Mil News Australia, NZ, Oceania Military News

Australia will make its first major investment in sea mines since the Vietnam War, spending up to $1 billion on high-tech underwater weapons to deter China and other potential adversaries from sending ships and submarines into the nation’s waters.

The weapons have been used in virtually every maritime conflict since the 14th century, but fell out of favour with Western naval leaders in recent decades, including in Australia.
China has built up a stockpile of up to 100,000 sea mines as part of its massive military expansion.

Defence industry sources said the federal government would soon announce it had signed a contract to purchase a substantial number of sea mines from a European weapons supplier.

The Defence Department, sources said, intends to procure a sophisticated form of multi-influence ground mines that react to acoustic, magnetic and pressure influences of passing vessels.
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/fed...sea-mines-to-deter-china-20230119-p5ce1d.html
 
I am assuming that these mines will (among other things) be submarine deployable.
 
The Australian Defence Force’s standout radar-systems developer CEA Technologies will upgrade Australia’s EA-18G Growler to the most current US capabilities as part of the $6 billion Project AIR 5349 Phase 6 project.

The selection of the local firm to help perform the upgrades squares away the well-anticipated capability boost and reaffirms a broader focus on keeping Australia’s air power as sharp as possible as part of a wider quick readiness posture that allows cooperation with other airforces, particularly the US Air Force.

Currently approved funding for AIR 5349 Phase 6 sits at around $2 billion, with CEA’s cut coming in at $277 million.

Minister for defence industry Pat Conroy said the Albanese government was working closely with defence industry partners and that “Australian companies will be involved as much as possible throughout the life of this project.”

“I’m proud that this project will continue to develop Australia’s own CEA Technologies, a world-leading radar technology company.

“We are delivering leading-edge technology the RAAF needs to face an increasingly complex and uncertain strategic environment.”
1675925668019.webp
 
Collins-submarines-and-US-SSN-1024x611.webp

In March, the government is expected to announce its plans to implement the ambitious proposal for an Australian force of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) that is at the heart of the AUKUS agreement.

Any scheme for an Australian SSN force must meet several conditions if it is to be viable. The first is that it must include solutions to address the looming shortfall in Australia’s submarine capability that can’t be met in time by ab initio building the boats in Australia. It must then provide a practicable and cost-effective way ahead for long-term construction of SSNs that is effectively coordinated with one or both of our AUKUS partners. As is becoming increasingly clear, meeting the shorter-term capability requirement and developing a mature SSN construction line will require substantial efforts not only by Australia but also by at least the US and possibly the UK.

Australia’s commitment to SSNs has profound implications for the way in which the defence budget must be managed. The level of understanding of the full requirements for raising, training and sustaining an effective defence force has never been high in Australia, either within government or outside it. Apart from the frequency with which the full on-costs of major projects are deliberately underestimated to secure their political approval, there has long been a tendency to manage any pressure on the budget by reducing the funds allocated to sustainment, in particular, while allowing maintenance of defence facilities to be done on a shoestring. Both of these practices may well be happening now as the defence organisation struggles to find the money to meet the demands of a difficult international environment when the government has so many other priorities. Bad at the best of times, these tendencies are worse when there are serious prospects that Australian forces will be required at little notice to assert the national interest.

And if we have been poor at understanding the on-costs of our platforms, the irony is that we have been—and continue to be—even worse at estimating the true requirements for and the associated on-costs of people, whether in uniform or not, no matter whether they’re ‘poor bloody infantry’ or the most highly qualified engineers.

The point is that the operation of an SSN force and all that this involves, even after the submarines are in the water, for maintenance, base support, quality control and other technical governance will introduce a new factor—a commitment of human effort and of funds that is not only substantial but also non-reducible to an extent that even meeting the demands of air safety has provided no precedent in the Australian experience.

Concerns expressed over the potential intrusions into Australia’s ability to make sovereign decisions have been well meant, but have generally focused on the wrong target. It is not the operations of the submarines themselves that will be subject to any real loss of national autonomy in a mature system but the working of the governance regime for nuclear power. The US in particular will want to be satisfied that Australia fully meets whatever commitments it makes to nuclear-power standards and safety, and it will insist on inspection regimes which guarantee that. Such regimes will not only apply to the submarines, their power plants and their support infrastructure, but also include critical assessment of the management bureaucracy. It is not a subject much discussed, but it is difficult to avoid the impression that American concerns were a critical factor behind the reforms of the UK system that resulted in the setting up in 2016 of the UK Defence Nuclear Organisation as the focal point and sponsor of the UK’s defence nuclear enterprise.

All this requires not only that Australia commit itself consciously to the total bill for nuclear power but also that the implications for the defence effort as a whole be completely understood for what will be in practice an irrevocable and irreducible commitment.

Here, a fully thought-out SSN plan also needs to include a complete understanding of the opportunity costs involved and confirmation that SSNs are indeed the most effective capability that Australia can select to meet its strategic challenges.

That itself will call for a degree of sophistication which has rarely marked the national debate on defence policy, whether within government or outside it. The report of the defence strategic review to be presented to the government next month might help provide some of the answers, particularly for the shorter term and about the way the transition from conventional submarines to SSNs will be managed.

