criminals including the one General who swallowed poison in court not so long ago.

Countless Bosniak war criminals including Naser Oric who butchered dozen of Serbs civilians and now walk free.

Countless Kosovar war criminals...

And the Serbs... where do you even start? Radic, Karadzic, Arkan, and their Führer Slobodan Milosevic.

So aye. Pretty much a f*cked up war on every sides.
 
i would say 50% they were gutless cowards they knew what was going to happen, it had happened several times before by ALL sides in the conflict/war ... in saying that the Dutch are not renowned for there fighting prowess
Don't be a dick. The Dutch produced formidable soldiers in WW2 and their colonial wars, but also in more recent conflicts such as the Afghanistan War. Secondly, there is no such thing as a fighter's gene. There's only men who were raised to be men, and those who weren't. Both sorts are spread in equal measure, and what makes you think otherwise is information bias. Just remember that stastically speaking, for every Nepalese becoming a Gurkha there's another who's clinically obese.

Also, I'd really like to hear what those Dutch peacekeepers had been supposed to do instead.

They'd been shoved into an utterly untenable situation. They were severely constrained by unrealistic rules of engagement; Russia's UN envoy had seen to it that foreign troops could not interfere with Serbian interests in the region. They didn't have the equipment needed to withstand a siege, they were outnumbered, their own chain of command merely waited for the problem to go away, and to make matters worse, they'd have risked prosecution should they've shown any sign of individual initiative.

Go ahead, tell me you would've had volunteered to die fighting in a useless bid to protect complete and utter strangers threatened by a conflict that doesn't even make sense.

The only representatives of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to blame were the members of government at that time, who for some reason or another failed to realize they'd thrusted soldiers with their hands tied behind their backs into a seething cauldron of ancient hatred. They (as well as all other contributing nations) should've had either pushed for a stronger mandate or remained on the sidelines to begin with; the result would've had amounted to the same catastrophe.
 
I don't really see what they hope to achieve by laying part of the blame on the Dutch troops in this particular situation .


Only a year before the situation above took place which to me showed a lack of situational awareness on the UN s part and probably weighed in the troops mind when making their decision . Did the UN have recources to support them effectively , or were they slung in there on a whim with the hope that as soon as everyone saw the UN flag they d lay down their arms and start handing out flowers . I'd guess at the latter .
 
On the Balkans, it was Moscow who vetoed against resolute rules of engagement. Paris had done the same with regards to Rwanda. Both these governments did not want their local allies deprived of power, and they had economical interests to whose benefit they were ready to play with fire.

There is not "the UN"; the agenda of "the UN" is suggested by the respective majority of its members and either furthered or dead-tracked by the Security Council's veto powers.

In the Central African Republic, Blue Helmets have been showing what they're capable of as of late. They need to be given the leeway to step in, though.
 
On the Balkans, it was Moscow who vetoed against resolute rules of engagement. Paris had done the same with regards to Rwanda. Both these governments did not want their local allies deprived of power, and they had economical interests to whose benefit they were ready to play with fire.

There is not "the UN"; the agenda of "the UN" is suggested by the respective majority of its members and either furthered or dead-tracked by the Security Council's veto powers.

In the Central African Republic, Blue Helmets have been showing what they're capable of as of late. They need to be given the leeway to step in, though.
Well, well
It is more complicated than that. Moscow didnt did S**t in the Balkans until a certain flare of glory on a Kosovo airport and that's pretty all because Moscow was falling in rubbles politicaly and economicaly back then. The blame lies in the influence conflict between France,Germany and UK regarding their former historical allies, the fact that UN was not ready anymore for a kinetic action (contrary to Congo 50s), the fact that western politicians swallowed the 0 casualties concept post GW1 and the fact that there were no good guys on the ground.
Rwanda, it s another topic but nobody wanted to go there and it is more the US gov who hindered UN actions to support Kagamé (thats why after asking UN intervention had to send unilateraly soldiers)

Issue with UN is it is a chessboard for powers,not an independant from national policies tool.
 
I like how the blame game goes to the peacekeeping soldiers on the ground and not all the way up the military and political chain of command.
And why do they have only 10% of the blame, why not 12%, 17% or 23%, at the end of the day it matters the same, bunch of dudes got shafted while under "UN protection".

