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"Sure - I can drive between those mines!"
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What i ask myself, how could it "stay" 39 seconds in polish airspace, and get only 1km in it... i dont realy know how fast this things are, but anyways in 39 seconds, such a part can certainly cover more than 1 km...
You have a very detailed explanation posted by a Polish military journalist (translated by google):
WHY ARE WE NOT SHOOTING RUSSIAN MISSILES?
This question is asked in the public space every time Russian missiles violate our airspace, shortening their path while flying towards targets in western Ukraine.
There are four main reasons. From the most important to the least important.

1. When shooting at something in Polish airspace, a large part of it would have to be de facto closed.
How would this affect civilian domestic and international air traffic? For the economy? For emergency services? We have 66 registered civil airports in Poland. How many should be temporarily closed? What's more than Szymanów, Lublin, Rzeszów? How many more people would die if LPR could not fly over eastern voivodeships? It's not like rocket men and pilots can shoot each other like in the movies. The airspace must be closed to avoid tragic mistakes. Let's leave the downing of passenger planes to the Russians and Iranians.

2. Falling debris from an air-to-air/ground-to-air rocket or missile can kill someone.
This may sound strange at first, but this is the main reason - the Ch-101 missile flying into and out of our airspace may be something that offends the national ego (go ahead!), but unless such a failure occurs, it does not constitute a serious threat. Shooting it, e.g. from an F-16, will result in, firstly, a half-ton warhead and missile debris falling somewhere, and secondly, it is not certain that every AiM-9 or AiM-120 will be hit - they will also fall somewhere. Contrary to appearances, this is a significant factor that poses a threat to civilians on the ground. Both in Poland and in Ukraine. And Wires is not an argument here - the fact that UA rocket(s) fell does not mean that we should do the same.

3. Not revealing cards.
I wrote about it previously: the operating modes of both air defence and F-16 radars are two different things in peacetime and wartime. Russians and Belarusians would undoubtedly be very happy if they could collect emissions from radar and missile operating modes that have never been emitted so close to their border. This would make it much easier for them to find some countermeasures to reduce their effectiveness. The NATO-Russia frequency war, a form of cat-and-mouse game, continues all the time. The winner is the one who keeps his nerves under control and keeps certain emissions undiscovered until the war. In this field, the Russians completely lost because of Ukraine, broadcasting everything they have the best in every possible mode. NATO partially revealed the cards (Patriot sets with MPQ-65, IRIST-T SLM, SAMP-T MAMBA, NASAMS, ASPIDE were delivered), but most of the emissions are still a mystery to RUS. It would be foolish to reduce the chances of successfully overcoming the RUS jamming caused by the Wisła and Narew or F-16 radars just because, for ambition and image reasons, someone ordered the downing of a Ch-101 that was in the border zone of our airspace for less than a minute.

4. There is no anti-aircraft defense that covers 100% of the country.
Even Israel is not capable of this. It is always difficult to choose objects to cover and objects that will not be defended. Military airports, command centres, the largest population centres in the country, the most important Critical Infrastructure (mainly energy), areas of military mobilization, etc. These are the facilities that will be protected. So if a Ch-101 got lost and was flying towards Warsaw or Rzeszów, it would probably be shot down. But there are no and there will be no funds - sorry for the expression - wasted on protecting the border just to prove that "there is no luck in my sky!" This is military nonsense and a waste of resources and something that only politicians could come up with. Not the military, for whom the hypothetical protection of key facilities of the Polish Armed Forces and CI is already a nightmare that cannot be solved without the help of NATO aviation.
Why? Since we are just rebuilding the anti-aircraft defence after over two decades of neglect, apart from its lowest level (where we are doing very well), its condition is very bad, both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the Narew bridge and the first Patriot are still a drop in the ocean of needs. It will start to be "tolerable" around 2028-2030 and quite good around 2035. Until then, "in NATO we trust" and especially in AWCS and forward air components with fighter planes and the USA, France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Spain, etc. This is a very large force that cannot be seen in Ukraine at present and a great multiplier of the effectiveness of air defence. And this force is there and watches over the Polish sky (especially in Bydgoszcz). But again - this does not change the fact that the entire territory of Poland will never be protected because it is not militarily feasible (even a fighter plane (no WSB) must detect the target and move into positions to intercept - which takes time and... space) and secondly - it does not make sense.
I would like to emphasize that reasons 1 and 2 are the most important.
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The crew of the Russian anti-tank grenade launcher SPG-9M "Spear" spoke about their combat work in Ukraine. The effective firing range of the SPG-9 grenade launcher against armored targets is up to 1300 meters, against infantry with fragmentation ammunition - up to 4.5 km.

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At last, Putin finally just admitted this horrendous attack on the Moscow concert hall was that of radical jihadists.

Good bye the nonsense theory about some Ukraine proxies. This attack had Jihad written all over it, Ingushia, caucasians or not.
 
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Ukraine 'unleashes hell' on Putin's warship base as 18 missiles scream into Sevastopol



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