In some ways, we have been here before, though we made a mess of things each time. The grand ideas of AUKUS are in many ways no novelty to Australian strategic thinking. The problem is that the history of Australian defence policy is marked by a series of ambitious force structure plans that have failed to be fulfilled. As with the SSN project, the most important of these have been maritime focused, recognising Australia’s situation as an island continent that is dependent on the maintenance of supply flows and for which achieving a secure region is a much higher priority than defending actual territory. Either Australia has attempted to create a force of sufficient weight that it could make a substantial contribution to regional collective defence, as was the case in 1923 with the plan to create a force based on new cruisers and submarines, or there was an explicit effort to develop an independent capability for power projection, as was the case in 1947 with the creation of the Fleet Air Arm based on two aircraft carriers.

The 1923 example may have the louder resonance for the present day, given that’s when Australia’s plan to create a submarine flotilla emerged from an Imperial Conference. Six submarines were to be our contribution to the large submarine force permanently based in the Far East, serving as a standing deterrent and the ‘trip wire’ against any Japanese incursions into British possessions in Southeast Asia. But only two of the six boats ever materialised, and by 1931 they were given to the British because the Australian budget could no longer afford them.

However, for our SSN effort, if we don’t take care, there may be closer parallels with the 1947 carrier plan in what followed over the long term. The carrier program went ahead but was dogged from the outset by barely adequate funding and the difficulties of finding the additional resources to adapt to changing technology. For the next 33 years, the navy had the experience of trying to maintain a major capability, in this case fixed-wing seaborne aviation, when the nation was unwilling to provide the full funding for the capability actually required, whatever the rhetoric that accompanied the initial commitment. That the navy was able to achieve so much with its aircraft carriers and their air groups between 1949 and 1981 was remarkable, but there was a price. Not only did naval aviation itself struggle at times, but there can be no doubt that the remainder of our maritime forces suffered. The difference this century is that such ‘making do’ cannot be enough.

The lesson is obvious. If Australia is to embark on the SSN program, the bill in people, money and infrastructure must be understood and met from the first and in full.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/u...Understanding Australias submarine commitment
James Goldrick served as a rear admiral in the Royal Australian Navy and has published widely on naval issues.
 
Fiji:
328337042_575070567530935_7870974057908385778_n.webp

It’s been just over a month and a half since Fiji’s new coalition government, headed by former coup leader Sitiveni Rabuka, was sworn in to parliament. The December election was a tight race, as many had predicted, and Rabuka’s former party, the Social Democratic Liberal Party (SODELPA), was dubbed ‘kingmaker’ when its eventual support for Rabuka ended Frank Bainimarama’s 16-year premiership. Australia’s relationship with the new government appears to be positive, but we must ensure our support continues to be Fiji-focused regardless of who’s leading the country.

Rabuka and his coalition have hit the ground running, making sweeping changes that have caused a few tense moments. He is loosening a restrictive media act, and Fiji Broadcasting Corporation CEO Riyaz Sayed-Khaiyum (a brother of former attorney-general Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum) has been removed. The government has welcomed back exiled officials and is reviewing diplomatic appointments to ensure they represent the needs of the government. Rabuka has also set up the Mercy Commission, which was written into the 2013 constitution but never convened, to review the cases of those who have been incarcerated for a very long time. That process may lead to the release from prison of yet another coup instigator, George Speight.

Some are concerned that in moving so quickly the coalition may leave itself open to having its changes invalidated if the correct legal processes aren’t followed. Others believe that the new government is going too far too fast. The commander of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces, Major General Jone Kalouniwai, publicly outlined his concerns with the new government, citing his responsibility to do so given the military’s self-proclaimed role as ‘guardian’ under the Fijian constitution.

After 16 years of one government, there’s little cabinet experience in the coalition. Rabuka has admitted that some mistakes will be made—or, as Home Affairs Minister Pio Tikoduadua said after a damage-control meeting with Kalouniwai, ‘We are all learning.’ It was a moment of tension, but Rabuka and Tikoduadua settled the simmering pot before it boiled over. With many campaign promises still to be delivered, however, there could still be more sticking points to come.

As would be expected, the opposition—namely, Bainimarama and his right-hand man Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum—wasted no time in ridiculing the government’s every move. Bainimarama could seize power through a motion of no confidence, so Rabuka will have to ensure he keeps SODELPA onside after initially rewarding the party with key ministries and positions. But Bainimarama’s absence hasn’t necessarily left the gaping hole that it could have. In fact, Rabuka has returned to power relatively seamlessly after 23 years.

Rabuka also inherited the role of Pacific Islands Forum chair, at least until the position transitions to Cook Islands in March. The short timeframe means expectations on Rabuka to achieve much in the position were minimal. But he was quick to make a statement by travelling to Kiribati in January on his first overseas trip that he was intent on bringing it back to the fold. In what can only be deemed a major win for unity in the region, Rabuka came home successful in facilitating Kiribati’s presumptive return to the forum. His success demonstrates that Fiji will be no less influential in the region under Rabuka’s leadership than under Bainimarama’s, and perhaps even more so.