Situation on the ground was FUBAR, Dutch blue helmets were thrown there with shitty ROEs written by somebody who believed that the real world goes like Disney movies. Anybody with 2 braincells, and a basic notion of Balcan history would have known that once the war started, situation would rapidly go down the drain African-Genocidal-tribal-war-style. Whats even worst, every army on the ground knew it, and the whole UN deployment was just a joke.
Jeeeeezzzz… It was merely 40-50 years back in time, the whole gruesome Yugoslavia partisan and antipartisan war during WW2. It was those very same guys parents and grandparents the ones chopping each others heads with Woodsaws or slitting each others throats after long hours of torture tied to a tree. Or any other gruesome/vicious death you can think about going from genital mutilation, forced poison feeding, to alive burial.

Basically Dutch peacekeepers were there like the rest of blue helmets back in the day, to witness the gore movie and became target practise for anybody wanting to lob a mortar or shot an RPG at them.
Better not to send soldiers to war with their hands tied to their backs. Political correctness BS. At the end the massacres were the same and the soldiers were powerless to do anything, because of spineless political leaders that didnt want to take the PR hit of giving a finger to UN while keeping the troops at home because the ROEs where fvcking useless.
 
It is more complicated than that. Moscow didnt did S**t in the Balkans until a certain flare of glory on a Kosovo airport and that's pretty all because Moscow was falling in rubbles politicaly and economicaly back then.

I was referring to the UNSC resolution that'd established the toothless tiger that was UNPROFOR, and to the resolutions pertaining to the Srebrenica humanitarian zone (824 ff.) in particular. It's a well documented fact the Russian envoy had threatened to veto the motion if the SC wished to allow Dutchbat to enforce the peace. To that end, no UN contingent was allowed to move heavy weapons into the humanitarian zone. This charade went so far some vehicles indispensable to the Dutch effort had to have their weapon stations removed.

Hence I ask: What could those Dutch soldiers have had done differently? They were only allowed to use the force of arms if shot upon. Had they tried to contain the Serbs by force, they would've had 1. committed a war crime themselves (F***ed up though this might sound) and 2. given the Serbs a formidable excuse to attack them (and possibly UNPROFOR in its entirety). Considering how machine guns were the "heaviest" weapon in the Dutch arsenal widely available against the Serbs' T-72s and BM-21s, they surely would've had been overwhelmed.

I don't think the Serbs would've had sought to wipe them out, but many blue helmets would've had died and those taken prisoner – in conjunction with Russia's backing in the UNSC – would've had been used as a bargaining chip to keep the international response to a minimum. In my opinion, under the historic circumstances it's as good as a fact those Bosnians were doomed to die regardless of the Dutch soldiers' actions.
 
I wonder how this situation with DufchBat fits in with Warren v, District of Columbia?

It’s a famous US Supreme Court case where law enforcement were shown to have no specify duty to protect the public.

Different case law perhaps, but perhaps still has relevancy.

But regardless of legality, morality will probably have more lasting effects.

PTSD and moral injury comparison study between DutchBat and NordBat is worthy of consideration.

If I had to guess, I’d bet that NordBat suffered statistically relevant lower levels of PTSD/moral injury than DutchBat.

As an outsider, I think DutchBat represents the exceptionally high long term unmeasured cost of INaction and optics rather than action.

If a nation is going to deploy forces, send them with a chance to “win” and effectively executive their mission.


What would have happened if NordBat with its aggressive mission command interpretation and disregard for political orders were in place instead of DurchBat at Srebrenica?

If the Swedish NordBat platoon that protected 3 muslim nurses from a Croat battalion is any indication, there may have been a different result.

While an epic stand of good against genocidal evil is the kind of speculative engagement all good soldiers yearn for, I think the real learning is in comparing the long term psychological effects experienced by DutchBat and NordBat.

Discussion around all future deployments should incorporate a litmus test to ensure they are not effectively damned for eternity like DutchBat before they even deploy.

Just my 0.02c.
 
Parallels with the Bravo Company 2RAR Platoon caught in the middle of the Kibeho massacre in Rwanda. Having worked with a lot of those guys in subsequent years there was fairly widespread PTSD. They were outgunned, out manned and armed with a shitty ROE, that probably ultimately saved them, however helpless it made them feel at the time.
 
