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- Apr 16, 2019
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But as a matter of proof,even the vaunted IDF has shown that it is easy to lose a culture of war for ground forces and it is time, money and energy consuming to recover it. So it is not so much a matter of culture rather than a matter of doctrine.
There is one army that is well rated, yet the soldiers and officers are arabs (I am speaking about Jordan). The difference with KSA idiots is that officers are not or less selected by nepotism, regular soldiers are not regarded as 3d tier citizens and the elite force of the kingdom is not a client tribe ala KSA National Guard.
To the former, I think it is a hybrid mix of culture and flexible doctrine that gets Israel thru it.
Programs like Talpiot are the new fighter pilot aspirations.
Agility(proactively/reactively responding to adveraries)
Velocity(speed of adapting to and disrupting adversaries)
Innovation(unfair advantage in people, processes, platforms)
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To the latter, I met a few higher speed Jordanians recently. They seemed ok at first pass, but their one minder was genuinely impressive.
An article was written a few years back at Small Wars Journal about forcing square Arab pegs into round US/UK/Soviet combined arms doctrinal holes, and how it rarely works.
For both former/latter, unconventional warfare is likely to be front and centre for the foreseeable future.
Israel needs to adapt more/faster to the unconventional fight since it is regionally unequalled in the conventional fight and it’s adversaries have largely given up any real possibility of a conventional fight.
Arab countries might benefit from shifting towards more of an unconventional/political warfare & population centric Hez/IRGC like org model backed by some conventional combined arms capability.
Who knows.