Looking further out in the region, last week Rabuka announced that he will terminate the memorandum of understanding between the Fiji Police Force and China’s Ministry of Public Security that has been in place since 2011. He explained that there was no need for the policing relationship to continue because the two countries’ ‘systems of democracy and justice systems are different’. In the meantime, both Rabuka and Tikoduadua have expressed a desire to deepen Fiji’s relationship with Australia, New Zealand and the US based on their having similar systems.

At the same time, police commissioner Sitiveni Qiliho was suspended from his role, as was the commissioner of corrections, Francis Kean. Both have strong ties to Bainimarama—Kean is the former PM’s brother-in-law—and questionable backgrounds to say the least. China’s policing assistance in the Pacific, which Qiliho was closely involved with for the past six years, has vastly more authoritarian characteristics than that of Australia or New Zealand. The decisions to remove the two commissioners and tear up the agreement with China were partly to demonstrate this change to a domestic audience and partly to send a clear signal to foreign partners about where Fiji’s values lie, and that aid and assistance must align with those values.

It’s a welcome statement for Australia and New Zealand, which are also seeking to highlight the values shared among all countries in the Pacific neighbourhood. In a joint visit to Fiji this week by the Australian and New Zealand defence chiefs, New Zealand’s CDF, Air Marshal Kevin Short, reiterated the importance of respecting Fiji’s values and ways of operating. Australia will now need to ensure that the new Fijian government is not left unable to fill any capability gaps that might arise in the Fiji Police Force.

Even though the policing agreement has been terminated, China is unlikely to turn away from Fiji. Instead, Beijing will probably continue to aggressively pursue friendship and look for other areas to deepen the relationship with the new government. Even Tikoduadua’s decision to meet with Taipei before Beijing won’t halt the Chinese Communist Party’s advances. Rabuka’s government will have to find a way to hold to its values without sacrificing a large economic partner.

Australia and other democratic partners should focus on supporting the coalition government in its efforts to strengthen Fiji both domestically and regionally. When Rabuka travelled to Kiribati, he flew on a Royal Australian Air Force plane, and the iconic kangaroo roundel featured in the background of some fantastic photo opportunities that had a wide reach across the region. Actions like this demonstrate that Canberra is interested in supporting the success of the region without needing to be at the forefront of issues.

As Rabuka’s coalition powers ahead, intent on moving past the policies of the previous government, there remains a risk of discontent if the population feels left behind. Australia must remain focused on supporting Fiji as a whole, and find a delicate balance between supporting the democratising instincts of the new government and not sullying the record of the previous prime minister, with whom we built a close partnership, and who might return.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/r...in Fiji require a delicate balance of support
 
GettyImages-1463562209.webp

It’s too soon to declare an end to China’s economic war against Australia, but the signs are all pointing in that direction, with the meeting between trade ministers of the two countries this week coinciding with the first shipments of Australian coal to China in two years.

What looks like a unilateral Chinese backdown is a remarkable development. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s government has made no visible change in policies affecting China, beyond a softening of the at times harsh rhetoric of its predecessor.

China was showing signs of wanting to resume a more normal relationship with Australia before the change of government last May. Australian National University researcher Benjamin Herscovitch highlights the December 2021 speech by Wang Xining, chargé d’affaires at the Chinese embassy, who declared: ‘There are so many common values that we share and present at this challenging juncture. I believe that there is no reason that Australian and Chinese people can’t be good friends.’

China has a very long history of using denial of access to its markets as a tool of economic coercion, going back to the early 20th century when there was an orchestrated boycott of American products to pressure the US to shift its then–racially based immigration policy.

In recent times, there have been numerous episodes of China closing its markets to particular nations over perceived grievances, ranging from Norwegian salmon following the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to imprisoned Chinese dissident Liu Xiabao to the blockages to French products after the 2008 Olympic torch relay was disrupted in Paris.

However, China’s campaign of economic coercion against Australia, launched in May 2020, went much further than its efforts against any other significant economy and included strikes against Australia’s exports of coal, copper, nickel, woodchips, wine, lobster, cotton, barley and beef. Commodities for which there was no feasible replacement, including iron ore, wool and liquefied natural gas, were exempted.

The only analogous, though much less fierce, campaign of Chinese economic warfare was conducted against South Korea in 2016–17, following the US’s installation of its THAAD missile-defence system. Both Seoul and Washington said the move was designed to defend South Korea against missile attack from North Korea; however, Beijing contended that the system’s reach, particularly its radar, extended to China.

Chinese tourism to Korea stopped overnight. The Korean supermarket chain Lotte had 70% of its outlets in China shut down, ostensibly over fire regulations. Hyundai’s car sales in China plummeted by two-thirds, Korean pop stars disappeared from Chinese TV and exports of some consumer goods were blocked.

The campaign lasted for about nine months. China’s decision to end it followed the 19th Chinese Communist Party congress, at which Xi Jinping was anointed leader for another five years, paving the way for him to hold office indefinitely.

It also followed Korea’s election of a more moderate leader in President Moon Jae-in, who had stressed the importance of good relations with China. The ice broken by a meeting of foreign ministers.

While the breakthrough with Australia may appear to follow this template, the huge difference is that the Korean and Chinese foreign ministers struck what China contends is a military agreement, which it renders as ‘the three nos’. The Moon government undertook not to expand the THAAD system, not to enter a missile-defence network with the US and not to enter any trilateral alliance with the US and Japan. It was a humiliating deal for Korea, and China withdrew its boycotts in return.