I was referring to the UNSC resolution that'd established the toothless tiger that was UNPROFOR, and to the resolutions pertaining to the Srebrenica humanitarian zone (824 ff.) in particular. It's a well documented fact the Russian envoy had threatened to veto the motion if the SC wished to allow Dutchbat to enforce the peace. To that end, no UN contingent was allowed to move heavy weapons into the humanitarian zone. This charade went so far some vehicles indispensable to the Dutch effort had to have their weapon stations removed.

Hence I ask: What could those Dutch soldiers have had done differently? They were only allowed to use the force of arms if shot upon. Had they tried to contain the Serbs by force, they would've had 1. committed a war crime themselves (F***ed up though this might sound) and 2. given the Serbs a formidable excuse to attack them (and possibly UNPROFOR in its entirety). Considering how machine guns were the "heaviest" weapon in the Dutch arsenal widely available against the Serbs' T-72s and BM-21s, they surely would've had been overwhelmed.

I don't think the Serbs would've had sought to wipe them out, but many blue helmets would've had died and those taken prisoner – in conjunction with Russia's backing in the UNSC – would've had been used as a bargaining chip to keep the international response to a minimum. In my opinion, under the historic circumstances it's as good as a fact those Bosnians were doomed to die regardless of the Dutch soldiers' actions.
I see what you are saying and i agree with you. The main issue however is that the russians insisted that Srebrenica enclave stayed a neutral haven (since the first UN stunt with general Morillon) and that blue helmets were only here to watch the implementation of that agreement between serbs and muslims. The enclave was supposed to be weapon free/military free zone as per the agreement IIRC. That didnt stopped ArBiH to organize operations from the enclave toward serbian bordering villages (not stopped by blue helmets) and in retaliation bosnoserb forces to resume their offensive there (not stopped either by blue helmets).
RoE cleary said observe, not intervene. That was the case on the various frontlines (and costed us more than 80 soldiers).
But even without heavy equipment on the ground, varipus Xbat were not toothless (they could call airsupport)
The issue was the chain of command, the UNPROFOR one and beyond that each bat national chain of command.
 
I wonder how this situation with DufchBat fits in with Warren v, District of Columbia?
It’s a famous US Supreme Court case where law enforcement were shown to have no specify duty to protect the public.

It's a highly complicated matter.

Civil Law (a variant of which is used in the Netherlands and most of continental Europe) does know a so called "everyman's duty" to intervene against clear and present threats to a legally protected good (such as human life).

The degree to which that duty lies on a person depends on their personal abilities and the circumstances of the case. For example, the law does not expect of a non-swimmer to try and save a drowning person. It might expect of a decent swimmer to try and save a drowning person, unless they're excused by an important reason (textbook example: a child in their care cannot be left alone). But it does demand that, say, a trained lifeguard or swimming champion goes into that water, simply because of their skillset.

Failure to comply could constitute the offence of denial of assistance; and, under extreme circumstances, even the felony of murder through passivity.

Accordingly, the question of liability in the present case hinges on whether or not Dutchbat had a reasonable and reasonably obvious chance of repelling the Serbs.

It remains a fact those soldiers had been ordered not to intervene, though. Disobedience is a criminal offence. Generally speaking, under Civil Law philosophy one law may not expect of you that you violate another. There is however the dilemma clause; much like one's allowed to break the law in order to defend oneself, one is also excused with regards to any offence the commission of which is necessary to avert the aforesaid threat.

In a nutshell this means that if Dutchbat had a reasonable chance of averting the massacre regardless of orders, and if their commander had to be aware of this, then and only then would the duty to intervene have had been upon their shoulders.

Curiously enough, even the recent court ruling seems not to have been able to give a definite answer. I think there is none.
 
It's a highly complicated matter.

Civil Law (a variant of which is used in the Netherlands and most of continental Europe) does know a so called "everyman's duty" to intervene against clear and present threats to a legally protected good (such as human life).

The degree to which that duty lies on a person depends on their personal abilities and the circumstances of the case. For example, the law does not expect of a non-swimmer to try and save a drowning person. It might expect of a decent swimmer to try and save a drowning person, unless they're excused by an important reason (textbook example: a child in their care cannot be left alone). But it does demand that, say, a trained lifeguard or swimming champion goes into that water, simply because of their skillset.

