Book Mark E. Stille Leyte Gulf

[Nansouty]

This recent work – 2022 – seeks to "demystify" the battle and uncover the various command errors that, on both sides, gave it its distinctive character. On the Japanese side, the weaknesses of the Sho Go plan are obvious: at best, the armored pincers would have closed only on freighters long since unloaded, before having to give way and allow their replacements to resupply the landing force. But strategic realities and a sense of samurai honor dictated that something had to be done, because losing the Philippines meant losing the war. On the US side, the command structure—no subordination between the 5th Fleet (Halsey) and 7th Fleet (Kinkaid)—explains a lack of direct communications that led to the absence of surveillance of the San Bernardino Strait, the demarcation between the two forces zones of operations. And much of the blame falls on Kinkaid, who failed to ensure, when he could have, that the strait was empty. Halsey, for his part, could have kept one of his CV Task Forces in place, that had been sent to resupply at Ulithi, so that the attack Kurita's forces in the Sibuyan Sea on October 23 would have been all the more significant. The book also places the battle in a broader operational context (the importance of the air battle off Formosa, which decimated the Kido Butai flotillas, and the continuation of naval operations in the archipelago) and emphasizes its decisive strategic significance: in good Mahanian doctrine, the irremediable destruction of his main battlegroup shattered the teeth of a Japanese navy that its enemy no longer had to fear, even as a "fleet in being." It is also teeming with technical notes and provides an excellent cross-checking of the phases of the battle, like many others. Finally, from a historiographical perspective, this reading highlights the quality of Morrison's work, which it does not fundamentally contradict, despite the fact that it was written in the heat of the moment.