Korea, which last year decided to add to its missile defences, contends that there was no signed agreement and that the ‘three nos’ simply articulated the Moon government’s policy at that time. However, China believed it had a deal, and friction has intensified between the two countries over the past year as a result.

Any explanation of China’s about-face with Australia is necessarily speculative, but there are several possibilities.

The biggest strategic issue facing China is how to preserve the globalisation that has delivered it such gains over two decades in the face of the US’s increasing rejection of international trade architecture in favour of a more robust policy of containment of China.

China’s ‘coming out’ internationally, following the abandonment of its zero-Covid-19 policy, is consistent with this. Vice Premier Liu He’s speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos last month declared that for China, ‘opening up to the world is a must, not an expediency’, adding that China must oppose unilateralism and protectionism while strengthening international cooperation.

China’s application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership is designed to cement its economic relations through the Asia–Pacific, using a vehicle that the US designed but then, under Donald Trump’s administration, walked away from.

Starting negotiations to enter the CPTPP requires the assent of all parties. In 2021, Australia’s trade minister, Dan Tehan, explained that while Australia had no principled opposition to China’s admission, it would be impossible to commence negotiations without minister-to-minister dialogue. This was not a veto, he said. ‘These are ultimately decisions which always end up at the ministerial level. There’s never been a free trade agreement that’s purely been negotiated at an officials level.’

It hasn’t been stated publicly, but it wouldn’t be surprising if Australia has given China an indication that it will not block its application. It was striking that directly after his meeting with Xi at last year’s G20 summit in Bali, Albanese stumbled when asked about Taiwan’s application to join the CPTPP, saying that it was a trade agreement only between states, implying that Taiwan would be excluded. Albanese’s office swiftly corrected the record to make clear that the CPTPP is an agreement between economies and is open to Taiwan; however, the prime minister’s formulation reflected Chinese talking points.

So it’s likely that China’s CPTPP application has been discussed and Australia’s support for negotiations over China’s accession to at least begin may have been on the agenda at yesterday’s online meeting of Australian Trade Minister Don Farrell and Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao.

As US President Joe Biden’s administration intensifies its efforts to isolate China, Beijing’s campaign against Australia looks increasingly like an own goal, pushing Australia into closer alliance with the US, as evident in both AUKUS and the Quad arrangement, without achieving any obvious gains.

Australia had been extraordinarily successful in diversifying its exports in the face of China’s boycotts. China’s share of Australia’s exports dived from 42% in July 2021 to just 29% by August last year, where it has remained for the last four recorded months. Australia’s export earnings in the year to November of $585 billion were $200 billion, or 55%, higher than in the 12 months before China started rejecting Australian cargoes.

Before the boycotts, China was buying a third of Australia’s metallurgical coal and a quarter of its thermal coal. Australia was able to replace these markets entirely with additional sales to India, South Korea, Taiwan, Japan and the European Union. China was left facing episodic blackouts because of coal shortages, while the lifespan of its steel mills will have been reduced through the use of inferior coal for which they were not designed. One of the largest coalmining companies in Australia affected by the boycott was Yancoal, which is majority owned by a Chinese state-owned company.

Other commodities like cotton and barley were able to diversify similarly despite China having taken the lion’s share of their sales before the boycott. Wine and lobster were among the few industries that were really hurt.

There are many differences between Australia and South Korea, but it’s possible that the export sectors targeted by China have less political sway in Australia than do the chaebol conglomerates in Korea. While there were some grumbles from Fortescue Metals Group founder Andrew Forrest, there was little concerted pushback from the Australian resources and rural sectors over government policy towards China, which was increasingly dominated by security considerations.

In an increasingly fractious world marked by economic hostilities, the lessons from the Australian experience would appear to be that:

  • faced with coercion, a country may have success if security policy assumes priority over economic policy
  • commodity markets are enormously flexible, making it hard to sanction them—as Europe has shown over Russian gas and as Russia may yet show over its oil
  • branded products, such as wine, are more vulnerable
  • sanctions can hurt the country inflicting them
  • a little bit of leverage, as Australia may be demonstrating over China’s mooted application to join the CPTPP, can go a long way when it affects the interests of great powers.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/h...withstood Chinas campaign of economic warfare
 
9ran8620187_0004.t633b9461.m2400.xoRtUv12DVf0oJbtR.webp

Much has been written on the importance of guided weapons and ensuring conflicts aren’t lost through a shortage of ammunition. Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles’s observation about the need for ‘impactful projection’ implies that the Australian Defence Force’s firepower will be increased, and the intent to manufacture advanced guided weapons in Australia is a welcome development.
In 1995, the Royal Australian Navy possessed 368 missile cells on its major surface combatants. By 2020, that had reduced to 208, a 43% reduction in firepower. It will take until 2045 for the navy to get back up to its 1995 capacity. From 2050 it will plateau at 432, a net increase of 64 cells.
How did this happen, and how many is enough?
Figure 1: Number of missile cells on RAN major surface combatants, 1995 to 2060
230216-Shackleton-Figure-1-1024x571.webp