Failure to comply could constitute the offence of denial of assistance; and, under extreme circumstances, even the felony of murder through passivity.

Accordingly, the question of liability in the present case hinges on whether or not Dutchbat had a reasonable and reasonably obvious chance of repelling the Serbs.

It remains a fact those soldiers had been ordered not to intervene, though. Disobedience is a criminal offence. Generally speaking, under Civil Law philosophy one law may not expect of you that you violate another. There is however the dilemma clause; much like one's allowed to break the law in order to defend oneself, one is also excused with regards to any offence the commission of which is necessary to avert the aforesaid threat.

In a nutshell this means that if Dutchbat had a reasonable chance of averting the massacre regardless of orders, and if their commander had to be aware of this, then and only then would the duty to intervene have had been upon their shoulders.

Curiously enough, even the recent court ruling seems not to have been able to give a definite answer. I think there is none.

Good post.

I agree that there seems to be no definitive answer......beyond ensuring that if a government deploys forces they have a moral and ethical duty to equip and support them to achieve a clearly defined mission.

Otherwise, don't even think about going.

I am absolutely fascinated by what I perceive as a bifurcation between DutchBat and NordBat.

I'm wondering what it must have been like on the ground with both the DutchBat at Srebrenica and the NordBat platoon that protected the 3 nurses.

Mission Command combined with doing the right thing can be a powerful force to effectively counter the more sickening facets of inaction, optics, and realpolitik.

True mission command removes much of the political interference risk at the tactical level by giving permission to break rules and disobey orders as long as you achieve mission success.

To me the greatest lessons in this are for politicians.
 
I am absolutely fascinated by what I perceive as a bifurcation between DutchBat and NordBat.

I'm wondering what it must have been like on the ground with both the DutchBat at Srebrenica and the NordBat platoon that protected the 3 nurses.

NordBat, BritBat 1 (less so BritBat 2) and some of the FreBats (in my experience) generally used their ROE to engage the warring factions when they could. That is partly down to culture and mission command but in my experience (two UNPROFOR tours) far more down to the fact that they had a lot of patrol/mobile tasks where they could deliberately place themselves in the field of fire forcing whichever faction it was they were dealing with to either disengage or risk engaging with them. They also (generally) had much better armour (Warrior, up-armoured M113, Leopard etc) than the other units operating in wheeled APCs and soft skins.

The Dutch get much of the blame for Srebrenica but what is usually forgotten is that their FAC/JTAC (and most of their secure comms) was provided by UKSF. They repeatedly called for strikes but were told "Weapons Tight" because the Serbs were not directly threatening UNPROFOR and then ordered to exfiltrate before the enclave fell, leaving the Dutch well and truly in the lurch.
 
Also, let us not forget the Serbs had taken what can only be described as hostages. They'd already isolated about 200 Dutch soldiers from their battalion at Srebrenica, an aspect that I'd neglected above. During the buildup to the massacre, a single attack had been flown on an advancing column – an action that was met with the implicit threat to let harm come to the interned blue helmets. Considering this, I should think that the Dutch commander might've been justified in his actions that served to preserve the welfare of his interned troops.

Militarily speaking, this entire situation would've had required a harsh response not unlike the air war of 1999. But without the body bags to justify it, any unilateral action could've had easily led to a nasty confrontation with one Boris Yeltsin, who at the time was all too eager to distract his people from their economic malaise. Only after the massacre were the Russians in no position to muster more than a token resistance against NATO's air strikes of 1995.

The sad truth is that the governments involved in UNPROFOR, still reeling from the nasty images that failed interventions such as in Somalia had produced, were most willing to go the path of least resistance and watch how things would pan out.
 
Parallels with the Bravo Company 2RAR Platoon caught in the middle of the Kibeho massacre in Rwanda. Having worked with a lot of those guys in subsequent years there was fairly widespread PTSD. They were outgunned, out manned and armed with a shitty ROE, that probably ultimately saved them, however helpless it made them feel at the time.

Speak of the devil. The Australian government just announced late last week that A Coy 2/4RAR and B Coy 2RAR have been awarded the Meritorious Unit Citation for their time in Rwanda.
 

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