After World War II, guided missiles progressively became the primary armament of large warships and countering saturation attacks was a priority. From the late 1970s, the US Navy designed ships around the Aegis combat system. The Arleigh Burke–class guided missile destroyer (DDG) reflects current best practice with 96 cells, and Japan and Korea have adopted the same philosophy. China has a slightly larger ship with 128 cells.
The US Navy uses advanced modelling to assess its needs against a changing threat. That has led to it having more advanced combat systems and heavily armed ships with fast missile launch rates. Large warships in the European region are less well armed than their Pacific counterparts. That might be due to generally shorter transit requirements, timelier logistics support lines, and the proximity of land-based air cover. Conditions in the Pacific are much less accommodating and Australia can’t ignore geographic realities.
The RAN was fully aware of this evolution in naval warfare when the air warfare destroyer program was announced in the 2000 defence white paper, producing the Aegis-equipped Hobart class. Plans for a new, larger frigate to replace the Anzac class were incorporated in the 2009 defence white paper, which warned of increased regional security risks, a mantra repeated in the 2013 and 2016 policy papers. The 2018 decision to acquire a British-designed warship requiring a wholesale change of its combat system, sensors and weapons, and fitting it only with 32 missile cells, appears irrational.
Guided weapons continue to increase in lethality, speed, range and accuracy. Their evolution follows the classic cycle of matching, neutralising and further enhancing their features. It’s an endless journey. It’s imperative for naval guided weapons to contribute to joint ‘all arms’ warfare. The US Navy’s soon-to-be-introduced hypersonic guided missile is being developed in concert with the US Army.
Standardisation, where sensible, offers considerable operational and other benefits, not least of which are resupply availability and cost.
Notwithstanding the desire for commonality and for a one-size-fits-all solution, that ambition remains out of reach. From announcements in the public domain, the RAN already operates or will acquire:
  • the SM-2 (Standard Missile 2) for long-range air and missile defence
  • the SM-6 which has a longer range than the SM-2 and can be used for the same role as well as ballistic missile interception. SM-6 might replace SM-2
  • the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM) for shorter-range air and missile defence
  • the Tomahawk cruise missile for long-range land and anti-shipping attack
  • the NSM (naval strike missile), a medium-range anti-ship missile with a land-attack capability (replacing the Harpoon missile).
Except for the NSM, which is carried in a deck-mounted cannister launcher, these missiles are stored in a strike-length Mk41 vertical launcher system (VLS) module allowing a ship to use different missiles in unpredictable circumstances. The ESSM is small enough for a cell to carry four, but the others occupy a full cell each. It’s suggested that the US Navy’s future large surface combatant, the DDG(X), which is expected to have 128 cells, might also require a larger cell capable of launching hypersonic land-attack missiles now under development.
By 2006, when the RAN’s final Anzac frigate, HMAS Perth, was commissioned, the class had 64 cells, but the ESSMs they contained were to be used for self-defence. In the interim, two of six older Perry-class ships were decommissioned to provide funds to upgrade the remaining four, including adding eight VLS cells. That gave each ship 48 cells, and an improved capability with the longer-range SM-2. After modernisation, the Perry class went from six ships to four, but the total number of cells went from 240 to 192.
HMAS Hobart, the first of the RAN’s three DDGs, entered service in 2015. Its Aegis combat system was matched to a 48-cell VLS, giving a class capacity of 144 cells. Some cells in a Hobart-class DDG can be used for ESSMs (for example, eight cells could carry 32 missiles). But the 40 remaining cells would limit the SM-2s it could carry to the same number, or fewer, if the ship embarked Tomahawks or SM-6s. Operational judgements, which might be compromises, are necessary.
In 1995, the RAN operated three guided missile destroyers, six guided missile frigates and the first of eight smaller frigates, with 368 missile cells in all, the most it has ever possessed. By 2020, the combined effect of several force structure changes meant that across its fleet of eight Anzac-class and three Hobart-class surface combatants, the RAN could provide only 208 cells.
Australia failed to comprehend the fundamental link between firepower and the number of surface combatants—and that it takes decades to overcome deficiencies.
Changing the RAN’s force structure where its major surface combatants (and submarines) are concerned always has very long-term implications for the nation and for the options available to the government.
The eight Anzac frigates are to be progressively replaced from around 2032 by nine Hunter frigates, which are expected to have 32 VLS cells accompanied by deck-mounted cannisters for eight surface-to-surface and land-attack missiles. At an estimated 10,000 tonnes, these ships will be about 3,000 tonnes heavier than the Hobart class but have 16 fewer cells. They’ll be slightly larger than the US Navy’s Arleigh Burkes, which have 64 more cells. The Hunters will become the RAN’s most numerous, but least well-armed surface combatants.
If 32 ESSMs are used for self-defence, they would take up eight of the Hunter’s cells. Operational judgements will again have to be made as to which missiles will be loaded into the remaining 24 cells. For instance, two Tomahawks might be needed against some land targets, but how many are to be attacked? And then there’s the question of longer-range air and missile defence, usually requiring two missiles per target for a probable kill.
Even with advanced digital phased-array radars, sophisticated networking and weapon-management capabilities, the RAN’s small number of surface combatants will make the missile shortage more acute when facing a determined opponent.
That the US, Japan and Korea can fit 96 cells into a Hunter-sized ship raises the question of why that’s not being done for the RAN.
The same loss of firepower in the submarine force might become evident if the transition to nuclear-powered boats suffers serious setbacks. The RAN’s primary combat power comes from its surface combatants and its submarines. It’s not a case of choosing one or the other. Australia needs both.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/r...r&utm_term=Rearming the Royal Australian Navy
AUTHOR
David Shackleton is a retired vice admiral and former chief of the Royal Australian Navy. Image: Department of Defence.
 
On February 27, 2023, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced the consent of the US State Department for the potential sale to Australia of a batch of several dozen anti-radiation missiles with extended range AGM-88G AARGM-ER (Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range) for up to USD 503 million. If the deal goes through, Australia will become the first user of this latest weapon system.

aargm-er.webp
 
On February 27, 2023, the US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced the consent of the US State Department for the potential sale to Australia of a batch of several dozen anti-radiation missiles with extended range AGM-88G AARGM-ER (Advanced Anti-Radiation Guided Missile-Extended Range) for up to USD 503 million. If the deal goes through, Australia will become the first user of this latest weapon system.

View attachment 424464
Up to 63 warshots plus 20 training rounds ?
 
I am assuming that these mines will (among other things) be submarine deployable.
I'd hope they have considered copying drug 'submarines' as unmanned, to deploy these.
 
Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) has signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Australian defense company Daronmont Technologies, to deliver advanced air and missile defence capabilities as part of the Australian Ministry of Defense Tender (AIR-6502) for the procurement of defence systems and other Australian Defense Forces (ADF) programs. The agreement was signed at the AVALON Australian International Airshow.

IAI will leverage Daronmont's proven integration, development and manufacturing capabilities as part of its broad Australian Industry Capability (AIC) strategy to deliver the combat proven BARAK-MX Air and Missile Defense (AMD) system, to provide effective defense to the ADF and Australian national assets, and rapid initial operational capability.

IAI's Barak-MX Air & Missile Defense System is an advanced operational air defense system, used by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) naval forces and the Indian land, naval and air forces as well as with other forces worldwide. The system provides both wide-area and targeted defense capabilities against a wide span of threats. Barak-MX includes several key systems including AESA radar, weapon control system, launchers, and a interceptors for different ranges as well as advanced radar seeker, datalink communications and system-wide connectivity.

IAI EVP and GM,Systems, Missiles & Space Group Guy Bar Lev said, "We are honored to be partnering with Daronmont to offer the Australian MOD Barak-MX defense system, one of the world’s most-advanced air-defense solutions. The Barak family includes various range interceptors, and combines the capability to intercept various air defense threats from both naval and land platforms.

Daronmont Technologies CEO Ben Norris added, "We’re looking forward to developing our AIC partnership with IAI and working together to deliver a state-of-the-art solution designed to address the capability gap in medium-range ground-based air-defence, should the (Australian) Ministry of Defence choose IAI to deliver AIR-6502."
1679054133484.webp

https://en.globes.co.il/en/article-...h-australian-co-on-missile-defense-1001441199
 
The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to the Government of Australia of Tomahawk Block V and Block IV All Up Rounds

(AUR) and related equipment for an estimated cost of $895 million. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale today.

The Government of Australia has requested to buy up to two hundred (200) Tomahawk Block V All Up Rounds (AUR) (RGM-109E); and up to twenty (20) Tomahawk Block IV All Up Rounds (AUR) (RGM-109E). Also included is support for all three segments of Australia’s Tomahawk Weapon System (TWS) to include the All Up Round (AUR), the Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System (TTWCS) and the Theater Mission Planning Center (TMPC). The support consists of unscheduled missile maintenance; spares; procurement; training; in-service support; software; hardware; communication equipment; operational flight test; engineering and technical expertise to maintain the TWS capability; and other related elements of logistical and program support. The estimated total cost is $895 million.
https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/australia-tomahawk-weapon-system

Australia said a deal to buy 220 US Tomahawk cruise missiles was essential for keeping “adversaries at bay” Friday, as Canberra ratchets up defense spending to counter growing Chinese military clout. Defense industry minister Pat Conroy said the potent long-range weapons would be deployed first to existing surface ships and later to a new fleet of nuclear-powered submarines.
 
On March 20, 2023, the Prime Minister of the Australian state of Queensland, Annastacia Palaszczuk, took part in the inauguration of the first welding of components for the production of Boxer CRV (Combat Reconnaissance Vehicle) at the Rheinmetall Military Vehicle Center of Excellence (MILVEHCOE) in Redbank near Brisbane, Queensland.

Together with Deputy Prime Minister Dr. Steven Miles, Australian industry partners including Bisalloy, Marand, Intellidesign and 600 Rheinmetall employees in Queensland, vehicles have begun production for the Mounted Combat Reconnaissance Capability Land 400 Phase 2 program for the Australian Army as successors to the aging ASLAV-25 (Australian Light Armored Vehicle).

RheinmetallAustralia_25Boxer_00.webp


Thus, Rheinmetall has started the production of the second batch of 186 Boxer CRV combat reconnaissance vehicles for the Australian Defense Force (ADF), which is to last until 2026. Between September 24, 2019 and June 2, 2021, a batch of the first 25 vehicles was handed over to the ordering party as part of the first stage program, but the vehicles came from a German production line overseen by the ARTEC (ARmoured vehicle TEChnology) consortium, composed of Rheinmetall AG and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW). On October 15, 2022, the Australian Army announced Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of its new combat vehicles).
Nathan Poyner, managing director of Rheinmetall Defense Australia, commenting on the deliveries of the first 25 Boxer CRVs from Germany (retrofitted with MILVEHCOE), emphasized that the Australian plant has delivered over 2,900 RMMV HX trucks to ADF, which are currently serviced there.
 
As reported on March 6, 2023 by the Australian daily The Australian Financial Review, the government in Canberra is negotiating probably the most lucrative export contract with an estimated value of up to AUD 3 billion with the German federal government for the production and delivery of hundreds of Boxer AFV (Armoured Fighting Vehicle) vehicles, which are manufactured under the German license of the Rheinmetall AG group in Queensland.

maxresdefault.jpg

Intergovernmental talks are to be at an advanced stage. The Australian side declares that if the export contract is finalized, deliveries to Germany could start as early as 2024. German purchases are related to the ongoing Russian aggression against Ukraine, which has demolished the existing security architecture in Europe and be part of Chancellor Olaf's Scholz announcement last year of a multi-year fund increasing defense spending by a total of EUR 100 billion.
 
Last edited:
Australian defence force personnel have been rescued after an army helicopter crashed into the ocean off the New South Wales south coast during a routine counter-terrorism training exercise.

The 10 soldiers were plucked from the water after the Army MRH-90 Taipan multi-role helicopter ditched into the water near Jervis Bay on Wednesday night.

Two of the crew sustained minor injuries from the crash that occurred just after 9pm.

“All 10 Australian defence force personnel on board the aircraft have been recovered and accounted for and are being assessed by medical personnel at HMAS Creswell, south of Nowra, NSW,” an ADF statement said.

The chief of army, Lt Gen Simon Stuart, thanked emergency responders for their quick action.

“Tonight quick responses from ADF personnel and emergency services and well drilled teams prevented a potential tragedy,” Stuart said.

“We will conduct a thorough investigation into this incident to determine the cause and ensure the platform remains safe to operate.”

The ADF has temporarily paused the training activity and will ground the MRH-90 Taipan fleet while the cause of the incident is investigated.
1680088701992.webp

https://www.theguardian.com/austral...a-after-army-helicopter-crash-near-jervis-bay
 

AWMC290067.webp

One of the most used quotes in support of the argument that the Australia Defence Force has no need for tanks in future structures is that they’re surplus to requirements because, in part, they haven’t been deployed since the Vietnam War. This is an oft-repeated line run by commentators in two of our major newspapers, the Sydney Morning Herald and The Australian. It is also a factoid employed in articles hosted by SBS and a range of other media outlets.

At its heart though, it is a nonsensical argument. If we were to use the ‘hasn’t been employed since Vietnam’ as the metric for the utility of defence platforms, there are a whole raft of other ones whose continued relevance would be open to discussion.

An anniversary marked this week provides a particularly good example of why the Vietnam metric is so lacking in intellectual rigour. Seventy years ago, on 27 March 1953, was the last time an Australian military aircraft was involved in air-to-air combat. If the half-century since an Australian tank fired a shot in anger is considered Exhibit A in the case against them, what are we to make of the seven decades and billions of dollars that we’ve spent on an air-to-air combat capability that we’ve never had to use?

And taking the ‘use it or lose it’ argument to its logical conclusion, what should the general public think about the eye-watering cost of our new nuclear submarines come April when it will be 108 years since a Royal Australian Navy submarine last launched a torpedo in anger? Yes, you heard correctly—108 years.

Of course, I’m not questioning the utility of submarines or combat aircraft or tanks as part of a robust ADF. Rather, this is an appeal to those who seek to influence public debate to avoid the pitfalls inherent in declaring capabilities obsolete simply because they were last used in the Vietnam War. Australian artillery hasn’t fired a shot in anger since Vietnam (although Australian gunners served with UK gun batteries in Afghanistan), yet the US’s use of artillery to support the Syrian Democratic Forces in defeating Islamic State in Syria and the difficulties in keeping up the supply of ammunition to Ukraine shows how critical tubed artillery remains on the modern battlefield.

Time alone doesn’t consign a capability to the scrapheap. Technological advances may do so, or the nature of conflict itself. But often those facts are only known once a conflict has commenced and the adversaries’ capabilities become known. Which is why predicting the obsolescence of a capability is so difficult, and why the various sages who seek to do so would do well to buttress their arguments with a deeper level of analysis about scenarios in which capabilities are, or are not, likely to be used. Of all the arguments as to why a capability is no longer required, temporal distance from the last time it was used is often the weakest.

So, when the defence strategic review is published and the impact on the defence budget of the AUKUS submarine project is better understood, it would be good if the commentariat could discuss the pros and cons of various capabilities that the ADF may require in the future without referencing the Vietnam War. Some capabilities, after all, retain their utility regardless of when they were last used.

Rodger Shanahan is a former Australian Army officer and Middle East analyst
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/d...ility and the not used since Vietnam critique
 
20221111ran8625149_0452.webp

After decades of gradual military build-up by China, territorial disputes with China and Russia, and increasing concern about North Korea’s missile-strike capability, Japan is once again reinventing itself and rapidly moving from the pacifist stance it has embraced since the end of World War II. Recent geostrategic instability has also accelerated this shift. It is central to US plans in the Indo-Pacific to retain the strategic advantage by bringing Japan and Australia into a deeper interoperable trilateral relationship—the northern and southern anchors for a free and open Indo-Pacific.

The Japanese government has embraced this and has been unusually frank about its desire to lift military cooperation with Australia to unprecedented levels in coming years. There’s also a growing interest in adding new layers to the defence and security relationship, including in defence industry cooperation; research on and development of critical and emerging technologies; and cooperation in cybersecurity, energy security and renewables.

The Australian Defence Force and the Japan Self-Defense Forces have developed an impressive series of exercises that are now second only to Australia’s exercises with the US as far as depth and frequency go. This is very encouraging and important to help build interoperability, trust and people-to-people connections. Australia’s defence and national security ‘Japan watchers’ (unfortunately still a small group) will agree that this level of cooperation and engagement was unthinkable even just a decade ago—a short time in international relationship development.

Things are moving in the right direction and the policy and technical foundations have been laid, most recently with the signing of the Australia–Japan reciprocal access agreement. The agreement is important for increasing training and exercising between the JSDF and the ADF and could enable the JSDF to conduct unilateral training in Australia. It complements other arrangements between the two countries, such as the sharing of classified information and the reciprocal provision of supplies and services for exercises and training, UN peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, transportation of nationals and others in overseas exigencies.

Since the end of World War II, peacetime for Japan and a pacifist constitution have meant that the JSDF hasn’t engaged in actual warfighting for almost 80 years. That’s a long time for a military not to have the experience to help hone its tactics, techniques and procedures; for officers to develop battle experience and leadership; for soldiers to develop skills and combat techniques and to test equipment; and for the government to manage public reaction to personnel being involved in a conflict.

The JSDF has been involved in various peacekeeping, capacity-building and humanitarian missions, including with the ADF in Iraq from 2004 to 2006. However, as any military expert will tell you, this is not the same, and the JSDF now urgently needs to increase its combined arms training. Training and multinational experience are mandatory for success in a rapidly deteriorating Indo-Pacific.

The Northern Territory offers arguably the best location in the region to meet the JSDF’s training needs. There are alternative training sites on the US mainland; however, most experts agree that they don’t offer the unique characteristics found at training areas in the Northern Territory. No other location offers the opportunities for multi-domain training across air, land, sea, space and cyberspace available in the Northern Territory.

The territory has four key training areas that are already used for a range of annual training serials between the ADF and the US military—primarily the US marines and air force. The hard infrastructure at the heart of this hub are the Bradshaw and Delamere training ranges, which together form one of the largest training areas in the world. Bradshaw, for example, is almost three times the size of the US Army National Training Center and more than three and a half times as big as the US Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center. The ranges are in sparsely populated areas, are close to Asia and potential future areas of operations, and have no commercial overflight and therefor no altitude restrictions for aircraft and long-range rockets. They also have little to no electromagnetic interference, which helps with testing sensors, electronic-warfare capabilities and next-generation platforms.

In addition to supporting the JSDF’s training requirements, there’s great potential to deepen the Australia–Japan–US relationship and develop a multinational amphibious unit based in the Northern Territory. Given the US marines’ established presence in the Northern Territory, this is a natural next step. It would also be useful for coordinating with other regional partners and allies for amphibious training and in activities such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

It’s important that Australia capitalise on the momentum the reciprocal access agreement brings to its relationship with Japan by develop joint training opportunities in partnership with the JSDF. The Australian government should be—and may well already be—providing Japan with specific proposals for getting the JSDF to Australia routinely and perhaps in the future a modest permanent presence embedded with the ADF (as with the US marines in Darwin).

In this growing and important defence relationship, an immediate practical step could be establishing a JSDF liaison office at Robertson Barracks in Darwin along with increasing JSDF secondments to other ADF units and at the ADF headquarters in Canberra. Longer term (but not too distant), the Australian government should develop a permanent Japan–Australia military training initiative in the Northern Territory along similar lines to the longstanding Australia–Singapore training initiative based in central and northern Queensland.

The training areas in Queensland are owned and managed by the Australian government, but Singapore has a significant investment in developing and enhancing them to help meet the future needs of the ADF and facilitate an increased in Singapore Armed Forces personnel training in Australia. When the initiative reaches maturity, up to 14,000 Singapore Armed Forces personnel will train in Queensland for up to a total of 18 weeks split into two nine-week periods each year. A similar arrangement could easily be established in the Top End.

There will be political and public-perception hurdles to overcome on both sides, but now is the time to be thinking boldly.

Guy Boekenstein has spent more than two decades working in the Indo-Pacific region in the defence and national security sector, including diplomatic postings to Indonesia and Japan.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/t...stralia defence cooperation to the next level
 

Similar threads

Back
Top